The directionality of distinctively mathematical explanations

In “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?” (2013b), Lange uses several compelling examples to argue that certain explanations for natural phenomena appeal primarily to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In such explanations, the core explanatory facts are modally stronger than facts about causation, regularity, and other natural relations. We show that Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation is flawed in that it fails to account for the implicit directionality in each of his examples. This inadequacy is remediable in each case by appeal to ontic facts that account for why the explanation is acceptable in one direction and unacceptable in the other direction. The mathematics involved in these examples cannot play this crucial normative role. While Lange's examples fail to demonstrate the existence of distinctively mathematical explanations, they help to emphasize that many superficially natural scientific explanations rely for their explanatory force on relations of stronger-than-natural necessity. These are not opposing kinds of scientific explanations; they are different aspects of scientific explanation

Mechanistic Levels, Reduction, and Emergence

We sketch the mechanistic approach to levels, contrast it with other senses of “level,” and explore some of its metaphysical implications. This perspective allows us to articulate what it means for things to be at different levels, to distinguish mechanistic levels from realization relations, and to describe the structure of multilevel explanations, the evidence by which they are evaluated, and the scientific unity that results from them. This approach is not intended to solve all metaphysical problems surrounding physicalism. Yet it provides a framework for thinking about how the macroscopic phenomena of our world are or might be related to its most fundamental entities and activities

High Tc superconductors: The scaling of Tc with the number of bound holes associated with charge transfer neutralizing the multivalence cations

It is observed that for the known high-T(sub c) Cu-, Tl-, and Bi-based superconductors, T(sub c) scales consistently with the number of bound holes per unit cell which arise from charge transfer excitations of frequency approximately = 3 x 10(exp 13) that neutralized the multivalence cations into diamagnetic states. The resulting holes are established on the oxygens. Extrapolation of this empirical fit in the up-temperature direction suggests a T(sub c) of about 220-230 K at a value of 25 holes/unit cell (approximately the maximum that can be materials-engineered into a high-T(sub c) K2MnF4 or triple Perovskite structure). In the down-temperature direction, the extrapolation gives a T(sub c) in the vicinity of 235 K for the Y-Ba-Cu-O system as well as the known maximum temperature of 23 K for low-T(sub c) materials shown by Nb3Ge. The approach is also consistent with the experimental findings that only multivalence ions which are diamagnetic in their atomic state (Cu, Tl, Bi, Pb, and Sb) associate with high-T(sub c) compounds

The Ontic Account of Scientific Explanation

According to one large family of views, scientific explanations explain a phenomenon (such as an event or a regularity) by subsuming it under a general representation, model, prototype, or schema (see Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36(2), 421–441; Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge: MIT Press; Darden (2006); Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation. In C. G. Hempel (Ed.), Aspects of scientific explanation (pp. 331–496). New York: Free Press; Kitcher (1989); Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67(1), 1–25). My concern is with the minimal suggestion that an adequate philosophical theory of scientific explanation can limit its attention to the format or structure with which theories are represented. The representational subsumption view is a plausible hypothesis about the psychology of understanding. It is also a plausible claim about how scientists present their knowledge to the world. However, one cannot address the central questions for a philosophical theory of scientific explanation without turning one’s attention from the structure of representations to the basic commitments about the worldly structures that plausibly count as explanatory. A philosophical theory of scientific explanation should achieve two goals. The first is explanatory demarcation. It should show how explanation relates with other scientific achievements, such as control, description, measurement, prediction, and taxonomy. The second is explanatory normativity. It should say when putative explanations succeed and fail. One cannot achieve these goals without undertaking commitments about the kinds of ontic structures that plausibly count as explanatory. Representations convey explanatory information about a phenomenon when and only when they describe the ontic explanations for those phenomena

Effects of Dysprosium Oxide Nanoparticles on Escherichia coli

There is increasing interest in the study of dysprosium oxide nanoparticles (nDy2O3) for biomedical applications due to their fluorescence and paramagnetic properties. However, the fate of nDy2O3 and their effects on natural biological systems are a growing concern. This study assessed the toxicity of nDy2O3 on Escherichia coli for concentrations between 0.02 and 2 mg L−1, exposed to three concentrations of NaCl (8500, 850, and 85 mg L−1) and three glucose concentrations (35, 70, and 140 mg L−1). The ranges of these variables were selected to cover manufacturer recommendations of analytical methodologies for toxicity assessment, environmental and industrial nDy2O3 effluent concentrations, and metabolic activity. Two array-based toxicity techniques were used to evaluate the 27 combinations of conditions. Fluorescent dyes (Live/Dead) and respirometric assays were used to measure the undisturbed cell membrane (UCM) and remaining respiration percentage (RRP), respectively. Respirometric tests showed a higher toxic effect than Live/Dead test assays, indicating that metabolic processes are more affected than the physical structure of the cell by exposure to nDy2O3. After exposing the bacteria to concentrations of 2.0 mg L−1 uncoated nDy2O3 for 2 h at 85 mg L−1 NaCl and 140 mg L−1 glucose, the RRP and UCM decreased to 43% and 88%, respectively. Dysprosium ion (Dy+3) toxicity measurement suggested that Dy+3 was the main contributor to the overall toxicity

Reviews and perspectives Individuals with episodic amnesia are not stuck in time

a b s t r a c t The metaphor that individuals with episodic amnesia due to hippocampal damage are "stuck in time" persists in science, philosophy, and everyday life despite mounting evidence that episodic amnesia can spare many central aspects of temporal consciousness. Here we describe some of this evidence, focusing specifically on KC, one of the most thoroughly documented and severe cases of episodic amnesia on record. KC understands the concept of time, knows that it passes, and can orient himself with respect to his personal past and future. He expresses typical attitudes toward his past and future, and he is able to make future-regarding decisions. Theories claiming that the hippocampus plays an essential role in temporal consciousness need to be revised in light of these findings

Compare and Contrast: How to Assess the Completeness of Mechanistic Explanation

Opponents of the new mechanistic account of scientific explanation argue that the new mechanists are committed to a ‘More Details Are Better’ claim: adding details about the mechanism always improves an explanation. Due to this commitment, the mechanistic account cannot be descriptively adequate as actual scientific explanations usually leave out details about the mechanism. In reply to this objection, defenders of the new mechanistic account have highlighted that only adding relevant mechanistic details improves an explanation and that relevance is to be determined relative to the phenomenon-to-be-explained. Craver and Kaplan (B J Philos Sci 71:287–319, 2020) provide a thorough reply along these lines specifying that the phenomena at issue are contrasts. In this paper, we will discuss Craver and Kaplan’s reply. We will argue that it needs to be modified in order to avoid three problems, i.e., what we will call the Odd Ontology Problem, the Multiplication of Mechanisms Problem, and the Ontic Completeness Problem. However, even this modification is confronted with two challenges: First, it remains unclear how explanatory relevance is to be determined for contrastive explananda within the mechanistic framework. Second, it remains to be shown as to how the new mechanistic account can avoid what we will call the ‘Vertical More Details are Better’ objection. We will provide answers to both challenges