Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes

Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one in developing countries. This paper challenges these views. Based on whether influence is sought with rulemakers or rule-enforcers, we develop a conceptual framework that highlights how political institutions are instrumental in defining the choice between bribing and lobbying. We test our predictions using survey data for about 6000 firms in 26 countries. Our results suggest that (a) lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different, (b) political institutions play a major role in explaining whether firms choose bribing or lobbying, (c) lobbying is more effective than corruption as an instrument for political influence, and (d) lobbying is more powerful than corruption as an explanatory factor for enterprise growth, even in poorer, often perceived as highly corrupt, less developed countries.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64386/1/wp930.pd

Nonperturbative Results for Yang-Mills Theories

Some non perturbative aspects of the pure SU(3) Yang-Mills theory are investigated assuming a specific form of the beta function, based on a recent modification by Ryttov and Sannino of the known one for supersymmetric gauge theories. The characteristic feature is a pole at a particular value of the coupling constant, g. First it is noted, using dimensional analysis, that physical quantities behave smoothly as one travels from one side of the pole to the other. Then it is argued that the form of the integrated beta function g(m), where m is the mass scale, determines the mass gap of the theory. Assuming the usual QCD value one finds it to be 1.67 GeV, which is in surprisingly good agreement with a quenched lattice calculation. A similar calculation is made for the supersymmetric Yang-Mills theory where the corresponding beta function is considered to be exact.Comment: RevTeX, 2colmuns, 6 pages and 7 figure

Mass Deformed Exact S-parameter in Conformal Theories

We use the exact expression for the S parameter in the perturbative region of the conformal window to establish its dependence on the explicit introduction of fermion masses. We demonstrate that the relative ordering with which one sends to zero either the fermion mass or the external momentum leads to drastically different limiting values of S. Our results apply to any fermion matter representation and can be used as benchmark for the determination of certain relevant properties of the conformal window of any generic vector like gauge theory with fermionic matter. We finally suggest the existence of a universal lower bound on the opportunely normalized S parameter and explore its theoretical and phenomenological implications. Our exact results constitute an ideal framework to correctly interpret the lattice studies of the conformal window of strongly interacting theories.Comment: 4 pages, 2 figures. 2column

Evaluating the Holevo Cramér-Rao bound for multiparameter quantum metrology

Only with the simultaneous estimation of multiple parameters are the quantum aspects of metrology fully revealed. This is due to the incompatibility of observables. The fundamental bound for multiparameter quantum estimation is the Holevo Cram´er-Rao bound (HCRB) whose evaluation has so far remained elusive. For finite-dimensional systems we recast its evaluation as a semidefinite program, with reduced size for rank-deficient states. We show that it also satisfies strong duality. We use this result to study phase and loss estimation in optical interferometry and three-dimensional magnetometry with noisy multiqubit systems. For the former, we show that, in some regimes, it is possible to attain the HCRB with the optimal (single-copy) measurement for phase estimation. For the latter, we show a nontrivial interplay between the HCRB and incompatibility and provide numerical evidence that projective single-copy measurements attain the HCRB in the noiseless 2-qubit case

Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes

Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one in developing countries. This paper challenges these views. Based on whether influence is sought with rulemakers or rule-enforcers, we develop a conceptual framework that highlights how political institutions are instrumental in defining the choice between bribing and lobbying. We test our predictions using survey data for about 6000 firms in 26 countries. Our results suggest that (a) lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different, (b) political institutions play a major role in explaining whether firms choose bribing or lobbying, (c) lobbying is more effective than corruption as an instrument for political influence, and (d) lobbying is more powerful than corruption as an explanatory factor for enterprise growth, even in poorer, often perceived as highly corrupt, less developed countries.lobbying, corruption, political institutions.

Exotic prepotentials from D(-1)D7 dynamics

We compute the partition functions of D(-1)D7 systems describing the multi-instanton dynamics of SO(N) gauge theories in eight dimensions. This is the simplest instance of the so called exotic instantons. In analogy with the Seiberg-Witten theory in four space-time dimensions, the prepotential and correlators in the chiral ring are derived via localization formulas and found to satisfy relations of the Matone type. Exotic prepotentials of SO(N) gauge theories with N=2 supersymmetries in four-dimensions are also discussed.Comment: 19 page

Policy Uncertainty and Precautionary Savings

In 1997 Chancellor Kohl proposed a major pension reform: he pushed the law through Parliament explaining that the German PAYG system had become unsustainable. One limitation of the new law - one that is crucial for our identification strategy - is that it left the generous pension entitlements of civil servants intact. The year after, in 1998, Kohl lost the elections and was replaced by Gerhard Shroeder. One of the first decisions of the new Chancellor was to revoke of the 1997 pension reform. We use the quasi-experiment of the adoption and subsequent revocation of the pension reform to study how households reacted to the increase in uncertainty about the future path of income that such an event produced. Our estimates are obtained from a diff-in-diff estimator: this helps us overcome the identification problem that often affects measures of precautionary saving. Departing from the majority of studies on precautionary saving we also analyze households' response in terms of labor market choices: we find evidence of a labor supply response by those workers who can use the margin offered by part-time employment.Pension Reform, Precautionary saving, uncertainty, Germany

Lobbying, Corruption and Other Banes

Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one in developing countries. This paper challenges these views. Based on whether influence is sought with rule-makers or rule-enforcers, we develop a conceptual framework that highlights how political institutions are instrumental in defining the choice between bribing and lobbying. We test our predictions using survey data for about 6000 firms in 26 countries. Our results suggest that (a) lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different, (b) political institutions play a major role in explaining whether firms choose bribing or lobbying, (c) lobbying is more effective than corruption as an instrument for political influence, and (d) lobbying is more powerful than corruption as an explanatory factor for enterprise growth, even in poorer, often perceived as highly corrupt, less developed countries.lobbying, corruption, political institutions

Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence

Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and influence using data for about 4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show that (a) lobbying and corruption are substitutes, if anything; (b) firm size, age, ownership, per capita GDP and political stability are important determinants of lobby membership; and (c) lobbying seems to be a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption, even in poorer, less developed countries.