Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game

Contains fulltext : 112206.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access) Contains fulltext : 112206-a.pdf (author's version ) (Open Access)The paper reports experimental data on the behavior in the first-price sealed-bid auction for a varying number of bidders when values and bids are private information. This feedback-free design is proposed for the experimental test of the one-shot game situation. We consider both within-subjects and between-subjects variations. In line with the qualitative risk neutral Nash equilibrium prediction, the data show that bids increase in the number of bidders. However, in auctions involving a small number of bidders, average bids are above, and in auctions involving a larger number of bidders, average bids are below the risk neutral equilibrium prediction. The quartile analysis reveals that bidding behavior is not constant across the full value range for a given number of bidders. On the high value quartiles, however, the average bid–value ratio is not different from the risk neutral prediction. The behavior is different when the winning bid is revealed after each repetition.22 mei 201327 p

Thar SHE Blows? Gender, Competition, and Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets

Contains fulltext : 138688.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access) Contains fulltext : 138688-a.pdf (author's version ) (Open Access)Do women and men behave differently in financial asset markets? Our results from an asset market experiment using the Smith, Suchaneck, and Williams (1988) framework show marked gender difference in producing speculative price bubbles. Using 35 markets from different studies, a meta-analysis confirms the inverse relationship between the magnitude of price bubbles and the frequency of female traders in the market. Women’s price forecasts also are much lower, even in the first period. Additional analysis shows the results are not due to differences in risk aversion, personality, or math skills. Implications for financial markets and experimental methodology are discussed.15 p

Die Candle Auktion - Eine experimentelle Analyse

Item does not contain fulltextMagdeburg Univ. Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., 3 juni 2009Promotores : Sadrieh, A., Weimann, J

Hidden vs. known gender effects in experimental asset markets

Contains fulltext : 176714.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)Eckel and Füllbrunn (2015) report a striking gender effect in experimental asset markets: Markets with only men produce substantial price bubbles while markets with only women sometimes produce negative bubbles. A possible explanation might be that common expectations about the behavior of men and women in a market drive the bubble formation. If we take away these common expectations, male/female differences might be reduced. Hence, we reran this experiment hiding the single-sex composition of the markets. We find no significant difference between all-male and all-female markets, providing evidence that common expectations play a role in bubble formation

Anonymity deters collusion in hard-close auctions: experimental evidence

Item does not contain fulltext18 p

Testing market regulations in experimental asset markets - the case of margin purchases

Margin requirements regulate the risks of leveraged positions in financial markets. Violated margin requirements trigger margin calls leading to automated liquidation of open margin positions. Due to a lack of active margin regulation, however, empirical studies are not able to capture the effect of margin regulation on asset market performance. Instead, we conduct an experimental finance study to understand how margin regulations, and in particular margin purchases, influence market performance. Our experimental results indicate that permitting margin purchases inflates market prices; in fact, active margin trading positively correlates with market prices. In a robustness check, we also permit short sales which curb though not eliminate the effects from margin purchases

The value of a fallback option

Contains fulltext : 141768.pdf (publisher's version ) (Closed access)Fallback options are relatively common in the business context. If for example a firm fails to acquire a certain target firm—a first-best solution—it may decide to attempt the acquisition of another takeover target—a second best solution. When a decision maker tries to obtain the first-best solution, she may frequently choose different levels of effort to invest into its pursuit. This level of effort is generally influenced by the availability of a fallback option in case she fails to succeed in obtaining her first-best solution. Using a second price auction mechanism, we experimentally test whether subjects react to the existence and attractiveness of this fallback option by changing their bidding behavior. Our results show that subjects only partially adjust to the existence of the fallback option according to the theoretical prediction14 p