19 research outputs found
Communicability Of Pleasure And Normativity Of Taste In Kantās Third Critique
Do claims of taste function as validity claims? Our ordinary use of aesthetic notions suggests as much. When I assert that Rodinās Camille Claudel is ābeautifulā I mean my claim to be, in a sense, correct. I expect others to concur and if they do not I think that they are mistaken. But am I justified in attributing an error to the judgment of someone who, unlike me, does not find Rodinās Camille Claudel beautiful? Not obviously. For it looks, on the other hand, that my assertion āThe sculpture of Camille Claudel is beautifulā is not an assertion about a property of that sculpture, not, that is, about a feature of the world which exists for others as well as for me. Quite the opposite, I seem to base my claim on a subjective response, on a certain feeling of mine. I maintain that the sculpture of Camille Claudel is ābeautifulā because it produces a particular effect upon me, namely it pleases me aesthetically. But how can the feeling of pleasure, being a subjective response on my part, serve as a normative ground for a claim
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A State of Besire
I argue that there is at least one genuine state of besire.</p
The Duties of an Artist
Casting directors are tasked with selecting a suitable actor for a given role. āSuitableā in this context typically means possessing a combination of physical attributes and acting skills. But are there any moral constraints on the choice? I argue that there are. This is an uncommon supposition, and few even entertain the question. In this essay, I discuss the reasons for this omission and attempt to make up for it
My Delicate Taste: Aesthetic Deference Revisited
I suggest that none of the arguments for pessimism about aesthetic testimony succeeds against a plausible version of optimism. However, I claim also that pessimist intuitions have a certain pull that optimists must account for. My second task is to explain the force of pessimist intuitions by shedding new light on their source
Playing with Fire: Art and the Seductive Power of Pain
I discuss the aesthetic power of painful art. I focus on artworks that occasion pain by āhitting too close to home,ā i.e., by presenting narratives meant to be āabout us.ā I consider various reasons why such works may have aesthetic value for us, but I argue that the main reason has to do with the power of such works to transgress conversational boundaries. The discussion is meant as a contribution to the debate on the paradox of tragedy
A Puzzle About Knowledge in Action
I question the widespread assumption that when we act for reasons we know what our reasons are. I argue that an agent may act in ignorance, or partial ignorance, regarding his or her reasons, and an action involving ignorance of this sort may still qualify as done for reasons. I conclude from here that we need to develop a suitable new model of action for reasons, and I proceed to offer such a model. Briefly, I argue that an action qualifies as done for reasons when the agent performing that action possesses a reasons explanation of it and is (at least partly) motivated to act by the fact he possesses such an explanation. The crucial point is that the agent may not be motivated ā not even in part ā by the content of the reasons that constitute the explanation in question