Due deference to denialism: explaining ordinary people’s rejection of established scientific findings

There is a robust scientific consensus concerning climate change and evolution. But many people reject these expert views, in favour of beliefs that are strongly at variance with the evidence. It is tempting to try to explain these beliefs by reference to ignorance or irrationality, but those who reject the expert view seem often to be no worse informed or any less rational than the majority of those who accept it. It is also tempting to try to explain these beliefs by reference to epistemic overconfidence. However, this kind of overconfidence is apparently ubiquitous, so by itself it cannot explain the difference between those who accept and those who reject expert views. Instead, I will suggest that the difference is in important part explained by differential patterns of epistemic deference, and these patterns, in turn, are explained by the cues that we use to filter testimony. We rely on cues of benevolence and competence to distinguish reliable from unreliable testifiers, but when debates become deeply politicized, asserting a claim may itself constitute signalling lack of reliability

The future of public service broadcasting

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Licensing (Young Persons) Bill 1999-2000 Bill 14 of 1999-2000

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Which norms are strong reciprocators supposed to enforce? Not all norms are psychologically the same

Gintis’ (2000) analysis of strong reciprocity in terms of group survival leads to the conclusion that any norm, be it cooperative or prudential, that potentially enhances group survival will be enforced by a significant subset of individuals (strong reciprocators) who enforce norms even at their own individual expense. Gintis’ assumption that the human mind is an initially structureless receptacle for cultural norms further reinforces this view. In contrast, I argue that humans possess a natural domain-specific competence for social cooperation that is distinct from our prudential competence in dealing with potential hazards. I review a range of psychological evidence including multidimensional scaling studies, studies of emotional reactions, reasoning, functional MRI and judgments about punishment suggesting that not all norms are psychologically equivalent, with only a subset of norm violations eliciting punitive sentiments

Adaptive domains of deontic reasoning

Deontic reasoning is reasoning about permission and obligation: what one may do and what one must do, respectively. Conceivably, people could reason about deontic matters using a purely formal deontic calculus. I review evidence from a range of psychological experiments suggesting that this is not the case. Instead, I argue that deontic reasoning is supported by a collection of dissociable cognitive adaptations for solving adaptive problems that likely would have confronted ancestral humans