Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon

Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group de- cisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilbirum than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making to a Stackelberg market game, by running both one-shot and repeated markets. Whereas in the one-shot markets we ?nd no signi?cant di¤erences in the behavior of groups and individuals, we ?nd that the behavior of groups is further away from the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the stage game than that of individuals. To a large extent, this result is independent of the method of eliciting choices (sequential or strategy method) and the method used to account for observed ?rst- and second- mover behavior. We provide evidence on followers?response functions and electronic chats to o¤er an explanation for the di¤erential e¤ect that the time horizon of interaction has on the extent of individual and group players?(non)conformity with subgame perfectness.

Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game

This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is a third party independent of the implicated parties who propose the punishment. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, we find an independent third party vetoes not only punishment to the cooperators but punishment to the defectors as well. Compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.Social dilemmas; third party; punishment; cooperation; experiment

Voting on Punishment Systems within a Heterogeneous Group

We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after contributions are made and observed. The productivity of contributions, as captured in the marginal-per-capita return, differs among individuals, so that there are two types: high and low productivity. Every two or eight periods, depending on the treatment, individuals vote on a punishment regime, in which certain individuals are permitted, but not required, to have punishment directed toward them. The punishment system can condition on type and contribution history. The results indicate that the most effective regime, in terms of contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of low contributors only, regardless of productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of sessions converge to this system, indicating a tendency for the voting process to lead to suboptimal institutional choice.voting, punishment, voluntary contributions, heterogeneity, experiment

Recovering complete and draft population genomes from metagenome datasets.

Assembly of metagenomic sequence data into microbial genomes is of fundamental value to improving our understanding of microbial ecology and metabolism by elucidating the functional potential of hard-to-culture microorganisms. Here, we provide a synthesis of available methods to bin metagenomic contigs into species-level groups and highlight how genetic diversity, sequencing depth, and coverage influence binning success. Despite the computational cost on application to deeply sequenced complex metagenomes (e.g., soil), covarying patterns of contig coverage across multiple datasets significantly improves the binning process. We also discuss and compare current genome validation methods and reveal how these methods tackle the problem of chimeric genome bins i.e., sequences from multiple species. Finally, we explore how population genome assembly can be used to uncover biogeographic trends and to characterize the effect of in situ functional constraints on the genome-wide evolution