133 research outputs found
Deregulation of Business
What determines the enforcement of deregulation reform of business activities? What are the outcomes of deregulation? We address these questions using an episode of a drastic reform in Russia between 2001 and 2004 which liberalized registration, licensing, and inspections. Based on the analysis of micro-level panel data on regulatory burden, we find that: 1) On average, the reform reduced the administrative costs of firms; but, the progress of reform had a substantial geographical variation. 2) The enforcement of deregulation reform was better in regions with a transparent government, low corruption, better access of the public to independent media sources, a powerful industrial lobby, and stronger fiscal autonomy. 3) Using the exogenous variation in regulation generated by the interaction of reform and its institutional determinants, we find a substantial positive effect of deregulation on net entry and small business employment and no effect on pollution and public health. The results support public choice theory of the nature of regulation and are inconsistent with the predictions of public interest theory.
State Capture in a Federation
The paper provides evidence that the welfare effect of decentralization in countries with weak democratic institutions depends on the multi-jurisdictional vs. single-jurisdictional span of interest group lobbies. Weak democracy leads to capture of local authorities. Captors who have multi-jurisdictional scope internalize inter-jurisdictional externalities of local policies to a larger extent than both the captors with interests in a single jurisdiction and not captured local politicians. Particularly, multi-jurisdictional captors lobby for lower inter-regional trade barriers than single-jurisdictional captors. Based on case study evidence and econometric analysis of a unique data set from Russia, we show that capture by multiregional interest groups leads to significantly better performance of firms with no political connections in the neighboring regions and worse performance of such firms in the captured region compared to capture by regional industrial interests with similar political power or situation of no capture. Our findings have implications for international trade as well: lobbying by multinationals leads to lower protectionism compared to lobbying by national corporations.
Inter-Regional Trade and Lobbying
In a federation, local policies with inter-regional spillovers depend on the extent and the nature of local capture. Local lobbyists who have multi-regional scope internalize inter-jurisdictional externalities to a larger extent than the lobbyists with interests in a single region. In particular, multi-regional industrial groups lobby for lower interregional trade barriers than local industrial lobbies. The results are based on a simple model, case-study evidence, and econometric analysis of micro-level panel data from Russia. Controlling for firm-level fixed effects, the performance of firms increases with an increase in the number of neighboring regions captured by multiregional groups. The paper has implications for international trade: lobbying by multinationals should lead to lower protectionism compared to lobbying by national corporations.
Identification, data combination and the risk of disclosure
Businesses routinely rely on econometric models to analyze and predict consumer behavior. Estimation of such models may require combining a firm's internal data with external datasets to take into account sample selection, missing observations, omitted variables and errors in measurement within the existing data source. In this paper we point out that these data problems can be addressed when estimating econometric models from combined data using the data mining techniques under mild assumptions regarding the data distribution. However, data combination leads to serious threats to security of consumer data: we demonstrate that point identification of an econometric model from combined data is incompatible with restrictions on the risk of individual disclosure. Consequently, if a consumer model is point identified, the firm would (implicitly or explicitly) reveal the identity of at least some of consumers in its internal data. More importantly, we provide an argument that unless the firm places a restriction on the individual disclosure risk when combining data, even if the raw combined dataset is not shared with a third party, an adversary or a competitor can gather confidential information regarding some individuals from the estimated model.
Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia
How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measures of the political power of firms and regional regulatory capture using micro-level data on the preferential treatment of firms through regional laws and regulations in Russia during the period 1992-2000. Using these measures, we find that: 1) politically powerful firms perform better on average; 2) a high level of regulatory capture hurts the performance of firms that have no political connections and boosts the performance of politically connected firms; 3) capture adversely affects small business growth and the tax capacity of the state; 4) there is no evidence that capture affects aggregate growth.Regulatory capture, institutional subversion, Russia, redistribution, special interest politics
Cyllodes ater (Coleoptera, Nitidulidae) found again in Finland
Cyllodes ater (Herbst), which has been considered extinct in Finland, and is very rare in the other North European countries, was found in eastern Finland in 1993
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