29 research outputs found
ĆœMOGAUS TEISÄS IR ASMENS VARDAS: TEISÄS TENDENCIJOS IR IĆ Ć ĆȘKIAI
This article explains the recent evolution in the recognition and use of a personâs own name in international human rights. It examines the historical reasons why this central aspect of individual identity was initially largely omitted from earlier treaties because of the different traditions on whether individuals could freely assert their identity through the use of their own name and surname, particularly in Europe where common law and civil approaches on the matter were significantly different. It shows how there has been significant changes in recent jurisprudence internationally and in Europe that have focused increasingly on the importance of an individualâs identity, and that this means vulnerable segments of society such as children, women and minorities must generally be entitled to have their own names recognised and used by state authorities, rather than having authorities impose an officially acceptable version.Ć iame straipsnyje analizuojama, kaip pastaruoju metu tarptautinÄje ĆŸmogaus teisiĆł teisÄje vystÄsi asmens vardo pripaĆŸinimo ir naudojimo koncepcija. Straipsnyje taip pat nagrinÄjamos istorinÄs prieĆŸastys, paaiĆĄkinanÄios, kodÄl ĆĄis centrinis asmens tapatybÄs aspektas iĆĄ pradĆŸiĆł sutartyse buvo praleidĆŸiamas. Manoma, kad tokia situacija susiklostÄ dÄl skirtingĆł tradicijĆł, lÄmusiĆł asmens teisÄ laisvai iĆĄreikĆĄti savo tapatybÄ per savo vardo ir pavardÄs naudojimÄ
. YpaÄ Europoje bendrosios teisÄs poĆŸiĆ«ris ĆĄiuo klausimu labai skyrÄsi nuo civilinÄs teisÄs krypties. Straipsnyje aptariami svarbiausi pastarojo laikotarpio pasaulio ir Europos jurisprudencijos pokyÄiai, atskleidĆŸiantys, kad vis daugiau dÄmesio skiriama asmens tapatybÄs svarbai. Tai reiĆĄkia, kad labiausiai paĆŸeidĆŸiamĆł visuomenÄs grupiĆł, tokiĆł kaip antai vaikai, moterys ir maĆŸumos, atstovai turi turÄti teisÄ, kad jĆł vardai valstybÄs valdĆŸios institucijose bĆ«tĆł pripaĆŸÄŻstami ir naudojami, o nebĆ«tĆł verÄiami priimti valstybÄs institucijos nustatytÄ
oficialiai priimtinÄ
vardo variantÄ
Human rights and a person's name : legal trends and challenges
The absence of a specific right to oneâs own name in early international
human rights treaties seems perplexing in the twenty-first century until
one appreciates the historical and legal contexts which initially made this
omission almost unavoidable. The growing importance of human rights
in international law, of the obligation to recognize and respect individual
identity, as well as the generality of certain human rights standards such as
the prohibition of discrimination, the right to private life, and the right to
a name, have led to an evolution in the understanding and interpretation
of these standards in more recent years. It is now increasingly accepted in
international law and state practice that individuals are generally entitled
to state recognition and use of their own namesâincluding names in a
language which may not be official.http://www.press.jhu.edu/journals/human_rights_quarterly/index.htmlhb201
Langues officielles versus droits linguistiques : lâun exclut-il lâautre ?
Il est souvent pris pour acquis dans de nombreux pays que le choix dâune langue officielle relĂšve uniquement de la prĂ©rogative de lâĂtat, ce que la Cour europĂ©enne des droits de lâhomme et le ComitĂ© des droits de lâhomme de lâONU semblent avoir tous deux confirmĂ© Ă quelques reprises. Il demeure nĂ©anmoins un point de litige Ă la fois fondamental et pourtant trĂšs mal compris, souvent tant par les gouvernements en cause que les juristes eux-mĂȘmes : que se passe-t-il lorsque les textes de loi portant sur le choix dâune ou quelques langue(s) officielle(s) excluent, ou mĂȘme dans certains cas extrĂȘmes « criminalisent »lâutilisation dâune autre langue, mĂȘme dans un contexte familial ou privĂ©Â ? Cet article tente de rĂ©pondre Ă cette question en dĂ©montrant comment et pourquoi â si le choix dâune langue officielle relĂšve bel et bien de la prĂ©rogative de lâĂtat â cela ne permet pas pour autant Ă un gouvernement de faire fi du droit international, et en particulier des droits de lâhomme. Ainsi, lĂ oĂč la mise dâun Ćuvre dâun droit fondamental comme la libertĂ© dâexpression ou lâinterdiction de la discrimination fondĂ©e sur la langue aurait indirectement pour effet de crĂ©er un « droit linguistique », ce droit primerait sur la disposition nationale en matiĂšre de langue officielle. Un tel rĂ©sultat, sâil est en train de sâĂ©tablir au niveau de la jurisprudence internationale, nâen demeure pas moins difficile Ă accepter pour certains intervenants.Several countries take for granted the fact that the choice of an official language is a State exclusive prerogative. This was confirmed by both the European Court of Human Rights and the U.N. Human Rights Committee on several occasions. There remains however a matter of dispute altogether fundamental and yet often quite misunderstood by some governments as well as by jurists themselves. Indeed, what happens when legislations on the choice of one or more official language(s) exclude or even in some extreme cases « criminalise »the use of another language even within a domestic or private context? This paper attempts to provide an answer to this question by establishing how and why â although the choice of an official language indeed constitutes a prerogative of the Stateâ it doesnât imply a government to trespass the international law, especially the human rights. Thus, wherever the implementation of a fundamental right such as freedom of expression or forbiddance of discrimination based on language would have the indirect effect of creating a « linguistic right », this right would prevail on the national stipulations regarding official language(s). The resulting establishment of a jurisprudence at the international level remains, however a matter some stakeholders have difficulty to agree upon
Langues officielles versus droits linguistiques : lâun exclut-il lâautre ?
Several countries take for granted the fact that the choice of an official language is a State exclusive prerogative. This was confirmed by both the European Court of Human Rights and the U.N. Human Rights Committee on several occasions. There remains however a matter of dispute altogether fundamental and yet often quite misunderstood by some governments as well as by jurists themselves. Indeed, what happens when legislations on the choice of one or more official language(s) exclude or even in some extreme cases « criminalise »the use of another language even within a domestic or private context? This paper attempts to provide an answer to this question by establishing how and why â although the choice of an official language indeed constitutes a prerogative of the Stateâ it doesnât imply a government to trespass the international law, especially the human rights. Thus, wherever the implementation of a fundamental right such as freedom of expression or forbiddance of discrimination based on language would have the indirect effect of creating a « linguistic right », this right would prevail on the national stipulations regarding official language(s). The resulting establishment of a jurisprudence at the international level remains, however a matter some stakeholders have difficulty to agree upon
Langues officielles versus droits linguistiques : lâun exclut-il lâautre ?
Il est souvent pris pour acquis dans de nombreux pays que le choix dâune langue officielle relĂšve uniquement de la prĂ©rogative de lâĂtat, ce que la Cour europĂ©enne des droits de lâhomme et le ComitĂ© des droits de lâhomme de lâONU semblent avoir tous deux confirmĂ© Ă quelques reprises. Il demeure nĂ©anmoins un point de litige Ă la fois fondamental et pourtant trĂšs mal compris, souvent tant par les gouvernements en cause que les juristes eux-mĂȘmes : que se passe-t-il lorsque les textes de loi portant sur le choix dâune ou quelques langue(s) officielle(s) excluent, ou mĂȘme dans certains cas extrĂȘmes « criminalisent »lâutilisation dâune autre langue, mĂȘme dans un contexte familial ou privĂ©Â ? Cet article tente de rĂ©pondre Ă cette question en dĂ©montrant comment et pourquoi â si le choix dâune langue officielle relĂšve bel et bien de la prĂ©rogative de lâĂtat â cela ne permet pas pour autant Ă un gouvernement de faire fi du droit international, et en particulier des droits de lâhomme. Ainsi, lĂ oĂč la mise dâun Ćuvre dâun droit fondamental comme la libertĂ© dâexpression ou lâinterdiction de la discrimination fondĂ©e sur la langue aurait indirectement pour effet de crĂ©er un « droit linguistique », ce droit primerait sur la disposition nationale en matiĂšre de langue officielle. Un tel rĂ©sultat, sâil est en train de sâĂ©tablir au niveau de la jurisprudence internationale, nâen demeure pas moins difficile Ă accepter pour certains intervenants.Several countries take for granted the fact that the choice of an official language is a State exclusive prerogative. This was confirmed by both the European Court of Human Rights and the U.N. Human Rights Committee on several occasions. There remains however a matter of dispute altogether fundamental and yet often quite misunderstood by some governments as well as by jurists themselves. Indeed, what happens when legislations on the choice of one or more official language(s) exclude or even in some extreme cases « criminalise »the use of another language even within a domestic or private context? This paper attempts to provide an answer to this question by establishing how and why â although the choice of an official language indeed constitutes a prerogative of the Stateâ it doesnât imply a government to trespass the international law, especially the human rights. Thus, wherever the implementation of a fundamental right such as freedom of expression or forbiddance of discrimination based on language would have the indirect effect of creating a « linguistic right », this right would prevail on the national stipulations regarding official language(s). The resulting establishment of a jurisprudence at the international level remains, however a matter some stakeholders have difficulty to agree upon
Lingua, diritti e opportunitĂ : O della lingua nellâinclusione e nellâesclusione delle popolazioni indigene*
Nel corso della storia, nella maggior parte del mondo, i popoli indigeni sono stati soggiogati e marginalizzati dagli stati europei e coloniali, spesso attraverso misure legali che hanno portato alla loro esclusione e privazione dei diritti. Uno dei mezzi utilizzati in questi processi Ăš stata lâimposizione della lingua dei conquistatori e pertanto lâeliminazione delle lingue indigene dalle sfere pubbliche. Questo articolo si pone lâobiettivo, da un lato, di illustrare lâuso della lingua come mezzo di marginalizzazione dei popoli indigeni e, dallâaltro, di esaminare il mutato apprezzamento dellâimpatto di un numero di disposizioni in materia di diritti umani sullâuso della lingua. Questo articolo fornisce inoltre una spiegazione del motivo per cui la lingua stessa e ulteriori standard sui diritti umani, in modo particolare il divieto di discriminazione in base alla lingua e in altre aree di preferenza nazionale, potrebbero costituire un potenziale significativo per la protezione di un numero di aree di interesse di particolare significato per i popoli indigeni. Si conclude pertanto che questo non solo rappresenti un potenziale in termini di cultura, identitĂ o istruzione, ma che possa anche conferire pieni poteri ai popoli indigeni perfino in termini di opportunitĂ di lavoro e di rappresentanza in istituzioni nazionali