“This time is different”: The prospects for an effective climate agreement in Paris 2015

Headline issue: COP21, to be held in Paris at the end of 2015, presents an important opportunity for governments to negotiate a new international climate agreement. A question of central importance to preparations for COP21 is: what sort of policy architecture is most likely to generate sufficiently ambitious action to reduce global emissions? Whilst a legally binding policy architecture, such as that seen in the Kyoto Protocol, can increase the likelihood of participating countries meeting their commitments, this paper suggests that this no longer appears to be the best approach for every sector and every aspect of mitigation. Key points: The oft-heard call for a ‘legally binding’ agreement is too simplistic. The focus on ‘nationally-determined contributions’, which are unlikely to be binding under international law, is likely to enable the participation, and increase the ambition, of the largest, systemically important emitters, including China and the United States. Any agreement in Paris needs to have dynamic elements that provide for regular reviews and revision of commitments, so that countries’ ambition can be ratcheted up over time, as technical and political barriers that inhibit higher domestic ambition are overcome. International cooperation on climate action beyond the main Paris agreement will also be important. Coalitions of countries could seek deeper emissions reductions ‘on the side’ of the formal negotiations with collaborative action that focuses on particular areas, for example coordination of low-carbon innovation and phasing out the use of coal for power generation

Anti-fossil fuel norms

Historically, climate governance initiatives and associated scholarship have all but ignored the potential for “global moral norms” to bring about changes in the political conditions for global climate mitigation. This is surprising, since global moral norms are widely employed—as both a mode of governance and an analytical framework—in other domains of global governance, from international security to human rights. However, recent national-level fossil fuel divestments, moratoria on new coal mines and bans on gas fracking, among other developments, suggest the promise of global moral norms prohibiting fossil fuel-related activities, which this article terms “anti-fossil fuel norms” (AFFNs). The article interprets recent examples of such activities in the light of international relations theory on moral norms to provide a general framework for understanding how AFFNs originate, spread and affect states. Specifically, the article argues that there are: (i) influential agents that are originating, and likely to continue to originate, AFFNs; and (ii) international and domestic mechanisms by which AFFNs are likely to spread widely among states and have a significant causal effect on the identity-related considerations or rational calculations of states in the direction of limiting or reducing the production or consumption of fossil fuels. The article also shows that, because they spread and affect state behaviour through mechanisms of “international socialization” and domestic “political mobilization”, AFFNs cohere with and build upon the new paradigm of global climate governance crystallized in the Paris Agreement. AFFNs, the article concludes, represent a promising new frontier in climate governance

New economics of climate change action challenges ‘costly burden’ arguments

National economic benefits of decarbonising outweigh domestic costs, writes Fergus Gree

Ecological limits: science, justice, policy, and the good life

Recent years have witnessed a revival of scientific, political and philosophical discourse concerning the notion of ecological limits. This article provides a conceptual overview of descriptive ecological limit claims—i.e. claims that there are real, biophysical limits—and reviews work in political and social philosophy in which such claims form the basis of proposals for normative limits. The latter are classified in terms of three broad types of normative theorising: distributive justice, institutional/legal reform, and the good life. Within these three categories, the article reviews normative proposals for limits on both aggregate‐level and individual‐level ecological exploitation. It also considers the relevance of political and ideological facts to the normative analysis of ecological limits, raising methodological questions about how normative theorists should respond to a world facing escalating ecological challenges

Fossil Free Zones: a proposal

This perspective paper proposes a new conceptual framework for bottom-up climate mitigation: the Fossil Free Zones (FFZs) framework. The aim of the framework is to facilitate grassroots, goal-driven climate action, and government policy at increasingly higher levels, with a view to ‘tipping’ social systems away from their reliance on fossil fuels. The paper outlines the framework and the theory of change on which it is predicated, after first introducing the historical precedent that inspired it – the system of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. The FFZs framework offers two main advantages over other anti-fossil fuel initiatives – such as the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative – though it is intended and designed to complement these, not compete with them. First, the FFZs framework combines a unified and accessible discursive frame with a focus on practical decarbonising activities at multiple levels of governance. The discursive frame promotes the diffusion of anti-fossil fuel norms while the practical activities promote positive (reinforcing) social, technological, economic and other feedback effects. Second, the combined focus on supply and demand increases the political resilience of anti-fossil fuel initiatives in the face of fossil fuel price fluctuations, and promotes cooperation between producer regions and urban consumer centres. KEY POLICY INSIGHTS: Anti-fossil fuel activism has become a global phenomenon, but fossil fuel production and combustion continue to rise, threatening climate objectives. A system of Fossil Free Zones is proposed to further mobilise grassroots and subnational action against fossil fuels, and build anti-fossil fuel norms. A Fossil Free Zone is a geographic area characterised by the absence of fossil fuel production and consumption, with intermediate statuses based on fuel types and activities, e.g. ‘coal supply free zone’. Motivated groups set zone-related goals and work toward them, cooperating with others and across different levels of government as necessary, and declare the zones they have achieved. Ultimately, Fossil Free Zones could become institutionalised at national and international level, as has occurred with Nuclear Weapon Free Zones. Fossil Free Zones combine discursive framing with practical decarbonising activities, and address fossil fuel production and consumption, improving on other anti-fossil fuel initiatives

Fragmentation in Two Dimensions: The ICJ’s Flawed Approach to Non-State Actors and International Legal Personality

Non-state actors have a profound and growing impact on international affairs. In light of their international influence, it is unsurprising that certain types of non-state actors have also been involved in high-profile international legal disputes. Yet, despite their relevance to international law, international lawyers have struggled to integrate non-state actors into the state-centric constructs of the discipline. This article analyses the decisions of one international legal body, the ICJ, that involve non-state actors. The article discusses the arbitrary and incoherent approaches taken by the Court when confronted with legal issues which bear upon the rights and obligations of various non-state actors and analyses the implications for states of the Court’s problematic jurisprudence, arguing that international law is in a resultant state of fragmentation ratione personae. The article advances an alternative, coherent framework for addressing non-state actors which avoids the legal complications, ambiguities and lacunae caused by the current approaches and is more attuned to the realities of international life

China: a critical decade

China’s consumption of coal could reach a peak by 2020, or even earlier, as part of its plans to pursue more sustainable economic growth. The policy paper by Fergus Green and Nicholas Stern notes that discussions are already taking place in China about the possibility of setting a target for ending the rise in its annual consumption of coal before the end of its 13th Five-Year Plan, which will cover the period from 2016 to 2020. The paper states: “China could intensify its efforts to reduce its reliance on coal, in the form of a plan to peak its coal consumption by 2020 (or earlier), as has been suggested as a possibility in some discussions occurring in China, and phase it out thereafter”. Paper based on a presentation by Lord Stern to the China Development Forum in March 2014, points out that limiting coal consumption could have substantial benefits for China’s economy, including a cut in the risk of shocks to the supply of energy, reduced pressure on its water supplies, an improvement in air quality, and the mitigation of climate change. Phasing out the use of coal could be achieved through clear planning regulations and a coal tax, which could potentially raise revenue equivalent to between 7 and 9 per cent of China’s GDP to invest in low-carbon innovation and infrastructure, to protect poorer people from the impacts of the transition to low-carbon economic growth, and to reduce other taxes. The paper also suggests that effective planning to promote the growth of compact and energy-efficient cities with good public transport “is likely to be essential to China’s future environmental and economic success”. The paper states: “China’s ambitions for more sustainable growth, its urbanisation plans, and its strategic emerging industry policy suggest the potential for a powerful vision: over a billion people living and working in appealing cities, in which services, high-technology industries, and innovation are the engines of growth and prosperity”. However, the paper also warns that “achieving these benefits will require major structural changes, with some inevitable dislocation, in the short term” in China’s economy. It concludes: “At present there is ignorance in many places over China’s plans and achievements. China can develop its influence by informing the world of its plans as its 13th Five-Year Plan is developed. China’s contributions are credible given past performance and do not necessarily have to be expressed in formal treaty terms. They could be expressed in terms of a range of outcomes, the upper bound of which could reflect ambitious yet likely achievable goals on emissions, coal consumption and low-carbon technology, although it would be recognised that these could not be guaranteed.” “Contributions of this nature by China could raise substantially the likelihood of more ambitious mitigation action by developed and other emerging economies. China would be well-positioned to both lead and share in much of the resulting global growth and would benefit immensely from the associated reduction in risks from climate damages.

China’s changing economy: implications for its carbon dioxide emissions

As China’s government finalises the country’s 13th Five Year Plan for economic development (2016–2020), this article takes stock of recent changes in China’s economy and energy system since the turn of the century, and looks ahead to the likely trajectory of China’s emissions over the next decade. The period 2000–2013, it is now clear, was a distinct and exceptional phase in China’s developmental history, during which the very high levels of greenhouse gases emitted were linked closely with the energy-intensive, heavy industry-based growth model pursued at that time. China is currently undergoing another major structural transformation — towards a new development model focused on achieving better quality growth that is more sustainable and inclusive — and it is also grappling with economic challenges associated with the transition. Data from 2014 and the first three quarters of 2015 illustrate the extent of these changes. Based on analysis of this data in light of the underlying changes occurring in China’s economy and policy, this article provides an updated forecast of the Kaya components of energy CO2 emissions (GDP, energy/GDP and CO2/energy) over the next decade to 2025. It concludes that China’s CO2 emissions from energy, if they grow at all, are likely to grow much slower than under the old economic model and are likely to peak at some point in the decade before 2025

Cutting with both arms of the scissors: the economic and political case for restrictive supply-side climate policies

Proponents of climate change mitigation face difficult choices about which types of policy instrument(s) to pursue. The literature on the comparative evaluation of climate policy instruments has focused overwhelmingly on economic analyses of instruments aimed at restricting demand for greenhouse gas emissions (especially carbon taxes and cap-and-trade schemes) and, to some extent, on instruments that support the supply of or demand for substitutes for emissions-intensive goods, such as renewable energy. Evaluation of instruments aimed at restricting the upstream supply of commodities or products whose downstream consumption causes greenhouse gas emissions—such as fossil fuels—has largely been neglected in this literature. Moreover, analyses that compare policy instruments using both economic and political (e.g. political “feasibility” and “feedback”) criteria are rare. This article aims to help bridge both of these gaps. Specifically, the article demonstrates that restrictive supply-side policy instruments (targeting fossil fuels) have numerous characteristic economic and political advantages over otherwise similar restrictive demand-side instruments (targeting greenhouse gases). Economic advantages include low administrative and transaction costs, higher abatement certainty (due to the relative ease of monitoring, reporting and verification), comprehensive within-sector coverage, some advantageous price/efficiency effects, the mitigation of infrastructure “lock-in” risks, and mitigation of the “green paradox”. Political advantages include the superior potential to mobilise public support for supply-side policies, the conduciveness of supply-side policies to international policy cooperation, and the potential to bring different segments of the fossil fuel industry into a coalition supportive of such policies. In light of these attributes, restrictive supply-side policies squarely belong in the climate policy “toolkit”

Counting carbon or counting coal? Anchoring climate governance in fossil fuel-based accountability frameworks

For decades, the object of international climate governance has been greenhouse gases, standardised to tonnes of carbon dioxide-equivalent. The ongoing inadequacy of decarbonisation efforts based on this system have prompted calls to expand the scope of international climate governance to include restrictions on the supply of fossil fuels. Such initiatives could rely on accountability frameworks based on fossil fuel reserves, production, or infrastructure, yet to date there has been little consideration of the different implications for climate governance of each of these options. We seek to inform such discussions by undertaking a sociotechnical analysis of various existing schemes for the monitoring, reporting and verification of fossil fuels. We identify serious risks from anchoring climate governance in fossil fuel reserves: the extensive role for expert judgement that enters into the construction of reserves figures, and the exclusive control of reserves evaluation and classification practices by profit-motivated firms in the fossil fuel industry, raise serious risks of “gaming”; moreover, the fact that reserves figures are in part a function of climate governance outcomes means reserve-based climate governance would face an endogeneity problem. More promising directions for supply-side climate governance, we find, lie in accountability frameworks based on a combination of fossil fuel production volumes and infrastructure, since infrastructure and production-related transactions are more transparent to a wider range of actors. Crucially, this transparency would provide much-needed opportunities for democratic oversight of the data underpinning climate governance efforts, opening up new channels for holding states to account for their climate performance