R&D cooperation versus R&D subcontracting: empirical evidence from French survey data.

This paper uses a survey of French firms active in R&D to identify the determinants of R&D outsourcing and of the ensuing trade-off between R&D subcontracting and R&D cooperation. Internal R&D expenditures increase both the probability of outsourcing and the number of R&D partners. Investment in fundamental R&D, group belonging, and the sector’s high R&D intensity positively influences the probability of R&D outsourcing but have less impact on the number of partners. R&D subcontracting is more likely than R&D cooperation when the relationship deals with generic, standardized R&D processes, as reflected in the influence of several qualitative proxies.R&D cooperation, R&D subcontracting, organizational choices.

Protection endogène des biens intermédiaires en agence commune

Endogenous protection of intermediate goods in a common agency framework Using influence-driven approach developedby Grossman and Helpman [1994], we show that the level and the structure of protection rates that emerge in the political equilibrium depend on the nature of the contribution schedules made by lobbies. Whereas in some cases tariff escalation occurs due to consumer goods counter-lobbying, intermediate goods may however be better protected than consumer goods in the political equilibrium.Protection endogène des biens intermédiaires en agence commune À partir du modèle de contributions politiques développé par Grossman et Helpman [1994], nous montrons que le pouvoir politique des différents agents de l'économie ainsi que le niveau et la structure des taux de protection à l'équilibre diffèrent suivant la nature des barèmes de contributions des groupes de pression. Si, dans certains cas, l'existence d'un contre-lobbying actif des secteurs aval permet de retrouver le phénomène de progressivité des tarifs, il est cependant possible qu'à l'équilibre les biens intermédiaires soient mieux protégés que les biens finals.Dhont-Peltrault Estelle. Protection endogène des biens intermédiaires en agence commune. In: Revue économique, volume 53, n°3, 2002. pp. 459-468

L’indemnisation du chômage en France au regard des pratiques européennes

Unemployment Benefits in France Compared with European Practices. Cross-country comparisons of public financial support schemes for jobseekers require examining and evaluating many parameters related to unemployment insurance (such as eligibility criteria and benefit level and duration) as well as to benefit and tax rules. Comparative analysis of jobseekers’ net replacement rates shows that, on average, France is in line with European practices. However, France stands out for its very high maximum benefit level, the preponderant share of benefits in the net income of unemployed people and the low attention paid to their family situation. Unemployment benefit conditions also seem fairly lenient in France, with easier access to benefits and for a relatively long duration.La comparaison internationale des dispositifs publics de soutien financier en direction des demandeurs d’emploi repose sur la prise en compte de nombreux paramètres relatifs aux conditions d’indemnisation par l’assurance-chômage (accès, montant, durée, etc.) mais également aux caractéristiques du système de protection sociale et d’imposition. Dans le paysage européen, la France se caractérise par un taux de remplacement net des demandeurs d’emploi modéré en moyenne, mais élevé pour de hauts niveaux de salaire antérieurs, avec une part prépondérante des allocations chômage et une faible prise en compte de la situation familiale des demandeurs d’emploi. Les conditions d’indemnisation du chômage apparaissent également relativement accommodantes en France avec notamment une facilité d’accès à l’assurance chômage pour une durée relativement élevée.Dhont-Peltrault Estelle. L’indemnisation du chômage en France au regard des pratiques européennes. In: Économie & prévision, n°210, 2017. pp. 139-146

Protection endogène des biens intermédiaires en agence commune

Using influence-driven approach developed by Grossman and Helpman [1994], we show that the level and the structure of protection rates that emerge in the political equilibrium depend on the nature of the contribution schedules made by lobbies. Whereas in some cases tariff escalation occurs due to consumer goods counter-lobbying, intermediate goods may however be better protected than consumer goods in the political equilibrium. Classification JEL : F13, D72

Protection endogène des biens intermédiaires en agence commune

[fre] Protection endogène des biens intermédiaires en agence commune. . À partir du modèle de contributions politiques développé par Grossman et Helpman [1994], nous montrons que le pouvoir politique des différents agents de l'économie ainsi que le niveau et la structure des taux de protection à l'équilibre diffèrent suivant la nature des barèmes de contributions des groupes de pression. Si, dans certains cas, l'existence d'un contre-lobbying actif des secteurs aval permet de retrouver le phénomène de progressivité des tarifs, il est cependant possible qu'à l'équilibre les biens intermédiaires soient mieux protégés que les biens finals. [eng] Endogenous protection of intermediate goods in a common agency framework. . Using influence-driven approach developedby Grossman and Helpman [1994], we show that the level and the structure of protection rates that emerge in the political equilibrium depend on the nature of the contribution schedules made by lobbies. Whereas in some cases tariff escalation occurs due to consumer goods counter-lobbying, intermediate goods may however be better protected than consumer goods in the political equilibrium.

L'entrepreneuriat en France: Mythes et réalités en comparaison internationale

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L'entrepreneuriat en France : Comment mieux accompagner la prise de risque des créateurs d'entreprises ?

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An Assessment of the Distributional Impact of Agricultural Trade Policies in the Triad

This paper estimates the distributional impact of agricultural trade policies in the Triad using the new concept of effective protection developed by Anderson (1998). The level of protection received by an industry is measured by the uniform tariff, which is equivalent in terms of sector specific rents to the actual differentiated tariff structure. It thus reflects the ability of specific factors owners to preserve their incomes at the expense of general welfare. In order to evaluate the cost of agricultural trade policies we construct an original computable general equilibrium framework, which incorporates three sources of price distortions: ad-valorem tariffs (which include ad-valorem equivalents of specific tariffs and tariff quotas), export and production subsidies or taxes. Our estimations allow us to evaluate international differences in levels of trade liberalization in agricultural sectors and to bring out some properties of the effective protection rates developed by Anderson. On the first point, we show that the cost of agricultural trade policies in the Triad is far from being trivial. This cost, measured in terms of the sacrifice bear by the community to protect sectoral rents is particularly high in Japan and in the European Union in the cereal sector. On the second point, we stress the discrepancy between the new concept of effective protection and the usual one defined as the percentage change in value added per unit induced by the tariff structure

R&D cooperation versus R&D subcontracting: empirical evidence from French survey data

This paper uses a survey of French firms active in R&D to identify the determinants of the trade-off between R&D subcontracting and R&D cooperation. We observe that R&D subcontracting is more likely than R&D cooperation when the partner is chosen on objective criteria, such as prices, quality certificates and geographic proximity. Subcontracting relationships also involve less uncertainty, are less likely to lead to patent deposits and less frequently involve public research institutions. These results are coherent with the hypothesis that R&D subcontracting mainly concerns standardized R&D processes.R&D cooperation, R&D subcontracting, organizational choices,