Theory of Cognitive Distortions: Over-Generalisation and Mislabeling

In a previous paper (Compléments pour une théorie des distorsions cognitives, Journal de Thérapie Comportementale et Cognitive, 2007), we introduced some elements aimed at contributing to a general theory of cognitive distortions. Based on the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa, these elements allow to define the general cognitive distortions as well as the specific cognitive distortions. This model is extended here to the description of two other classical cognitive distortions: over-generalisation and mislabelling. The definition of the two latter cognitive distortions is based on preliminary distinction between three levels of reasoning: primary, secondary and ternary pathogenic arguments. The latter analysis also leads to define two other cognitive distortions which insert themselves into this framework: ill-grounded inductive projection and confirmation bias

On the Impossibility of Successful Ontological Arguments

In this paper I present a novel objection to ontological arguments. The argument concerns ontological arguments in general and has the general form of a reductio ad absurdum. Roughly, it rests on the fact that if a sound ontological argument were available, it would contradict the very nature of God. For God aims at maximizing the development of human good qualities (including thus faith) and if a successful ontological argument were available, faith would become unnecessary. Lastly, I review several objections that can be raised against the present argument

A Dichotomic Analysis of the Surprise Examination Paradox

This paper proposes a new framework to solve the surprise examination paradox. I survey preliminary the main contributions to the literature related to the paradox. I introduce then a distinction between a monist and a dichotomic analysis of the paradox. With the help of a matrix notation, I also present a dichotomy that leads to distinguish two basically and structurally different notions of surprise, which are respectively based on a conjoint and a disjoint structure. I describe then how Quine's solution and Hall's reduction apply to the version of the paradox corresponding to the conjoint structure. Lastly, I expose a solution to the version of the paradox based on the disjoint structure

A Brief Introduction to N-universes

I describe in this paper the basic elements of the n-universes, a methodological tool originally introduced in Franceschi (2001) in the context of the study of Goodman's paradox. As the n-universes can be used in wide-ranging applications, such as thought experiments, I describe them from an essentially pragmatic standpoint, i.e. by describing accurately the step-by-step process which leads to a given modelisation

A Dichotomic Analysis of the Surprise Examination Paradox

This paper presents a dichotomic analysis of the surprise examination paradox. In section 1, I analyse the surprise notion in detail. I introduce then in section 2, the distinction between a monist and dichotomic analysis of the paradox. I also present there a dichotomy leading to distinguish two basically and structurally different versions of the paradox, respectively based on a conjoint and a disjoint definition of the surprise. In section 3, I describe the solution to SEP corresponding to the conjoint definition. Lastly, I expose in section 4, the solution to SEP based on the disjoint definition

Complement to a theory of the cognitive distortions

The purpose of this study is to describe a conceptual framework for cognitive distortions, which notably allows to specify more accurately their intrinsic relationships. This conceptual framework aims at inserting itself within the apparatus of cognitive therapy and of critical thinking. The present analysis is based on the following fundamental concepts: the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa. With the help of these three notions, each cognitive distortion can be defined. A distinction is also made between, on the one hand, general cognitive distortions and on the other hand, specific cognitive distortions. The present model allows then to define within the same conceptual framework the general cognitive distortions such as dichotomous reasoning, disqualifying a given pole, minimisation and maximisation. It also allows to describe as specific cognitive distortions: disqualifying the positive, selective abstraction and catastrophism. Furthermore, the present model predicts the existence of two other general cognitive distortions: the omission of the neutral and requalifying in the other pole

A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument

In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their ancestors models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I describe then a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt's models and fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more consensual than the original one

A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument

In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to, on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and, on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their original models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I then describe a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt's models and fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more plausible than the original one

A Logical Defence of Maher's Model of Polythematic Delusions

We proceed to describe a model for the formation and maintenance of polythematic delusions encountered in schizophrenia, which is in adequacy with Brendan Maher's account of delusions. Polythematic delusions are considered here as the conclusions of arguments triggered by apophenia that include some very common errors of reasoning such as post hoc fallacy and confirmation bias. We describe first the structure of reasoning which leads to delusions of reference, of telepathy and of influence, by distinguishing between the primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary types of delusional arguments. These four levels of arguments correspond to a stage the nature of which is respectively instantial, inductive, interpretative at a monothematic level and interpretative at a polythematic level. We also proceed to identify accurately the fallacious steps in the corresponding reasoning. We expose then the role of apophenia in the elaboration of delusional ideas. Lastly, we describe the role played by the hallucinations in the present model