Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

Preliminary estimates of the inspection effort to verify a Nuclear Material Cutoff Convention are presented. The estimates are based on (1) a database of about 650 facilities a total of eight states, i.e., the five nuclear-weapons states and three ``threshold`` states; (2) typical figures for inspection requirements for specific facility types derived from IAEA experience, where applicable; and (3) alternative estimates of inspection effort in cutoff options where full IAEA safeguards are not stipulated. Considerable uncertainty must be attached to the effort estimates. About 50--60% of the effort for each option is attributable to 16 large-scale reprocessing plants assumed to be in operation in the eight states; it is likely that some of these will be shut down by the time the convention enters into force. Another important question involving about one third of the overall effort is whether Euratom inspections in France and the U.K. could obviate the need for full-scale IAEA inspections at these facilities. Finally, the database does not yet contain many small-scale and military-related facilities. The results are therefore not presented as predictions but as the consequences of alternative assumptions. Despite the preliminary nature of the estimates, it is clear that a broad application of NPT-like safeguards to the eight states would require dramatic increases in the IAEA`s safeguards budget. It is also clear that the major component of the increased inspection effort would occur at large reprocessing plants (and associated plutonium facilities). Therefore, significantly bounding the increased effort requires a limitation on the inspection effort in these facility types

International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs

Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

Preliminary estimates of the inspection effort to verify a Nuclear Material Cutoff Convention are presented. The estimates are based on a database of about 650 facilities in a total of eight states, the five nuclear-weapons states and three ``threshold`` states plus facility-specific inspection requirements. Typical figures for inspection requirements for specific facility types derive from IAEA experience, where applicable. Alternative estimates of inspection effort are used in cutoff options where full IAEA safeguards are not stipulated

Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. We have examined safeguards approaches for a state nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the state. We have focussed on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches. Technical effectiveness, in these cases, means an estimate of the assurance that all nuclear material has been accounted for

Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

Preliminary estimates of the inspection effort to verify a Nuclear Material Cutoff Convention are presented. The estimates are based on a database of about 650 facilities in a total of eight states, the five nuclear-weapons states and three ``threshold`` states plus facility-specific inspection requirements. Typical figures for inspection requirements for specific facility types derive from IAEA experience, where applicable. Alternative estimates of inspection effort are used in cutoff options where full IAEA safeguards are not stipulated

Framework for fuel-cycle approaches to IAEA safeguards

A framework is presented for comparing various safeguards verification approaches which have been proposed for consideration. Each inventory change, inventory, and material balance for each nuclear facility, reported by a state, may be verified. Verification approaches are compared by listing which of these reports would be verified and to what degree for each approach as they might be applied to a state with a closed fuel cycle. The comparison indicates that the extended-material-balance-area (or zone), the information-correlation, and the randomization-over-facilities approaches make more efficient use of Agency resources than the facility-oriented approach for states with large nuclear power programs. In contrast, any advantages of randomizing inspections over inspection activities within facilities are, percentagewise, relatively independent of the size of a state's nuclear program

Assessing the effectiveness of safeguards at a medium-sized spent-fuel reprocessing facility

In order to evaluate carefully and systematically the effectiveness of safeguards at nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency has adopted a safeguards effectiveness assessment methodology. The methodology has been applied to a well-characterized, medium-sized, spent-fuel reprocessing plant to understand how explicit safeguards inspection procedures would serve to expose conceivable nuclear materials diversion schemes, should such diversion occur

DOE Lab-to-Lab MPC&A workshop for cooperative tasks with Russian institutes: Focus on critical assemblies and item facilities

Seventeen Russian scientists and engineers representing five different institutes participated in a Workshop on material control and accounting as part of the US-Russian Lab-to-Lab Cooperative Program in Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A). In addition to presentations and discussions, the Workshop included an exercise at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) and demonstrations at the Zero Power Physics Reactor (critical-assembly facility) of Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-W). The Workshop particularly emphasized procedures for physical inventory-taking at critical assemblies and item facilities, with associated supporting techniques and methods. By learning these topics and applying the methods and experience at their own institutes, the Russian scientists and engineers will be able to determine and verify nuclear material inventories based on sound procedures, including measurements. This will constitute a significant enhancement to MPC&A at the Russian institutes

Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification