Protocol I: Moving Humanitarian Law Backwards

Colonel Carnahan of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has reviewed some of the practical military problems with Protocol I. I would like to spend a little time on what might be called the philosophical - or broader political - problems. In particular, I would like to discuss the diplomatic conference that produced the protocol and how it demonstrated the links among law, politics, and terrorism. When you get 126 countries together, as occurred at the diplomatic conference, there is a lot of politics. That is to say, Protocol I is not simply a legal matter than can be grasped using purely legal terms. I propose to examine the main results as reflections of the diplomatic goals of the Soviet bloc, the Third World, and the Western countries

'Full spectrum dominance': Donald Rumsfeld, the Department of Defense, and US irregular warfare strategy 2001-2008

This article examines the evolution of US irregular warfare (IW) doctrine and practice from 2001 onwards. It argues that, after 9/11, top-tier civilian policymakers in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and across the US government developed a heightened awareness of asymmetric threats and non-conventional forms of warfare, especially those shaped by contemporary globalisation. The result was a gradual turn towards irregular warfare, led by Rumsfeld and the DoD, designed to ensure ‘full spectrum dominance’ across all modes of conflict. This pre-dated the insurgency in Iraq and the promotion of counterinsurgency in the US Army by General David Petraeus and others. Policymakers' reluctance to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq was not down to a failure to understand the concept of IW, but because they had viewed Iraq in conventional terms for so many years and were reluctant to admit their mistake

Framing the Issues: An Overview

Moderator: Scott L. Silliman, Executive Director, Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, Duke University School of Law Panelists: Douglas J. Feith, Feith & Zell, P.C., Washington DC Graham T. Allison, Jr., Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Colonel Guy B. Roberts, USMC, Staff Judge Advocate, Second Marine Division and former Joint Staff Representative to arms control discussions at the UN, Geneva and Vienn

Framing the Issues: An Overview

Moderator: Scott L. Silliman, Executive Director, Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, Duke University School of Law Panelists: Douglas J. Feith, Feith & Zell, P.C., Washington DC Graham T. Allison, Jr., Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Colonel Guy B. Roberts, USMC, Staff Judge Advocate, Second Marine Division and former Joint Staff Representative to arms control discussions at the UN, Geneva and Vienn

Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims

In many business transactions, labor-management relations, international conflicts, and welfare-state reforms, bargainers hold strong entitlements that are often generated by claims that are not feasible anymore. These entitlements seem to shape negotiation behavior considerably. By using the novel setup of a Übargaining with claimsÝ experiment, we provide new systematic evidence tracking the influence of entitlements and obligations through the whole bargaining process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions, and (dis)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a Ümoral property rightÝ that is influential independent of negotiators' legal property rights.moral property rights, entitlements, fairness judgments, bargaining with claims, self-serving bias, experiment