2,346 research outputs found
Household behavior and individual autonomy.
The paper proposes a model of household behavior with both private and public consumption where the spouses independently maximize their utilities, but taking into account, together with their own individual budget constraints, the collective household budget constraint with public goods evaluated at Lindahl prices. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints are used to parameterize the set of equilibria, in addition to the usual parameterization by income shares. The proposed game generalizes both the âcollectiveâ model of household behavior and the non-cooperative game with voluntary contributions to public goods.Intra-household allocation, household financial management, degree of autonomy, Lindahl prices, local income pooling, separate spheres.
Oligopolistic Competition as a Common Agency Game
In applying the common agency framework to the context of an oligopolistic industry, we want to go beyond the classical dichotomy between Cournot and Bertrand competition. We define two games, the oligopolistic game and the corresponding concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, and an associated auxiliary game that can be interpreted as a common agency game and that has the same set of equilibria. The parameterization of the set of (potential) equilibria in terms of competitive thoughness is derived from the first order conditions of the auxiliary game. The enforceability of monopolistic competition, of price and quantity competition, and of collusion is examined in this framework. We then describe the (reduced) set of equilibria one would obtain, first in the non-intrinsic case and then in the case where a global approach would be adopted instead of partial equilibrium approach. Finally, we illustrate the use of the concept of oligopolistic equilibrium and of the corresponding parameterization by referring to the standard case of symmetric quadratic utility.
Household behavior and individual autonomy: A Lindahl approach.
A comprehensive model of economic household decision is presented which incorporates both fully cooperative and fully non-cooperative variants, parameterized by the income distribution, as well as a semi-cooperative variant, parameterized in addition by a vector B, representing the degrees of individual autonomy. In this comprehensive model, the concept of "household B-equilibrium" is introduced through the reformulation of the Lindahl equilibrium in strategic terms. Existence is proved and some generic properties of the household B-equilibrium derived. An example is given to illustrate. Finally a particular decomposition of the pseudo-Slutsky matrix is derived and the testability of the various models discussed.Intra-household allocation, household financial management, degree of autonomy, Lindahl prices, local income pooling, separate spheres.
Household behavior and individual autonomy
intra-household allocation, household financial management, degree of autonomy, Lindahl prices, local income pooling, separate spheres
Hawks and doves in segmented markets : A formal approach to competitive aggressiveness
Competitive aggressiveness is analyzed in a simple spatial oligopolistic competition model, where each one of two firms supplies two connected market segments, one captive the other contested. To begin with, firms are simply assumed to maximize profit subject to two constraints, one related to competitiveness, the other to market feasibility. The competitive aggressiveness of each firm, measured by the relative implicit price of the former constraint, is then endogenous and may be taken as a parameter to characterize the set of equilibria. A further step consists in supposing that competitive aggressiveness is controlled by each firm through its manager hiring decision, in a preliminary stage of a delegation game. When competition is exogenously intensified, through higher product substitutability or through larger relative size of the contested market segment, competitive aggressiveness is decreased at the subgame perfect equilibrium. This decrease partially compensates for the negative effect on profitability of more intense competition.
Hawks and doves in segmented markets : a formal approach to competitive aggressiveness
Competitive aggressiveness is analyzed in a simple spatial oligopolistic competition model, where each one of two firms supplies two connected markets segments, one captive the other contested. To begin with, firms are simply assumed to maximize profit subject to two constraints, one related to competitiveness, the other to market feasibility. The competitive aggressiveness of each firm, measured by the relative implicit price of the former constraint, is then endogenous and may be taken as a parameter to characterize the set of equilibria. A further step consists in supposing that competitive aggressiveness is controlled by each firm through its manager hiring decision, in a preliminary stage of a delegation game. When competition is exogenously intensified, through higher product substitutability or through larger relative size of the contested market segment, competitive aggressiveness is decreased at the subgame perfect equiibrium. This decrease partially compensates for the negative effect on profitability of more intense competition
Hawks and doves in segmented markets: a formal approach to competitive aggressiveness
Competitive aggressiveness is analyzed in a simple spatial oligopolistic competition model, where each one of two firms supplies two connected market segments, one captive the other contested. To begin with, firms are simply assumed to maximize profit subject to two constraints, one related to competitiveness, the other to market feasibility. The competitive aggressiveness of each firm, measured by the relative implicit price of the former constraint, is then endogenous and may be taken as a parameter to characterize the set of equilibria. A further step consists in supposing that competitive aggressiveness is controlled by each firm through its manager hiring decision, in a preliminary stage of a delegation game. When competition is exogenously intensified, through higher product substitutability or through larger relative size of the contested market segment, competitive aggressiveness is decreased at the subgame perfect equilibrium. This decrease partially compensates for the negative effect on profitability of more intense competition.
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The transient atmospheric response to midlatitude SST anomalies
To study the transient atmospheric response to midlatitude SST anomalies, a three-layer quasigeostrophic (QG) model coupled to a slab oceanic mixed layer in the North Atlantic is used. As diagnosed from a coupled run in perpetual winter conditions, the first two modes of SST variability are linked to the model North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and eastern Atlantic pattern (EAP), respectively, the dominant atmospheric modes in the Atlantic sector. The two SST anomaly patterns are then prescribed as fixed anomalous boundary conditions for the model atmosphere, and its transient responses are established from a large ensemble of simulations.
In both cases, the tendency of the airâsea heat fluxes to damp the SST anomalies results in an anomalous diabatic heating of the atmosphere that, in turn, forces a baroclinic response, as predicted by linear theory. This initial response rapidly modifies the transient eddy activity and thus the convergence of eddy momentum and heat fluxes. The latter transforms the baroclinic response into a growing barotropic one that resembles the atmospheric mode that had created the SST anomaly in the coupled run and is thus associated with a positive feedback. The total adjustment time is as long as 3â4 months for the NAO-like response and 1â2 months for the EAP-like one. The positive feedback, in both cases, is dependent on the polarity of the SST anomaly, but is stronger in the NAO case, thereby contributing to its predominance at low frequency in the coupled system. However, the feedback is too weak to lead to an instability of the atmospheric modes and primarily results in an increase of their amplitude and persistence and a weakening of the heat flux damping of the SST anomaly
Comment s'inscrit l'avenir de l'industrie bancaire dans un environnement de taux trĂšs bas ?
Lâindustrie bancaire suisse est entrĂ©e depuis peu dans une nouvelle Ăšre, notamment Ă cause dâun environnement Ă faibles rendements dus aux taux bas ainsi quâaux rĂ©cents dĂ©veloppements technologiques. Ce travail cherche Ă dĂ©finir quel est lâavenir de lâindustrie bancaire en expliquant dâabord le mĂ©canisme des taux bas, puis en dĂ©finissant quels sont les diffĂ©rentes stratĂ©gies qui sâoffrent aux banques pour Ă©voluer dans cet environnement. Il est dâabord nĂ©cessaire de comprendre quels ont Ă©tĂ© les causes qui ont menĂ© la Banque nationale suisse Ă abandonner son taux plancher et Ă adopter le taux dâintĂ©rĂȘt nĂ©gatif. Cela se fera grĂące Ă lâanalyse des facteurs que la Banque prend en compte pour sa politique monĂ©taire ainsi que lâanalyse de son bilan. Je me baserai Ă©galement sur la courbe des taux qui est un bon indicateur pour pouvoir entrevoir la vision de lâavenir quâa le marchĂ©. Tous ces Ă©lĂ©ments mâont permis dâĂ©tablir lâhypothĂšse que malgrĂ© des signaux positifs, les taux dâintĂ©rĂȘts en Suisse nâaugmenteront pas avant 2018. Ensuite, il sera question des stratĂ©gies envisageables pour les banques afin quâelles puissent sâadapter Ă cet environnement de taux bas. Qui plus est, le secteur financier est vouĂ© Ă se transformer, dâabord Ă cause des rĂ©glementations plus strictes, puis avec lâexpansion des fintechs et autres avancĂ©es technologiques. Lâanalyse de ces nouveaux enjeux permettra dâĂ©valuer leur importance. Toutes ces recherches mâont permis dâĂ©tablir une vision pour lâavenir de lâindustrie bancaire, qui sera fortement impactĂ©e par la technologie et verra se dĂ©velopper de nouveaux modĂšles dâaffaires
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