A methodology for the evaluation of competition policy

The paper develops a methodology for the evaluation of competition policy. Based on the existing literature and experiences with policy evaluations in other areas of economic activity, the three-step / nine-building-blocks methodology provides guidance for evaluation projects and also assists in the identification of avenues for further academic research

The effects of privatization and competitive pressure on firms' price-cost margins: Micro evidence from emerging economies.

This paper uses representative panel data on 1,701 Bulgarian and 2,047 Romanian manufacturing firms to analyze how price-cost margins are affected by privatization and competitive pressure. Privatization is associated with higher price-cost margins. This effect is stronger in highly competitive sectors, which suggests that the creation of competitive markets and privatization go together. It also suggests that privatized firms reduce costs rather than increase prices, as in highly competitive markets firms are more likely pricetakers. Import penetration is associated with lower price-cost margins in sectors where product market concentration is high, but in more competitive sectors this effect is reversed.imperfect competition; incomplete contracts; transition economies; private ownership; market-discipline; eastern-europe; productivity; benefits; performance;

Competition Law, Antitrust Immunity and Profits: A Dynamic Panel Analysis

This paper tests whether the transition from the old Economic Competition Act, which was based on the so-called “abuse system”, to the new Competition Act, which was based on “prohibition system”, in the Netherlands had an impact on the price-cost margins in manufacturing industries during the period 1993-2007. The paper further investigates if the price-cost margins were higher in industries where temporary antitrust immunity was granted for subset of firms that engaged in concerted practices. The results indicate that the change in the competition law in the Netherlands had a very small and negative, yet statistically insignificant deterrent effect on the price-cost margins. Elsewhere, markups were higher in industries in which temporary antitrust immunity was granted for some class of coordinated actions.