The Principle of Consistent Interpretation: Interpretation of National Law in the Light of EU Law

Načelo lojalne razlage je na prvi pogled najmanj invaziven način učinkovanja prava EU v pravnih redih držav članic. Pravo EU se za razliko od neposrednega učinka pri lojalni razlagi ne uporablja neposredno, ampak je pravna podlaga nacionalno pravo, ki so ga državni organi dolžni razlagati v skladu z besedilom in namenom direktive. Toda obveznost lojalne razlage se ne nanaša le na sodišča, ampak na vse državne organe in na nacionalno pravo kot celoto ter nastopi s potekom roka za implementacijo direktive. Sicer jo najpogosteje povezujemo z direktivami, a obstaja tudi v zvezi z drugimi viri prava EU. Čeprav drži, da SEU lojalne razlage ne zahteva za vsako ceno, so organi držav članic dolžni izčrpati vse možnosti, ki jim jih daje nacionalno pravo, da bi sprejeli lojalno razlago. Gre torej za izjemno intenzivno obveznost, ki od držav članic zahteva veliko več, kot se morda sprva zdi. Mejo lojalni razlagi postavljajo predvsem splošna pravna načela EU: načelo pravne varnosti, načelo prepovedi retroaktivnosti, načelo zakonitosti v kazenskem pravu itd. SEU prepoveduje tudi razlago contra legem, a je ne opredeli. Tako kot nekateri drugi nejasni vidiki doktrine lojalne razlage je definicija contra legem interpretacije prepuščena državnim organom in se med državami članicami lahko razlikuje. V Sloveniji jo razumemo kot razlago, do katere se z uveljavljenimi interpretativnimi metodami ne da priti. Lojalna razlaga je pomembna predvsem zaradi zagotavljanja enotnejše uporabe prava EU in njegove učinkovitosti, še posebej nasproti posameznikom, kjer v skladu z doktrino Marshall I velja prepoved neposrednega učinka direktiv. SEU je tako prek lojalne razlage na prefinjen način razširilo domet direktiv na posameznike, ne da bi pri tem »dvignilo preveč prahu«.At first glance, the principle of consistent interpretation seems to be the least intrusive way of giving effect to EU law in legal orders of Member states. Unlike direct effect, consistent interpretation does not entail direct application of EU law. The legal basis is national law, which national authorities are bound to interpret in accordance with the wording and the purpose of the directive. However, the obligation of consistent interpretation does not relate only to courts, but applies to all national authorities and to the national law as a whole. It applies from the moment of expiry of the deadline for transposition of the directive. In general, it is most commonly linked with directives, but it exists in relation to other sources of EU law as well. Even though it is true that the CJEU does not demand the consistent interpretation at any cost, the Member states’ authorities are nevertheless bound to exhaust all possibilities under national law, in order to ensure a consistent interpretation. Therefore, it is an extremely intensive obligation, requiring much more from the Member States than it may seem on the surface. The principle of consistent interpretation is limited especially by general principles of EU law: the principle of legal certainty, the principle of prohibition of retroactivity, the principle of legality in criminal law etc. Furthermore, the CJEU prohibits the interpretation contra legem, but does not define it. Like some other vague aspects of the doctrine of consistent interpretation, the definition of the contra legem interpretation is left to the state authorities and may therefore vary among Member states. In Slovenia, it is understood as an interpretation which cannot be reached with the use of established methods of statutory construction. Consistent interpretation is particularly important for ensuring the uniform application of EU law and its efficiency, especially with respect to individuals, where direct effect of directives is prohibited according to the Marshall I doctrine. The CJEU has thus extended the scope of application of directives to individuals in a very refined manner and without causing too much of a stir

TRIIAL national reports Belgium, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, The Netherlands

Recent constitutional and legislative changes in several member states are questioning core features of EU rule of law. For the first time ever, the EU institutions have proposed activation of the preventive mechanism in Article 7 TEU against Poland and Hungary, and the European Commission has launched the rule of law conditionality mechanism against Hungary. The jurisprudence of the CJEU finding numerous violations of judicial independence and fundamental rights undermining the rule of law in Europe is growing at a fast pace. Moreover, many preliminary references show the willingness of national courts to engage in judicial dialogue with the CJEU, relying on it to provide harmonised standards and guidelines on the rule of law. However, the future of such interactions is undermined by recent decisions of supreme and constitutional courts limiting the rights of domestic courts to use the preliminary reference procedure and prohibiting their obligation to give effect to EU law based on a tendentious understanding of national constitutional identity. In this context, the TRIIAL project has embarked on an ambitious research quest, which resulted in the present Edited Working Paper. It consists of nine country reports which cover the most relevant issues concerning judicial independence, impartiality, accountability, mutual trust and the rule of law in the jurisdictions of the project partners: Belgium, the Netherlands, Hungary, Romania, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Spain and Slovenia. The country reports primarily build on case law identified and analysed during the TRIIAL project and published in the CJC database. They outline the current state of affairs and challenges the member states face in the topics covered by TRIIAL exposing and analysing specific pressing issues, especially ones that are not yet covered in other reports such as the European Commission’s Rule of Law report.

Selection by the Judicial Council: ignorantia rationis nocet?

Kadrovanje v sodstvu je trenutno v Evropi posebej vroča tema. V Sloveniji ima v izbirnih postopkih osrednjo vlogo Sodni svet, ki naj bi kot garant sodniške neodvisnosti zagotavljal izbor najbolj kompetentnih kandidatov. Toda postopek izbire ni pregleden, obrazložitev izbire pa je preskopa in neprepričljiva. Avtor zato najprej oriše odziv slovenskih sodišč na táko odločanje Sodnega sveta. V sodni praksi se je uveljavil zadržan sodni nadzor, ki temelji na zaupanju diskrecijski izbiri Sodnega sveta. V prispevku je zato slovenska ureditev ocenjena v luči najnovejših evropskih standardov: pravice do učinkovitega sodnega varstva in z zakonom ustanovljenega sodišča, iz 6. člena Evropske konvencije o človekovih pravicah in 19. člena Pogodbe o EU. Kot problematična se izkažeta predvsem neustrezna obrazložitev odločitev in dejstvo, da Sodni svet v nasprotju z veljavno zakonodajo ne piše zapisnika o posvetovanju.Recruitment in the judiciary is currently a particularly hot topic in Europe. In Slovenia, the Judicial Council, as a guarantor of judicial independence having a central role in the appointment procedure, is supposed to ensure the selection of the most competent candidates. However, the selection process fails to be transparent and the reasoning of the choice is insufficient and unconvincing. Therefore, the author first outlines the Slovenian courts’ response to such decision-making of the Judicial Council. Restrained judicial review based on trust in the discretionary choice by the Judicial Council has become established in case law. Therefore, the contribution assesses the Slovenian legal framework in light of the latest European standards: the right to efficient judicial protection and to a tribunal established by law from Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 19 of the Treaty of EU. Especially, the inadequate reasoning of decisions and the fact that the Judicial Council does not write a record of the consultation in violation of the applicable legislation turns to be problematic