The next phase of European climate policy: laying the groundwork with the 2040 target

The outgoing European Commission has published its Communication on a 2040 cli­mate target as its last major climate policy initiative before the 2024 European elec­tions. By recommending a net emissions reduction target of 90 per cent compared to 1990 levels, it lays the strategic foundations for the forthcoming legislative period. At the same time, the policy initiative takes the opportunity to emphasise the growing importance of the interplay between industrial and climate policy, particularly with regard to carbon management technologies. Although reforming the EU’s climate policy architecture for the years 2031 to 2040 will not begin until after the upcoming European elections, the Communication offers a glimpse into the political challenges that the German government will also have to face. (author's abstract

EU-Canada’s strategic partnership: broadening relations and mutual interests

The strengthening of EU-Canada relations in the last years has revealed mutual interests in several policy fields. In times of increasingly tense relations with the US and weakening multilateralism, deepened and broadened bilateral cooperation is of particular importance for both, Canada and the EU. In order to better understand mutual interests and similar challenges, this article explores cooperation in the two different policy fields of foreign and security policy and climate change policy. This analysis of the current situation in international security and climate change policy points out key areas in which closer EU-Canada cooperation could be brought to bear fruits not only for their bilateral relationship but also the alliance for multilateralism in the short run and for years to come

EU trade and climate policy linkages: potentials in times of repositioning

The European Union (EU) was instrumental in successfully negotiating the Paris Agreement in 2015 and is now seeking a rapid international implementation. To this end, climate policy should be brought into line with as many foreign policies as possible, including trade policy. Free trade in environmental goods or the application of national emission standards to traded goods can accelerate climate protection globally. The legal support for this agenda through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its dispute settlement bodies will merely be a longer-term option. Therefore, the EU and its member states should engage on two fronts in particular. Firstly, the fora of the United Nations (UN) and the WTO should make the links between the two policy areas even more transparent. Secondly, the EU can operationalise its regional free trade agreements as a lever to push for the implementation of climate policies in its partner countries. In particular, the EU should review existing trade agreements for their "climate friendliness". If the EU succeeds in redesigning its external relations at this interface, it can both enhance its climate policy performance and become more proactive in trade policy. (Autorenreferat

Climate neutrality as long-term strategy: the EU's net zero target and its consequences for member states

As a traditional frontrunner in international climate policy, the European Union (EU) is under great pressure to meet global expectations. In 2020, it must present its long-term decarbonisation strategy to the United Nations. Political attention has so far focussed on the lack of consensus among the Member States on whether they should adopt the European Commission's proposed goal of "greenhouse gas neutrality" by 2050. Two aspects of this decision have hardly been debated so far - first, the ques­tion of whether this will herald the end of differentiated reduction commitments by Member States, and second, the tightening of the EU climate target for 2030. National governments and climate policymakers will have to take both issues into account. (author's abstract

Unconventional mitigation: carbon dioxide removal as a new approach in EU climate policy

If the EU wants to achieve net zero emissions by 2050, enacting conventional climate change mitigation measures to avoid emissions of greenhouse gases will not be enough. To compensate for unavoidable residual emissions, unconventional measures to remove CO2 from the atmosphere will also be necessary - for example, through afforestation or the direct cap­ture of CO2 from ambient air. Not all member states and economic sectors will have achieved green­house gas neutrality by 2050; some will already need to be below zero by then. The option of CO2 removal from the atmosphere will allow greater flexibility in climate policy, but will also raise new distributional issues. Avoiding greenhouse gas emissions should be given political priority over the subsequent removal of CO2. Net zero targets should be explicitly divided into emission reduction targets and removal targets, instead of simply off­setting the effects of both approaches. The future development of an EU CO2 removal policy should be structured by adequate policy design. Whether the EU chooses a proactive or cautious entry pathway in the medium term will depend not least on the net nega­tive targets it assumes for the period after 2050. In the coming years, the EU should focus on investing more in research and development of CO2 removal methods and gaining more practical experience in their use. Only if the EU and its members actually succeed in convincingly combin­ing conventional emission reductions and unconventional CO2 removals to reach net zero will the EU be able to live up to its status as a pioneer in climate policy. (author's abstract

Shadows over the European elections: three scenarios for EU-sceptical parties after the 2019 elections

For a long time, the elections to the European Parliament (EP) were considered second-order elections with little political significance. But for the elections coming in 2019, they are turning into a decisive vote on the future of the European Union (EU) - not only because the EP has gained in importance, but especially because the European party system is undergoing fundamental change. Whereas established parties are losing support, right-wing populist and EU-sceptical parties have been growing across Europe. At the same time, there are increased efforts to unite the traditionally frag­mented EU-sceptical forces into a collective movement. Even though there is no dras­tic increase expected in the number of EU-sceptical Members of European Parliament (MEPs) in the next parliamentary term, a reorganisation of the EU-sceptical spectrum could be the prelude to drastic changes in the political structure of the EU. (author's abstract

Reforming the European Parliament: Brexit creates opportunity for more than just seat redistribution - but plans are modest (for now)

Reform of the European Parliament is on the agenda in the run-up to the 2019 Euro-pean elections. Two impulses coincide here: First of all, Brexit requires a decision on whether to redistribute the 73 British seats, and if so how. Secondly, the European Parliament is sitting on a backlog of long-overdue reforms relating to its composition; this latter aspect is unlikely to be resolved before the 2019 elections. The Italian and French governments suggest creating a single EU constituency fought on the basis of transnational lists, to strengthen the European plane of party-political competition. But the European Parliament’s rejection of the proposal underlines the lack of majority support for federal initiatives in the EU’s year of reforms. Yet the single constituency discussion does offer potential: Leveraging it to reduce the existing discrepancies in required votes per seat would represent a major contribution to strengthening the Union’s democratic legitimacy. (Autorenreferat

Reforming the European Parliament: Brexit creates opportunity for more than just seat redistribution - but plans are modest (for now)

Reform of the European Parliament is on the agenda in the run-up to the 2019 Euro-pean elections. Two impulses coincide here: First of all, Brexit requires a decision on whether to redistribute the 73 British seats, and if so how. Secondly, the European Parliament is sitting on a backlog of long-overdue reforms relating to its composition; this latter aspect is unlikely to be resolved before the 2019 elections. The Italian and French governments suggest creating a single EU constituency fought on the basis of transnational lists, to strengthen the European plane of party-political competition. But the European Parliament’s rejection of the proposal underlines the lack of majority support for federal initiatives in the EU’s year of reforms. Yet the single constituency discussion does offer potential: Leveraging it to reduce the existing discrepancies in required votes per seat would represent a major contribution to strengthening the Union’s democratic legitimacy. (Autorenreferat

Carbon dioxide removal as an integral building block of the European Green Deal

The implementation of the new net emission targets for 2030 and 2050 as part of the European Green Deal is moving the deliberate removal of CO2 from the atmosphere up the agendas of political decision-makers. In its latest report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) also recently reiterated that net-zero targets can­not be achieved without the deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods. The political debate in the European Union (EU) about CDR has changed rapidly in recent years, with almost all political actors now calling for a new regulatory frame­work for CDR to become an integral building block of EU climate policy. However, fundamental conflicts are brewing over the question as to which removal methods and policy instruments should be implemented and which priorities should be set. There are signs of emerging political alliances on the EU level that will shape the Fit-for-55 legislation in the short term and pre-structure the debate on the design of climate policy between 2030 and 2040. (author's abstract