Regulation of Microfinance Institutions in Developing countries: an incentives theory approach

We analyze the optimal policy of regulation of microfinance institutions in developing countries, where investment funds are insured by the government and customer deposits. We used a mixed model, combining adverse selection and moral hazard to characterize a class of optimal incentive schemes applied in presence of government funds and in non-government funded. We also analyse the effects of prudential regulation of deposits on the profitability of MFI and social welfare, and we compare prudential and non-prudential regulation. The incentive scheme that we propose can be regarded as a "smart subsidy" mechanism that contributes to the economic and social development

Incentives, Supervision and Regulation of Microfinance Institutions in the developing countries

We analyze the optimal regulation of a MFI that has private information on the intrinsic quality of its loan portfolio (adverse selection) and where the MFI’s choice of effort to improve this quality cannot be observed by the regulator (moral hazard). In designing optimal contracts the regulator faces a tradeoff between inducing proper incentives for efficient MFI and costs of regulation in terms of leaving an informational rent for a high quality MFI. We identify conditions for the optimal incentive contract and show that, not surprisingly, these contracts depend on the accuracy of the supervisor’s signal, the likelihood of facing a high quality MFI, and the cost of supervision. However, since improving the accuracy of supervision is costly, even in the optimal monitoring scheme there generally exists a positive probability of MFI failure. The content of information disclosure is characterized by the optimal monitoring scheme

Regulation and supervision of microfinance institutions: an example of cooperative credit society

We study the optimal regulation of a cooperative credit society which has private information on the intrinsic quality of its loan portfolio (adverse selection) and where the cooperative’s choice of effort to improve this quality cannot be observed by the regulator (moral hazard). We characterize the optimal contracts offered by the regulator to the credit cooperatives. We have been able to show that the optimal contracts depend on 3 main factors namely: on the accuracy of the supervisor’s signal, the likelihood of facing a high quality credit cooperative, and the cost of supervision

Regulation and supervision of microfinance institutions: an example of cooperative credit society

We study the optimal regulation of a cooperative credit society which has private information on the intrinsic quality of its loan portfolio (adverse selection) and where the cooperative’s choice of effort to improve this quality cannot be observed by the regulator (moral hazard). We characterize the optimal contracts offered by the regulator to the credit cooperatives. We have been able to show that the optimal contracts depend on 3 main factors namely: on the accuracy of the supervisor’s signal, the likelihood of facing a high quality credit cooperative, and the cost of supervision

Méthodes de Privatisation des Entreprises Publiques en Afrique Sub-Saharienne : une analyse théorique

In this article, we analyze the process of privatization of state-owned enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa. When the possible investors are not able to finance with their own funds the acquisition of public companies, the financing by the State-seller is a method relevant taking into account the objectives and constraints of the situation in Africa. We propose a particularly method of privatization via auctions, where potentials investors submits a bid with equity shares and debt shares. In this case, the government has two objectives : maximization of revenue and maximization of the efficiency. We show that the properties of this method of privatization rest mainly on the shares debt/equity. The revenue maximization is contraditory to efficiency objectives.

Analyse de la performance du secteur agricole et son impact sur la croissance économique du Sénégal

Cet article analyse l'importance du rôle de l'agriculture dans le développement du Sénégal au cours des dernières années. Plus particulièrement, il étudie l'impact des différents programmes qui ont été mis en oeuvre pour la relance du secteur agricole. En utilisant un Model dynamique Auto régressif à retards échelonnés (ARDL), nous observons que la production agricole a un impact positif et significatif sur la croissance économique du Sénégal aussi bien à court qu'à long terme. Cependant, la performance de l'agriculture comme levier de croissance reste relativement faible. Ce résultat met en évidence la nécessité d'adapter les programmes agricoles pour le développement pour une croissance socio-économique soutenable