39 research outputs found
Information technology, capabilities and Asset Ownership: Evidence from Taxicab Fleets
We examine how information technology (IT) influences asset ownership through its impact on firms’ and agents’ capabilities. In particular, we propose that when IT is a substitute for agents’ industry-specific human capital, IT adoption leads to increased vertical integration. We test this prediction using micro data on vehicle ownership patterns from the Economic Census during a period when computerized dispatching systems were first adopted by taxicab firms. The empirical tests exploit exogenous variation in local market conditions, to identify the impact of dispatching technology on firm asset ownership. The results show that firms increase the proportion of taxicabs owned by 12% when they adopt new computerized dispatching systems. The findings suggest that firms increasingly vertically integrate when they acquire resources that substitute for their agents’ capabilities.
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Diversification, Coordination Costs and Organizational Rigidity: Evidence from Microdata
This paper examines the impact of coordination costs and organizational rigidity on the returns to diversification. The central thesis is that coordination costs offset economies of scope, while organizational rigidity increases coordination costs, further constraining economies of scope. The empirical tests of this proposition identify the effects of coordination and organizational rigidity costs on business-unit and firm productivity, using novel data from the Economic Census on taxicab and limousine firms. The key results show that coordination and organizational rigidity costs are economically and statistically significant, while organizational rigidity itself accounts for a 16% decrease in paid ride-miles per taxicab in incumbent diversifiers, controlling for the other costs and benefits of diversification and incumbency. The findings suggest that coordination costs, in general, and organizational rigidity costs, in particular, limit the scope of the fir
Diversification, Coordination Costs, and Organizational Rigidity: Evidence From Microdata
This paper examines the impact of coordination costs and organizational rigidity on the returns to diversification. The central thesis is that coordination costs offset economies of scope, while organizational rigidity increases coordination costs, further constraining economies of scope. The empirical tests of this proposition identify the effects of coordination and organizational rigidity costs on business unit and firm productivity, using novel data from the Economic Census on taxicab and limousine firms. The key results show that coordination and organizational rigidity costs are economically and statistically significant, while organizational rigidity itself accounts for a 16 percent decrease in paid ride-miles per taxicab in incumbent diversifiers, controlling for the other costs and benefits of diversification and incumbency. The findings suggest that coordination costs, in general, and organizational rigidity costs, in particular, limit the scope of the firm
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Information Technology, Productivity, and Asset Ownership: Evidence from Taxicab Fleets
We develop a simple model that links the adoption of a productivity-enhancing technology to increased vertical integration and a less skilled workforce. We test the model's key prediction using novel microdata on vehicle ownership patterns from the Economic Census during a period when computerized dispatching systems were first adopted by taxicab firms. Controlling for time-invariant firm-specific effects, firms increase the proportion of taxicabs under fleet ownership by 12% when they adopt new computerized dispatching systems. An instrumental variables analysis suggests that the link between dispatching technology and vertical integration is causal. These findings suggest that increasing a firm's productivity can lead to increased vertical integration, even in the absence of asset specificity
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Information Technology, Productivity, and Asset Ownership: Evidence from Taxicab Fleets
We develop a simple model that links the adoption of a productivity-enhancing technology to increased vertical integration and a less skilled workforce. We test the model's key prediction using novel microdata on vehicle ownership patterns from the Economic Census during a period when computerized dispatching systems were first adopted by taxicab firms. Controlling for time-invariant firm-specific effects, firms increase the proportion of taxicabs under fleet ownership by 12% when they adopt new computerized dispatching systems. An instrumental variables analysis suggests that the link between dispatching technology and vertical integration is causal. These findings suggest that increasing a firm's productivity can lead to increased vertical integration, even in the absence of asset specificity
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Diversification, Diseconomies of Scope, and Vertical Contracting: Evidence From the Taxicab Industry
This paper studies how firms reorganize following diversification, proposing that firms use outsourcing, or vertical disintegration, to manage diseconomies of scope. We also consider the origins of scope diseconomies, showing how different underlying mechanisms generate contrasting predictions about the link between within-firm task heterogeneity and the incentive to outsource following diversification. We test these propositions using microdata on taxicab and limousine fleets from the Economic Census. The results show that taxicab firms outsource, by shifting the composition of their fleets toward owner-operator drivers, when they diversify into the limousine business. The magnitude of the shift toward driver ownership is larger in less urban markets, where the tasks performed by taxicab and limousine drivers are more similar. These findings suggest that (1) firms use outsourcing to manage diseconomies of scope at a particular point in the value chain and (2) interagent conflicts can be an important source of scope diseconomies
How Do Mobile Information Technology Networks Affect Firm Strategy and Performance? Firm-Level Evidence from Taxicab Fleets
This paper examines how the adoption of mobile information technology
networks impact firm strategy and performance in the U.S. taxicab
industry. Using a rich, novel firm-level data set from the Economic
Census, I test transaction cost economics' prediction that adoption of
mobile IT networks leads to shifts in the boundary of the firm toward
increased fleet ownership of vehicles. I then exploit the homogeneity of
the industry's production function and exogenous variation in local
market conditions to precisely measure the impact of adoption of mobile
IT networks on productivity. I find strong evidence that firms respond
to adoption of mobile IT networks by changing their organizational
structure, shifting toward owning a greater fraction of vehicles in
their fleets (as opposed to contracting with independent driver-owners
for vehicles). I then use a precise and economically meaningful measure
of firm performance to show that adoption of mobile IT networks causes
firms to become more productive. The results suggest that adoption of
mobile IT networks increases asset utilization by improving within-firm
coordination but that firms must simultaneously shift toward a more
highly vertically integrated structure to fully capture the benefits of
mobile IT networks
Integration and Task Allocation: Evidence From Patient Care
Using the universe of patient transitions from inpatient hospital care to skilled nursing facilities and home health care in 2005, we show how integration eliminates task misallocation problems between organizations. We find that vertical integration allows hospitals to shift patient recovery tasks downstream to lower-cost organizations by discharging patients earlier (and in poorer health) and increasing post-hospitalization service intensity. Although integration facilitates a shift in the allocation of tasks and resources, health outcomes either improved or were unaffected by integration on average. The evidence suggests that integration solves coordination problems that arise in market exchange through improvements in the allocation of tasks across care settings
Integration and Task Allocation: Evidence from Patient Care
We develop a formal model to show how integration solves task allocation problems between organizations and test the predictions of the model, using a large and rich patient-level dataset on hospital discharges to nursing homes and home health care. As predicted by the theory, we find that vertical integration allows hospitals to shift patient recovery tasks downstream to lower cost delivery systems by discharging patients earlier and in poorer health, and integration leads to greater post-hospitalization service intensity. While integration facilitates a shift in the allocation of tasks, health outcomes are no worse when patients receive care from an integrated provider. The evidence suggests that by improving the allocation of tasks, integration solves coordination problems that arise in market exchange.