Mad Dog Nativism

In his recent book, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, Jerry Fodor retracts the radical concept-nativism he once defended. Yet that position stood, virtually unchallenged, for more than twenty years. This neglect is puzzling, as Fodor's arguments against concepts being learnable from experience remain unanswered, and nativism has historically been taken very seriously as a response to empiricism's perceived shortcomings. In this paper, I urge that Fodorean nativism should indeed be rejected. I argue, however, that its deficiencies are not so obvious that they can simply be taken for granted. Fodor can counter extant objections by stressing two distinctions: between historicist and counterfactual semantic theories and between explaining reference and explaining concept-acquisition. But, I argue, this victory is pyrrhic. Reformulated as objections to his account qua theory of concept-acquisition, and not qua theory of reference, analogous difficulties are fatal to the Fodorean position

On Cussing in Church: In Defense of What’s Within?

In his testimony in McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education, 529 F.Supp.1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982), Michael Ruse cites the lack of integrity and closed-mindedness of Creationists—in addition to Creationism’s untestability, absence of predictive power and tendency to appeal to miracles by way of ‘explanation’ of natural phenomena—as reasons to deny Creationism scientific status. While one may quibble with Ruse’s contention that the character of its advocates bears on Creationism’s claim to be a science, one can at least agree with him that it’s pointless to attempt to shake Creationists from their beliefs by the application of reasoned argument and evidence. Arguing with Creationists, as Ruse’s testimony emphasizes, is like arguing with the business end of a cricket bat: however many bits of empirical evidence or carefully-fashioned argument you lob at them, they whack them undigested right back at you, only harder and a lot nastier. Arguing with Nativists is sometimes like that too. Thus, it is a great relief to find Louise Antony and Robert Matthews expressing their critical reactions to What’s Within? (Cowie 1999) in such reasonable and respectful terms. I am grateful to them for transforming what might have been a thankless task—the writing of this response—into a welcome opportunity to conclude what has clearly been for all of us an illuminating and enriching exchange

The Mind is Not (Just) a System of Modules Shaped (Just) by Natural Selection

[First paragraph]. 1. Did the Mind Evolve by Natural Selection? Of course our minds and brains evolved by natural selection! They aren’t the result of divine intervention or fabrication by space aliens. Nor are they solely products of drift or any other naturalistic alternative to selection. That natural selection profoundly "shaped" the mind and brain is accepted by both by evolutionary psychologists and virtually all of their most vigorous critics

The Logical Problem of Language Acquisition

Arguments from the ‘Logical Problem of Language Acquisition’ suggest that since linguistic experience provides few negative data that would falsify overgeneral grammatical hypotheses, innate knowledge of the principles of Universal Grammar must constrain learners’ hypothesis formulation. Although this argument indicates a need for domain-specific constraints, it does not support their innateness. Learning from mostly positive data proceeds unproblematically in virtually all domains. Since not every domain can plausibly be accorded its own special faculty, the probative value of the argument in the linguistic case is dubious. In ignoring the holistic and probablistic nature of theory construction, the argument underestimates the extent to which positive data can supply negative evidence and hence overestimates the intractability of language learning in the absence of a dedicated faculty. While nativism about language remains compelling, the alleged ‘Logical Problem’ contributes nothing to its plausibility and the emphasis on the Problem in the recent acquisition literature has been a mistake

Why isn't Stich an ElimiNativist about Innate Ideas?

[First paragraph]. In 1975, and as usual scratching where it itches, Steve Stich published Innate Ideas, a collection of philosophical papers illustrating and analyzing the varied roles of the concept of innateness in philosophical psychology. In the thirty years since then, the idea of the innate has flourished in both popular and academic writings. Not only has it received a fair amount of use (think Chomsky and Pinker; think Fodor; think Herrnstein and Murray; think the New York Times’ ‘Science Times’ every other Tuesday), it has also occasioned a good deal of mention, particularly in the last twenty or so years, as philosophers, biologists and psychologists have sought to develop a more precise understanding of what innateness is

Late-Onset Meningeal Metastases in Liposarcoma: A Case Report and Review of the Literature

Intracranial metastases from liposarcoma are rare and almost always preceded by the development of systemic tumour spread. We report here a case of liposarcoma with spread to the cranial nervous system 23 years after treatment of the primary tumour. The literature on brain metastases from soft tissue sarcoma is also reviewed

Poorer without It? The Neglected Role of the Natural Environment in Poverty and Wellbeing

The relationship between sustainable development’s prime goal, human wellbeing, and the natural environment has been narrowly conceived. This paper focuses on the possibility and the implications of treating the natural environment as a ‘constituent’, or internal element, of the concepts of wellbeing and poverty, as opposed to a ‘determinant’, or instrumental, external factor. Our review of philosophical accounts and conceptual frameworks of wellbeing and poverty suggests that treating the environment as a constituent element is philosophically sound, conceptually robust and empirically grounded. We argue that failing to consider these missing environmental aspects can result in an incomplete capturing of the multiple dimensions of wellbeing and poverty, and their underlying drivers. This broader framing of the environment– wellbeing relationship has the potential to inform a new generation of individual level wellbeing and poverty indicators, creating measures of multidimensional poverty that reflect the broadened scope ambitiously articulated in the Sustainable Development Goals

Re-implantation of cryopreserved ovarian cortex resulting in restoration of ovarian function, natural conception and successful pregnancy after haematopoietic stem cell transplantation for Wilms tumour

With the improvement of long-term cancer survival rates, growing numbers of female survivors are suffering from treatment-related premature ovarian insufficiency (POI). Although pre-treatment embryo and oocyte storage are effective fertility preservation strategies, they are not possible for pre-pubertal girls or women who cannot delay treatment. In these cases, the only available treatment option is ovarian cortex cryopreservation and subsequent re-implantation. A 32-year-old woman had ovarian cortex cryopreserved 10 years previously before commencing high-dose chemotherapy and undergoing a haematopoietic stem cell transplant for recurrent adult Wilms tumour, which resulted in POI. She underwent laparoscopic orthotopic transplantation of cryopreserved ovarian cortex to the original site of biopsy on the left ovary. She ovulated at 15 and 29 weeks post-re-implantation with AMH detectable, then rising, from 21 weeks, and conceived naturally following the second ovulation. The pregnancy was uncomplicated and a healthy male infant was born by elective Caesarean section at 36(+4) weeks gestation. This is the first report of ovarian cortex re-implantation in the UK. Despite the patient receiving low-risk chemotherapy prior to cryopreservation and the prolonged tissue storage duration, the re-implantation resulted in rapid restoration of ovarian function and natural conception with successful pregnancy