Fidelity to Natural Law and Natural Rights in Constitutional Interpretation

It is an honor and a pleasure to comment on Professor Robert P. George\u27s elegant and provocative paper.\u27 For one thing, he is a leading proponent of reviving the natural law tradition in political, legal, and constitutional theory.2 For another, he was a reader of my Ph.D. dissertation in constitutional theory at Princeton University over a decade ago. I am happy to have the chance to reciprocate by reading a work of his and providing a critique of it. Fortunately, I learned at Princeton that vigorous criticism and disagreement are fully compatible with friendship and respect

Named relations: A universal in the pragmatics of reference within the kin group

Anthropolog

A/C Energy Management and Vehicle Cabin Thermal Comfort Control

This paper introduces a novel multi-objective controller which regulates A/C system operation in a trade-off between vehicle cabin comfort and fuel consumption for a conventional vehicle with internal combustion engine. The controller has been developed and tested in a simulated environment, where an energy-based model of the A/C system is combined with a thermal dynamic model of the cabin which considers heat transfer to the environment. The control algorithm proposed herein is compared with two widely used control techniques in the industry, respectively the thermostat and PI control, under different driving cycles. This novel method is implementable in real-time, and simulation results show a reduction of up to 2% in A/C system fuel consumption compared to existing methods with similar thermal performance

Introduction, Symposium on Ronald Dworkin\u27s Religion Without God

Boston University School of Law and the Boston University Law Review are proud to publish this Symposium on Dworkin’s final book, Religion Without God (Harvard University Press, 2013), as a sequel to our 2009 Symposium on his Justice for Hedgehogs. The Symposium includes an introduction and eulogy by James E. Fleming and contributions by a number of the most distinguished scholars of law and religion in the United States and the United Kingdom: Jeremy Waldron, Stephen L. Carter, Paul Horwitz, Andrew Koppelman, Cécile Laborde, Linda C. McClain, Micah Schwartzman, and Steven D. Smith

DISCOVERY

Parties litigant desire to obtain before trial all possible information relevant to the matter in issue. Obviously their opponents possess much of this information but are usually reluctant to divulge it. If the production of such information is compelled, however, this will frequently result in promptly clearing up those issues in the case concerning which there can be no bona fide controversy, thus saving time and cost both to the parties and to the state. Moreover such compulsion may tend to prevent substantial injustice to the party seeking information in the exclusive possession of his opponent. Both these results are desirable. But other considerations of equal social import render it undesirable to enable a party to find out before trial all that his adversary knows about the case. One problem is therefore to ascertain the extent to which discovery should be allowed, in order best to promote its usefulness without violating the latter considerations. The other problem is to find the machinery best adapted to obtain production of information, or documents, to the extent found desirable. This article aims to deal with these two problems and with a view to their solution attempts a sur- vey and examination of the existing statutes and decisions on the subject

Necessary and Indispensable Parties

In this article we shall consider who are necessary and indispensable parties. These terms are words of art. Necessary parties are those who must be included in an action either as plaintiffs or defendants unless there is a valid excuse for their non-joinder. Probably it would be better to call such parties conditionally necessary, but the shorter term will be used here to conform to general modern usage. Indispensable parties are those who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward. No excuse will be accepted for their non-joinder

The Unnecessary and Unfortunate Focus on “Animus,” “Bare Desire to Harm,” and “Bigotry” in Analyzing Opposition to Gay and Lesbian Rights

I am delighted to participate in this symposium on Professor Linda C. McClain’s wonderful new book, Who’s the Bigot? Learning from Conflicts over Marriage and Civil Rights Law. All of the other papers in this symposium focus on Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (and thus connect with Chapter Eight of her book, on claims of religious exemptions from protections of gay and lesbian rights), while my piece will join issue with the related Chapter Seven, on bigotry, motives, and morality in the Supreme Court’s gay and lesbian rights cases. In this brief Essay, I cannot do justice to McClain’s rich, insightful, and illuminating treatment of bigotry. But I can offer some thoughts on the unnecessary and unfortunate focus on “bigotry” in analyzing opposition to gay and lesbian rights that are deeply informed by and congruent with those in her book