The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences

Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) claim that a combination of efficiency seeking and minmax preferences dominates inequity aversion in simple dictator games. This result relies on a strong subject pool effect. The participants of their experiments were undergraduate students of economics and business administration who self-selected into their field of study and learned early on that efficiency is desirable. We show that for non-economists the preference for efficiency is much less pronounced. We also find a gender effect indicating that women are more egalitarian than men. However, perhaps surprisingly, the dominance of equality over efficiency is unrelated to political attitudes

The Role of Equality and Equity in Social Preferences

Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) question the relevance of inequity aversion in simple dictator game experiments claiming that a combination of a preference for efficiency and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is more important than inequity aversion. We show that these results are partly based on a strong subject pool effect. The participants of the E&S experiments were undergraduate students of economics and business administration who self-selected into their field of study (economics) and learned in the first semester that efficiency is desirable. We show that for non-economists the preference for efficiency is much less pronounced. We also find a non-negligible gender effect indicating that women are more egalitarian than men. However, perhaps surprisingly, the dominance of equality over efficiency is unrelated to political attitudes

The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences

Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) claim that a combination of efficiency seeking and minmax preferences dominates inequity aversion in simple dictator games. This result relies on a strong subject pool effect. The participants of their experiments were undergraduate students of economics and business administration who self-selected into their field of study and learned early on that efficiency is desirable. We show that for non-economists the preference for efficiency is much less pronounced. We also find a gender effect indicating that women are more egalitarian than men. However, perhaps surprisingly, the dominance of equality over efficiency is unrelated to political attitudes.Social Preferences; Inequity Aversion; Efficiency Preferences

The Role of Equality and Equity in Social Preferences

Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) question the relevance of inequity aversion in simple dictator game experiments claiming that a combination of a preference for efficiency and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is more important than inequity aversion. We show that these results are partly based on a strong subject pool effect. The participants of the E&S experiments were undergraduate students of economics and business administration who self-selected into their field of study (economics) and learned in the first semester that efficiency is desirable. We show that for non-economists the preference for efficiency is much less pronounced. We also find a non-negligible gender effect indicating that women are more egalitarian than men. However, perhaps surprisingly, the dominance of equality over efficiency is unrelated to political attitudes.Social Preferences; Inequity Aversion; Efficiency Preferences

Light-Induced Acidification by the Antiviral Agent Hypericin

The naturally occurring polycyclic quinone hypericin possesses light-induced antiviral activity against the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and other closely related enveloped lentiviruses such as equine infectious anemia virus (EIAV). We have previously argued that hypericin undergoes a fast proton transfer reaction in its singlet state (J. Phys. Chem. 1994, 98, 5784). We have also presented evidence that the light-induced antiviral activity of hypericin does not depend upon the formation of singlet oxygen (Bioorg. Med. Chem. Lett. 1994, 4, 1339). It is demonstrated here that steady-state illumination of a solution containing hypericin effects a pH drop. When hypericin and an indicator dye, 3-hexadecanoyl-7-hydroxycoumarin,a re both imbedded in vesicles, hypericin transfers a proton to the indicator within a time commensurate to its triplet lifetime. Proton transfer to the indicator is not observed when the indicator is protonated or when the system is oxygenated. Since hypericin is known to form triplets and to generate singlet oxygen with high efficiency, this latter result is taken to confirm triplet hypericin as a source, but not necessarily the only source, of proton

The resurrection of group selection as a theory of human cooperation

Two books edited by members of the MacArthur Norms and Preferences Network (an interdisciplinary group, mainly anthropologists and economists) are reviewed here. These books in large part reflect a renewed interest in group selection that has occurred among these researchers: they promote the theory that human cooperative behavior evolved via selective processes which favored biological and/or cultural group-level adaptations as opposed to individual-level adaptations. In support of this theory, an impressive collection of cross-cultural data are presented which suggest that participants in experimental economic games often do not behave as self-interested income maximizers; this lack of self-interest is regarded as evidence of group selection. In this review, problems with these data and with the theory are discussed. On the data side, it is argued that even if a behavior seems individually-maladaptive in a game context, there is no reason to believe that it would have been that way in ancestral contexts, since the environments of experimental games do not at all resemble those in which ancestral humans would have interacted cooperatively. And on the theory side, it is argued that it is premature to invoke group selection in order to explain human cooperation, because more parsimonious individual-level theories have not yet been exhausted. In summary, these books represent ambitious interdisciplinary contributions on an important topic, and they include unique and useful data; however, they do not make a convincing case that the evolution of human cooperation required group selection

Fiat-Shamir transformation of multi-round interactive proofs

The celebrated Fiat-Shamir transformation turns any public-coin interactive proof into a non-interactive one, which inherits the main security properties (in the random oracle model) of the interactive version. While originally considered in the context of 3-move public-coin interactive proofs, i.e., so-called Σ-protocols, it is now applied to multi-round protocols as well. Unfortunately, the security loss for a (2μ+1)-move protocol is, in general, approximately Qμ, where Q is the number of oracle queries performed by the attacker. In general, this is the best one can hope for, as it is easy to see that this loss applies to the μ-fold sequential repetition of Σ -protocols, but it raises the question whether certain (natural) classes of interactive proofs feature a milder security loss. In this work, we give positive and negative results on this question. On the positive side, we show that for (k1,…,kμ) -special-sound protocols (which cover a broad class of use cases), the knowledge error degrades linearly in Q, instead of Qμ. On the negative side, we show that for t-fold parallel repetitions of typical (k1,…,kμ)-special-sound protocols with t≥μ (and assuming for simplicity that t and Q are integer multiples of μ), there is an attack that results in a security loss of approximately 12Qμ/μμ+t

Fiat–Shamir transformation of multi-round interactive proofs (extended version)

The celebrated Fiat–Shamir transformation turns any public-coin interactive proof into a non-interactive one, which inherits the main security properties (in the random oracle model) of the interactive version. While originally considered in the context of 3-move public-coin interactive proofs, i.e., so-called Σ -protocols, it is now applied to multi-round protocols as well. Unfortunately, the security loss for a (2 μ+ 1) -move protocol is, in general, approximately Qμ , where Q is the number of oracle queries performed by the attacker. In general, this is the best one can hope for, as it is easy to see that this loss applies to the μ -fold sequential repetition of Σ -protocols, but it raises the question whether certain (natural) classes of interactive proofs feature a milder security loss. In this work, we give positive and negative results on this question. On the positive side, we show that for (k1, … , kμ) -special-sound protocols (which cover a broad class of use cases), the knowledge error degrades linearly in Q, instead of Qμ . On the negative side, we show that for t-fold parallel repetitions of typical (k1, … , kμ) -special-sound protocols with t≥ μ (and assuming for simplicity that t and Q are integer multiples of μ), there is an attack that results in a security loss of approximately 12Qμ/μμ+t

Interests, Norms, and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Cooperation

Mitigating climate change requires countries to provide a global public good. This means that the domestic cleavages underlying mass attitudes toward international climate policy are a central determinant of its provision. We argue that the industry-specific costs of emission abatement and internalized social norms help explain support for climate policy. To evaluate our predictions we develop novel measures of industry-specific interests by cross-referencing individuals? sectors of employment and objective industry-level pollution data and employ- ing quasi-behavioral measures of social norms in combination with both correlational and conjoint-experimental data. We find that individuals working in pollutive industries are 7 percentage points less likely to support climate cooperation than individuals employed in cleaner sectors. Our results also suggest that reciprocal and altruistic individuals are about 10 percentage points more supportive of global climate policy. These findings indicate that both interests and norms function as complementary explanations that improve our under- standing of individual policy preferences

Spontaneous Altruism by Chimpanzees and Young Children

People often act on behalf of others. They do so without immediate personal gain, at cost to themselves, and even toward unfamiliar individuals. Many researchers have claimed that such altruism emanates from a species-unique psychology not found in humans' closest living evolutionary relatives, such as the chimpanzee. In favor of this view, the few experimental studies on altruism in chimpanzees have produced mostly negative results. In contrast, we report experimental evidence that chimpanzees perform basic forms of helping in the absence of rewards spontaneously and repeatedly toward humans and conspecifics. In two comparative studies, semi–free ranging chimpanzees helped an unfamiliar human to the same degree as did human infants, irrespective of being rewarded (experiment 1) or whether the helping was costly (experiment 2). In a third study, chimpanzees helped an unrelated conspecific gain access to food in a novel situation that required subjects to use a newly acquired skill on behalf of another individual. These results indicate that chimpanzees share crucial aspects of altruism with humans, suggesting that the roots of human altruism may go deeper than previous experimental evidence suggested