Reciprocal interactions between tumor and endothelial cells: Effects of selective vasopressin V2 receptor peptide agonists

Recent experimental evidence suggested that the synthetic peptide desmopressin (DDAVP) interferes tumor angiogenesis by inducing the formation of angiostatin. It is also known that DDAVP stimulates the endothelial release of von Willebrand factor, a key element in resistance to metastasis. Vasopressin V2 receptor agonists such as DDAVP seem to evoke dual angiostatic and antimetastatic effects, breaking cooperative interactions of tumor and endothelial cells during tumor progression.Fil: Garona, Juan. Universidad Nacional de Quilmes. Departamento de Ciencia y Tecnología. Laboratorio de Oncología Molecular; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Alonso, Daniel Fernando. Universidad Nacional de Quilmes. Departamento de Ciencia y Tecnología. Laboratorio de Oncología Molecular; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

Cost-Based Models of Economic Growth

In this paper we highlight the importance of the operational costs in explaining economic growth and analyze how the industrial structure affects the growth rate of the economy. If there is monopolistic competition only in an intermediate goods sector, then production growth coincides with consumption growth. Moreover, the pattern of growth depends on the particular form of the operational cost. If the monopolistically competitive sector is the final goods sector, then per capita production is constant but per capita effective consumption or welfare grows. Finally, we modify again the industrial structure of the economy and show an economy with two different growth speeds, one for production and another for effective consumption. Thus, both the operational cost and the particular structure of the sector that produces the final goods determines ultimately the pattern of growth.operational cost, growth, monopolistic competition

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.wage tax, unemployment benefit system, payroll tax

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

We analyze the effects of the unemployment benefit system on the economy. In particular, we focus on both the tax structure and the unemployment benefits composition. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is only paid by firms, then employment and production are maximized. Moreover, the way the government contemplates the unemployment benefit system, either as a redistributive or as an insurance institution, is crucial for the dynamics and the equilibria of the economy.unemployment benefit system, payroll tax, wage tax.