Household behavior and individual autonomy.

The paper proposes a model of household behavior with both private and public consumption where the spouses independently maximize their utilities, but taking into account, together with their own individual budget constraints, the collective household budget constraint with public goods evaluated at Lindahl prices. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints are used to parameterize the set of equilibria, in addition to the usual parameterization by income shares. The proposed game generalizes both the ‘collective’ model of household behavior and the non-cooperative game with voluntary contributions to public goods.Intra-household allocation, household financial management, degree of autonomy, Lindahl prices, local income pooling, separate spheres.

Oligopolistic Competition as a Common Agency Game

In applying the common agency framework to the context of an oligopolistic industry, we want to go beyond the classical dichotomy between Cournot and Bertrand competition. We define two games, the oligopolistic game and the corresponding concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, and an associated auxiliary game that can be interpreted as a common agency game and that has the same set of equilibria. The parameterization of the set of (potential) equilibria in terms of competitive thoughness is derived from the first order conditions of the auxiliary game. The enforceability of monopolistic competition, of price and quantity competition, and of collusion is examined in this framework. We then describe the (reduced) set of equilibria one would obtain, first in the non-intrinsic case and then in the case where a global approach would be adopted instead of partial equilibrium approach. Finally, we illustrate the use of the concept of oligopolistic equilibrium and of the corresponding parameterization by referring to the standard case of symmetric quadratic utility.

Household behavior and individual autonomy: A Lindahl approach.

A comprehensive model of economic household decision is presented which incorporates both fully cooperative and fully non-cooperative variants, parameterized by the income distribution, as well as a semi-cooperative variant, parameterized in addition by a vector B, representing the degrees of individual autonomy. In this comprehensive model, the concept of "household B-equilibrium" is introduced through the reformulation of the Lindahl equilibrium in strategic terms. Existence is proved and some generic properties of the household B-equilibrium derived. An example is given to illustrate. Finally a particular decomposition of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix is derived and the testability of the various models discussed.Intra-household allocation, household financial management, degree of autonomy, Lindahl prices, local income pooling, separate spheres.

Household behavior and individual autonomy

intra-household allocation, household financial management, degree of autonomy, Lindahl prices, local income pooling, separate spheres

Hawks and doves in segmented markets : A formal approach to competitive aggressiveness

Competitive aggressiveness is analyzed in a simple spatial oligopolistic competition model, where each one of two firms supplies two connected market segments, one captive the other contested. To begin with, firms are simply assumed to maximize profit subject to two constraints, one related to competitiveness, the other to market feasibility. The competitive aggressiveness of each firm, measured by the relative implicit price of the former constraint, is then endogenous and may be taken as a parameter to characterize the set of equilibria. A further step consists in supposing that competitive aggressiveness is controlled by each firm through its manager hiring decision, in a preliminary stage of a delegation game. When competition is exogenously intensified, through higher product substitutability or through larger relative size of the contested market segment, competitive aggressiveness is decreased at the subgame perfect equilibrium. This decrease partially compensates for the negative effect on profitability of more intense competition.

Hawks and doves in segmented markets : a formal approach to competitive aggressiveness

Competitive aggressiveness is analyzed in a simple spatial oligopolistic competition model, where each one of two firms supplies two connected markets segments, one captive the other contested. To begin with, firms are simply assumed to maximize profit subject to two constraints, one related to competitiveness, the other to market feasibility. The competitive aggressiveness of each firm, measured by the relative implicit price of the former constraint, is then endogenous and may be taken as a parameter to characterize the set of equilibria. A further step consists in supposing that competitive aggressiveness is controlled by each firm through its manager hiring decision, in a preliminary stage of a delegation game. When competition is exogenously intensified, through higher product substitutability or through larger relative size of the contested market segment, competitive aggressiveness is decreased at the subgame perfect equiibrium. This decrease partially compensates for the negative effect on profitability of more intense competition

Hawks and doves in segmented markets: a formal approach to competitive aggressiveness

Competitive aggressiveness is analyzed in a simple spatial oligopolistic competition model, where each one of two firms supplies two connected market segments, one captive the other contested. To begin with, firms are simply assumed to maximize profit subject to two constraints, one related to competitiveness, the other to market feasibility. The competitive aggressiveness of each firm, measured by the relative implicit price of the former constraint, is then endogenous and may be taken as a parameter to characterize the set of equilibria. A further step consists in supposing that competitive aggressiveness is controlled by each firm through its manager hiring decision, in a preliminary stage of a delegation game. When competition is exogenously intensified, through higher product substitutability or through larger relative size of the contested market segment, competitive aggressiveness is decreased at the subgame perfect equilibrium. This decrease partially compensates for the negative effect on profitability of more intense competition.

The transient atmospheric response to midlatitude SST anomalies

To study the transient atmospheric response to midlatitude SST anomalies, a three-layer quasigeostrophic (QG) model coupled to a slab oceanic mixed layer in the North Atlantic is used. As diagnosed from a coupled run in perpetual winter conditions, the first two modes of SST variability are linked to the model North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and eastern Atlantic pattern (EAP), respectively, the dominant atmospheric modes in the Atlantic sector. The two SST anomaly patterns are then prescribed as fixed anomalous boundary conditions for the model atmosphere, and its transient responses are established from a large ensemble of simulations. In both cases, the tendency of the air–sea heat fluxes to damp the SST anomalies results in an anomalous diabatic heating of the atmosphere that, in turn, forces a baroclinic response, as predicted by linear theory. This initial response rapidly modifies the transient eddy activity and thus the convergence of eddy momentum and heat fluxes. The latter transforms the baroclinic response into a growing barotropic one that resembles the atmospheric mode that had created the SST anomaly in the coupled run and is thus associated with a positive feedback. The total adjustment time is as long as 3–4 months for the NAO-like response and 1–2 months for the EAP-like one. The positive feedback, in both cases, is dependent on the polarity of the SST anomaly, but is stronger in the NAO case, thereby contributing to its predominance at low frequency in the coupled system. However, the feedback is too weak to lead to an instability of the atmospheric modes and primarily results in an increase of their amplitude and persistence and a weakening of the heat flux damping of the SST anomaly

Comment s'inscrit l'avenir de l'industrie bancaire dans un environnement de taux très bas ?

L’industrie bancaire suisse est entrée depuis peu dans une nouvelle ère, notamment à cause d’un environnement à faibles rendements dus aux taux bas ainsi qu’aux récents développements technologiques. Ce travail cherche à définir quel est l’avenir de l’industrie bancaire en expliquant d’abord le mécanisme des taux bas, puis en définissant quels sont les différentes stratégies qui s’offrent aux banques pour évoluer dans cet environnement. Il est d’abord nécessaire de comprendre quels ont été les causes qui ont mené la Banque nationale suisse à abandonner son taux plancher et à adopter le taux d’intérêt négatif. Cela se fera grâce à l’analyse des facteurs que la Banque prend en compte pour sa politique monétaire ainsi que l’analyse de son bilan. Je me baserai également sur la courbe des taux qui est un bon indicateur pour pouvoir entrevoir la vision de l’avenir qu’a le marché. Tous ces éléments m’ont permis d’établir l’hypothèse que malgré des signaux positifs, les taux d’intérêts en Suisse n’augmenteront pas avant 2018. Ensuite, il sera question des stratégies envisageables pour les banques afin qu’elles puissent s’adapter à cet environnement de taux bas. Qui plus est, le secteur financier est voué à se transformer, d’abord à cause des réglementations plus strictes, puis avec l’expansion des fintechs et autres avancées technologiques. L’analyse de ces nouveaux enjeux permettra d’évaluer leur importance. Toutes ces recherches m’ont permis d’établir une vision pour l’avenir de l’industrie bancaire, qui sera fortement impactée par la technologie et verra se développer de nouveaux modèles d’affaires