14 research outputs found

    Considering clustering measures: third ties, means, and triplets

    Get PDF
    Measures that estimate the clustering coefficients of ego and overall social networks are important to social network studies. Existing measures differ in how they define and estimate triplet clustering with implications for how network theoretic properties are reflected. In this paper, we propose a novel definition of triplet clustering for weighted and undirected social networks that explicitly considers the relative strength of the tie connecting the two alters of the ego in the triplet. We argue that our proposed definition better reflects theorized effects of the important third tie in the social network literature. We also develop new methods for estimating triplet, local and global clustering. Three different types of mathematical means, i.e. arithmetic, geometric, and quadratic, are used to reflect alternative theoretical assumptions concerning the marginal effect of tie substitution

    Strategic action in network industries: an empirical analysis of the European mobile phone industry

    No full text
    This paper investigates the strategic moves of European mobile phone operators during the early development of the industry. Drawing on the literature on competitive dynamics and markets externalities, we study the strategic actions taken by mediators, i.e., firms based on a mediating technology such as phone operators (Organizations in Action, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967; Strat. Manage. J. 19(5) (1998) 413). As expected, market penetration, concentration, and time evolution drive the likelihood of inter-firm cooperation and the types of strategic action taken by firms in this network industry. The results confirm the unique characteristics of the value network configuration with regard to how mediators create value, the primary activities that they perform, and the combination of competitive and cooperative conduct in this type of industry

    Transaction organizations and transaction cost analysis: A theoretical investigation of the domain-expansion decisions of firms employing a mediating technology

    No full text
    We use the theory of network externalities in applying transaction cost economics (TCE) to inter-mediator transactions. We propose network specificity as an additional form of asset specificity associated with such transactions. Specifically, we identify and analyze two integration decisions that are distinctive to mediators and that both depend on network specificity: the network integration of nodes and the vertical integration of complement exchange activities. We derive some implications of this for managerial practice, public policy and further research.Transaction cost analysis Mediation industries Network externalities

    Strategic action in network industries: an empirical analysis of the European mobile phone industry

    No full text
    This paper investigates the strategic moves of European mobile phone operators during the early development of the industry. Drawing on the literature on competitive dynamics and markets externalities, we study the strategic actions taken by mediators, i.e., firms based on a mediating technology such as phone operators (Organizations in Action, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967; Strat. Manage. J. 19(5) (1998) 413). As expected, market penetration, concentration, and time evolution drive the likelihood of inter-firm cooperation and the types of strategic action taken by firms in this network industry. The results confirm the unique characteristics of the value network configuration with regard to how mediators create value, the primary activities that they perform, and the combination of competitive and cooperative conduct in this type of industry.Network industries Competitive dynamics Value-creation analysis

    Competition with local network externalities

    No full text
    Local network externalities are present when the utility of buying from a firm not only depends on the number of other customers (global network externalities), but also on their identity and / or characteristics. We explore the consequences of local network externalities within a framework where two firms compete offering differentiated products. We first show that local network externalities, in contrast to global network externalities, don't necessarily sharpen competition. Then we show that the equilibrium allocation is inefficient, in the sense that the allocation of consumers on firms does not maximize social surplus. Finally we show that local network externalities create a difference between the marginal and the average consumer, which gives rise to inefficiently high usage prices and too high level of compatibility between the networks
    corecore