Measuring Conduct and Cost Parameters in the Spanish Air Transport Market

This paper estimates a model of airline competition for the Spanish air transport market. I test the explanatory power of alternative oligopoly models with capacity constraints. In addition, I analyse the degree of density economies. Results show that Spanish airlines conduct follows a price-leadership scheme so that it is less competitive than the Cournot solution. I also find evidence that thin routes can be considered as natural monopolies.multiple equation models, air transportation, oligopoly

Infrastructure dominance in short-haul air transport markets

En este trabajo, se analiza cómo una compañía aérea puede beneficiarse del dominio de una red de aeropuertos en un mercado caracterizado por rutas de corto radio y congestión. Se estima un sistema de ecuaciones para el mercado español de transporte aéreo. Los resultados muestran que los beneficios del dominio aeroportuario, tanto en términos de demanda como de coste, son consecuencia de ofrecer una frecuencia de servicio elevada. Una frecuencia elevada permite ofrecer mayores descuentos en las clases de tarifas para viajeros por motivos personales y, a su vez, establecer precios más elevados en las clases de tarifas para viajeros por negocios. Tales beneficios pueden perjudicar la posición competitiva de aquellas aerolíneas con presencia limitada en los aeropuertos. De ahí que una asignación equilibrada del espacio en los aeropuertos sea crucial para garantizar la competencia.Competencia, transporte aéreo, modelos de ecuaciones simultáneas.

INTERCONTINENTAL FLIGTHS FROM EUROPEAN AIRPORTS: TOWARDS HUB CONCENTRATION OR NOT?

This paper empirically analyzes changes in the supply of non-stop intercontinental flights from European airports. We take advantage of OAG data for air services from a rich sample of European airports to intercontinental destinations in the period 2004-2008. Results of the empirical analysis indicate a tendency towards a more balanced distribution of intercontinental flights across European airports. We also find that the demographic size of a region, its sector specialization, the political role of its central city and the proportion of connecting traffic explain the amount of and changes in long-haul air services supplied from European airports.airports, air transportation, intercontinental flights

Privatization and competition in the delivery of local services: An empirical examination of the dual market hypothesis

This paper empirically analyses the hypothesis of the existence of a dual market for contracts in local services. Large firms that operate on a national basis control the contracts for delivery in the most populated and/or urban municipalities, whereas small firms that operate at a local level have the contracts in the least populated and/or rural municipalities. The dual market implies the high concentration and dominance of major firms in large municipalities, and local monopolies in the smaller ones. This market structure is harmful to competition for the market as the effective number of competitors is low across all municipalities. Thus, it damages the likelihood of obtaining cost savings from privatization.Competition, Concentration, Local Services, Privatization.

Choosing hybrid organizations for local servicesdelivery: An empirical analysis of partial privatization

The empirical literature about factors explaining local government delivery choices has traditionally focused the attention on the public or private production dilemma. However, hybrid organizational forms such as mixed public-private firms are increasingly used in several European countries. This paper makes use of survey data from Spanish municipalities to examine motivations of local governments for engaging in hybrid organizational forms. Data refer to two very relevant local services: water distribution and solid waste collection. The empirical analysis indicates that the use of mixed firms emerge as a type of pragmatically based ‘third way’ between pure public and pure private production. Indeed, local governments make use of mixed firms when cost considerations (scale economies, transaction costs and so on), financial constraints and private interests exert contradictory pressures. On the contrary, political and ideological factors do not play any significant role on the local government decision of engaging or not in joint ventures with private partners.Partial privatization, local governments

Privatization and regulation of toll motorways in europe.

The private sector plays an increasing and relevant role in highway funding and management. For that reason, the regulation designed and enforced by public authorities becomes even more important for the social welfare results generated by this process. In this study, we analyze the current trends in highway funding and management paying special attention on the recent process of privatization and its motivations. Since public ownership and regulation are substitutes for government intervention, we check the hypothesis that highways privatization induces more strict regulation. Indeed, we observe that as the private sector increases its size, toll regulation becomes more detailed.transport infrastructures, roads, privatization, regulation and tolls

"Why do municipalities cooperate to provide local public services? An empirical analysis"

Intermunicipal cooperation is being increasingly adopted in various countries as a part of local service delivery reforms. This paper draws on survey data from Spain’s municipalities to examine the reasons underpinning the decisions of local governments to engage in intermunicipal cooperation and privatisation. Our empirical analysis indicates that small municipalities prefer to rely on cooperation for reducing costs, while their larger counterparts prefer to privatise the delivery of services. By cooperating, scale economies can be achieved with lower transaction costs and fewer concerns for competition than is the case via private production.Privatization, cooperation, solid waste JEL classification:L33, R51, H72

DOES AIRLINE COMPETITION WORK IN SHORT-HAUL MARKETS?

In this paper, we analyze how an airline can take advantage of airport dominance of a whole network in a market characterized by short-haul routes and congestion. In order to tackle this issue, we estimate an equation system, which is based on theoretical grounds, for the Spanish domestic market. We find that costs and demand benefits of airport dominance have to do with providing a high flight frequency. Such benefits can damage seriously the effectiveness of competition as long as the competitive status of major airline’s rivals is threatened.Air Transportation, Multiple Equation Models, Oligopoly.

Situació actual i escenaris de futur dels aeroports de Catalunya

Vistes les ampliacions en curs, la clau de futur per als aeroports catalans no passa tant per les xifres d’inversió com per la fórmula de gestió. L’actual model espanyol, centralitzat en benefici de Barajas, és l’obstacle principal per a les principals instal·lacions del país. Si els aeroports volen quedar ben servits, així com la població que els envolta, cal que es dotin d’un patró més individual. En els propers anys, un aspecte més crucial que les inversions seran els acords i negociacions que els gestors dels aeroports estableixin amb les companyies aèries. La gestió individualitzada, la més comuna a Europa i països anglosaxons de referència, és una fórmula que permet a l’aeroport negociar amb les companyies que consideri més adients

Does privatization spur regulation?Evidence from the regulatory reform of European airports

This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between privatization and regulation drawing on data from a wide sample of European airports. We find that privatization promotes a shift from basic regulation to a situation of more detailed or non-regulation, depending on the specific characteristics of the privatization process and on the type of airport being privatized. Moreover, we report a significant association between high traffic volumes and more detailed regulation. By contrast, airports where slot allocation is noncoordinated are significantly associated with non-regulation.Privatization; regulation; air transportation; airports JEL classification: L33; L42; L93;