The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence fromDismantling the License Raj in India

This paper investigates whether the effects, on registered manufacturing out-put,employment, entry and investment, of dismantling the 'license raj' - a system of centralcontrols regulating entry and production activity in this sector - vary across Indian stateswith different labor market regulations. The effects are found to be unequal depending onthe institutional environment in which industries are embedded. In particular, followingdelicensing, industries located in states with pro-employer labor market institutions grewmore quickly than those in pro-worker environments. Our results emphasize how localinstitutions matter for whether industry in a region benefits or is harmed by thenationwide delicensing reform.

War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict

We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since conflict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time, transmitting them to the next generation. The theory bears a set of testable predictions. First, war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs. Second, the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode. Third, "accidental" conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust, plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects.human capital investment

Vertical integration and technology: theory and evidence

This paper investigates the determinants of vertical integration. We first derive a number of predictions regarding the relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration from a simple incomplete contracts model. Then, we investigate these predictions using plant-level data for the UK manufacturing sector. Most importantly, and consistent with theory, we find that the technology intensities of downstream (producer) and upstream (supplier) industries have opposite effects on the likelihood of vertical integration. Also consistent with theory, both these effects are stronger when the supplying industry accounts for a large fraction of the producer's costs. These results are generally robust and hold with alternative measures of technology intensity, with alternative estimation strategies, and with or without controlling for a number of firm and industry-level characteristics

Endogenous growth and intermediation in an 'archipelago' economy

A general equilibrium model based on the parable of an economy of many islands shows the market imperfections in the intermediation activity affect economic growth and possibly prevent take off into sustained growth. The inhabitants of different islands accumulate heterogeneous assets and transportation-type intermediation allows for better allocation of the productive resources. The development process is accompanied by a reduction in intermediation costs, which induces firms to adopt more efficient techniques and sustains economic growth. A laissez-faire economy suffers from two distortions: the existence of market imperfections and a ''thick market'' externality

The macroeconomics of child labor regulation

We develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws. Workers who compete with children in the labor market support a child labor ban, unless their own working children provide a large fraction of family income. Fertility decisions lock agents into specific political preferences, and multiple steady states can arise. The introduction of child labor laws can be triggered by skill-biased technological change, which induces parents to choose smaller families. The theory can account for the observation that, in Britain, regulations were first introduced after a period of rising wage inequality, and coincided with rapid fertility decline