32 research outputs found

    The Phenomenology of Mentality

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    peer reviewedThis paper offers a phenomenological interpretation of Brentano’s view of mentality. The key idea is that mental phenomena are not only characterized by intentionality; they also exhibit a distinctive way of appearing or being experienced. In short, they also have a distinctive phenomenology. I argue this view may be traced back to Brentano’s theory of inner perception (hereafter IP). Challenging the self-representational reading of IP, I maintain the latter is best understood as a way of appearing, that is, in phenomenological terms. Section 1 addresses Brentano’s claim that IP is one mark of the mental alongside intentionality. Sections 2 and 3 present support for a phenomenological interpretation of IP. And Section 4 briefly discusses two objections.The Phenomenology of Mentality (F.R.S.-FNRS Research Project / PDR

    Rutherford backscattering analysis of porous thin TiO2 films

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    The additional energy spread due to sample porosity was implemented in the SIMNRA simulation code, version 6.60 and higher. Deviations of the path length and energy loss distributions from the ones expected from a Poisson distribution of the number of traversed pores are taken into account. These deviations are due to the interaction of pores at higher pore concentrations by overlap or blocking. The skewnesses of the energy distributions are approximated by two-piece normal distributions with identical first three moments. Propagation of porosity-induced energy spread in thick layers is taken into account. Calculated results are compared to experimental data obtained with thin TiO2 mesoporous films measured by Rutherford backscattering (RBS),transmission electron microscopy (TEM), and atmospheric poroellipsometry

    Misleading Expressions: The Brentano-Ryle Connection

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    This chapter argues that Gilbert Ryle’s account of misleading expressions, which is rightly considered a milestone in the history of analytic philosophy, is continuous with Brentano’s. Not only did they identify roughly the same classes of misleading expressions, but their analyses are driven by a form of ontological parsimony which sharply contrasts with rival views in the Brentano School, like those of Meinong and Husserl. Section 1 suggests that Ryle and Brentano share a similar notion of analysis. Section 2 spells out the notion of misleading expression by means of the surface-grammar/truth-conditions distinction, which I argue is implicit in their accounts. Section 3 zooms in on a specific class of misleading expressions, namely expressions about ficta. Finally, Section 4 draws the consequences of what precedes for a correct understanding of the notion of meaning
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