Optimal Choice Models for Executing Time to American Options

Based on the structure models of options pricing on non-dividend-paying stock [16], this paper presents the choosing models and methods of optimal time of executing an American options for the first time. By using the models and methods, we can find the choosing criterion and optimal time to exercise the American options, i.e. the product of options price and its occurring probability is at maximum. So we can decide that an American option should be exercised or not in any time. The conclusions in this paper are more important in its consulting effect for single trader and organization investors to make their security market trade.partial distribution; American options; structure pricing; optimal executing; analytic formula

Gambling in contests with regret

This paper discusses the gambling contest introduced in Seel & Strack (Gambling in contests, Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 375, Mar 2012.) and considers the impact of adding a penalty associated with failure to follow a winning strategy. The Seel & Strack model consists of $n$-agents each of whom privately observes a transient diffusion process and chooses when to stop it. The player with the highest stopped value wins the contest, and each player's objective is to maximise their probability of winning the contest. We give a new derivation of the results of Seel & Strack based on a Lagrangian approach. Moreover, we consider an extension of the problem in which in the case when an agent is penalised when their strategy is suboptimal, in the sense that they do not win the contest, but there existed an alternative strategy which would have resulted in victory

Gambling in contests with random initial law

This paper studies a variant of the contest model introduced in Seel and Strack [J. Econom. Theory 148 (2013) 2033-2048]. In the Seel-Strack contest, each agent or contestant privately observes a Brownian motion, absorbed at zero, and chooses when to stop it. The winner of the contest is the agent who stops at the highest value. The model assumes that all the processes start from a common value $x_0>0$ and the symmetric Nash equilibrium is for each agent to utilise a stopping rule which yields a randomised value for the stopped process. In the two-player contest, this randomised value has a uniform distribution on $[0,2x_0]$. In this paper, we consider a variant of the problem whereby the starting values of the Brownian motions are independent, nonnegative random variables that have a common law $\mu$. We consider a two-player contest and prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium for the problem. The solution is that each agent should aim for the target law $\nu$, where $\nu$ is greater than or equal to $\mu$ in convex order; $\nu$ has an atom at zero of the same size as any atom of $\mu$ at zero, and otherwise is atom free; on $(0,\infty)$ $\nu$ has a decreasing density; and the density of $\nu$ only decreases at points where the convex order constraint is binding.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/14-AAP1088 in the Annals of Applied Probability (http://www.imstat.org/aap/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Glass transitions in two-dimensional suspensions of colloidal ellipsoids

We observed a two-step glass transition in monolayers of colloidal ellipsoids by video microscopy. The glass transition in the rotational degree of freedom was at a lower density than that in the translational degree of freedom. Between the two transitions, ellipsoids formed an orientational glass. Approaching the respective glass transitions, the rotational and translational fastest-moving particles in the supercooled liquid moved cooperatively and formed clusters with power-law size distributions. The mean cluster sizes diverge in power law as approaching the glass transitions. The clusters of translational and rotational fastest-moving ellipsoids formed mainly within pseudo-nematic domains, and around the domain boundaries, respectively