Wholly owned subsidiary versus technology licensing in the worldwide chemical industry.

This paper empirically analyzes the determinants of the choice between wholly owned subsidiary and technology licensing as a strategy for expansion abroad. We use a new and comprehensive database on worldwide plant level investments in the chemical industry during the 1981-1991 period. We find that both cultural distance and the presence of other potential licensors favor the use of licensing as a strategy for expanding abroad, whereas, prior experience favors the choice of wholly owned subsidiary. An implication of this study is that competition in the market for technology can foster the international diffusion of technology through the use of arm's length agreements.Strategic planning; Licensing; Globalization; Foreign investment; Chemical industry;

Pricing Diagnostic Information.

Diagnostic information allows an agent to predict the state of nature about the success of an investment project better than the prior. We analyze the optimal pricing scheme for selling diagnostic information to buyers with different, privately known, ex ante success probability. Investment costs and returns of successful projects are assumed to be the same for all buyers. The value of diagnostic information is the difference in expected payoffs with and without it, and we show that the willingness to pay for diagnostic information is nonmonotonic in the ex ante success probability. When the information seller can offer only one quality level, and negative payments are not allowed, we find that the optimal menu of (linear) contracts is remarkably simple. A pure royalty is offered to buyers with low ex ante success probability, and a pure fixed fee is offered to buyers with high ex ante success probability.Pricing; Diagnostic information; Marketing research;

Markets for technology (why do we see them, why don't we see more of them and why we should care)

This essay explores the nature, the functioning, and the economic and policy implications of markets for technology. Today, the outsourcing of research and development activities is more common than in the past, and specialized technology suppliers have emerged in many industries. In a sense, the Schumpeterian vision of integrating R&D with manufacturing and distribution is being confronted by the older Smithian vision of division of labor. The existence and efficacy of markets for technology can profoundly influence the creation and diffusion of new knowledge, and hence, economic growth of countries and the competitive position of companies. The economic and managerial literatures have touched upon some aspects of the nature of these markets. However, a thorough understanding of how markets for technology work is still lacking. In this essay we address two main questions. First, what are the factors that enable a market for technology to exist and function effectively? Specifically we look at the role of industry structure, the nature of knowledge, and intellectual property rights and related institutions. Second, we ask what the implications of such markets are for the boundaries of the firm, the specialization and division of labor in the economy, industry structure, and economic growth. We build on this discussion to develop the implications of our work for public policy and corporate strategy

Specialized technology suppliers, international spillovers and investment: evidence from the chemical industry.

In this paper we study how the development of specialized upstream technology suppliers in leading countries improves technology access and lowers investment costs for downstream firms in follower countries. We test this idea using a novel database covering all investments in chemical plants in less developed countries ŽLDCs. during the 1980s. We find that investments in chemical plants in the LDCs are greater, the greater is the number of technology suppliers that operate in the first world. A major contribution of this paper is to identify an important but understudied mechanism through which technology is made available.Market for technology; Specialization; Technology supply; Investment; Chemical industry;

Markets for Technology and Their Implications for Corporate Strategy.

Although market transactions for technologies, ideas, knowledge or information are limited by several well-known imperfections, there is evidence that they have become more common than in the past. In this paper we analyze how the presence of markets for technology conditions the technology and corporate strategy of firms. The first and most obvious implication is that markets for technology increase the strategy space: firms can choose to license in the technology instead of developing it in-house or they can choose to license out their technology instead of (or in addition to) investing in the downstream assets needed to manufacture and commercialize the goods. The implications for management include more proactive management of intellectual property, greater attention to external monitoring of technologies, and organizational changes to support technology licensing, joint-ventures and acquisition of external technology. For entrepreneurial startups, markets for technology make a focused business model more attractive. At the industry level, markets for technology may lower barriers to entry and increase competition, with important implications for the firms' broader strategy as well.

Markets for technology in the knowledge economy.

The focus of this research has been the study of the nature and functioning of markets for technologyStrategic planning; Technological planning; Organizational change; Research & development;

Licensing in the presence of competing technologies

In technology-based industries, many incumbent fIrms license their technology to other fIrms that will potentially compete with them. Such a strategy is diffIcult to explain within traditional models of licensing. This paper extends the literature on licensing by relaxing the widespread assumption of a "unique" technology holder. We develop a model with many technological trajectories for the production of a differentiated good. We fmd that competition in the market for technology induces licensing of innovations, and that the number of licenses can be ineffIciently large. A strong testable implication of our theory is that the number of licenses per patent holder decreases with the degree of product differentiation

The market for technology in the chemical industry: causes and consequences

The chemical industry provides a good example of the existence and functioning of a market for technology. This paper suggests that, in chemicals, patents have played a key role in facilitating the purchase and sale of technology. However, patents alone would not be sufficient for the rise of a market for technology. We suggest that the presence of specialized engineering firms has contributed to make chemical technology more widespread and has forced the large chemical corporations to modify their technology strategies. Empirical evidence is provided using a large database on worldwide investments in chemical plants during the 1980s.Financial support from the The European Commission throught the TSER program, contact SOE1-CT97-1059Publicad

Pricing Diagnostic Information

Diagnostic information allows an agent to predict the state of nature about the success of an investment project better than the prior. We analyze the optimal pricing scheme for selling diagnostic information to buyers with different, privately known, ex ante success probability. Investment costs and returns of successful projects are assumed to be the same for all buyers. The value of diagnostic information is the difference in expected payoffs with and without it, and we show that the willingness to pay for diagnostic information is non monotonic in the ex ante success probability. When the information seller can offer only one quality level, and negative payments are not allowed, we find that the optimal menu of (linear) contracts is remarkably simple. A pure royalty is offered to buyers with low ex ante success probability and a pure fixed fee is offered to buyers with high ex ante success probability

Wholly owned subsidiary versus technology licensing in the worldwide chemical industry

This paper empirically analyzes the determinants of the choice between wholly owned subsidiary and technology licensing as a strategy for expansion abroad. We use a new and comprehensive database on worldwide plant level investments in the chemical industry during the 1981-1991 period. We find that both cultural distance and the presence of other potential licensors favor the use of licensing as a strategy for expanding abroad, whereas, prior experience favors the choice of wholly owned subsidiary. An implication of this study is that competition in the market for technology can foster the international diffusion of technology through the use of arm's length agreements.Financial support from the European Union through the TSER project No. SOE1- CT97-1059Publicad