A NONPARAMETRIC TEST OF ADVERTISING'S EFFECTIVENESS

Nonparametric demand analysis uses axioms of revealed preference to test a data set for compatibility with the hypothesis of stable preferences. Previous applications have tested for the presence of structural change using this approach. This paper shows how to include demand shifters such as advertising in the analysis. It is shown that the implied results for changes in tastes depend on restrictions on advertising's effects.Marketing,

IS COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT BENEFICIAL FOR PUBLIC POLICY EFFICIENCY?

Replaced with revised version of paper 08/02.Political Economy,

IS COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT BENEFICIAL FOR PUBLIC POLICY EFFICIENCY?

Community involvement in public policy might have controversial effects on policy efficiency and equity. In this paper we evaluate the involvement of communities in a tradable permit policy, intendent to protect for environmental quality. We show that by integrating communities into the initial allocation of rights, we can achieve higher environmental quality, increase social welfare and correct for structural market failures

A NONPARAMETRIC TEST OF ADVERTISING'S EFFECTIVENESS

Nonparametric demand analysis uses axioms of revealed preference to test a data set for compatibility with the hypothesis of stable preferences. Previous applications have tested for the presence of structural change using this approach. This paper shows how to include demand shifters such as advertising in the analysis. It is shown that the implied results for changes in tastes depend on restrictions on advertising's effects

Recycled Effluent: Should the Polluter Pay?

A coastal city can either dispose of recycled effluent by dumping it in the sea, or transfer it to farmers in its hinterland for irrigation. Who should bear the cost of recycling? Three alternatives are employed: a central planner who maximizes the combined utility of city and farmers; regulation by prices, for which purpose we develop the city's supply function;and a bargaining framework for the allocation of costs. The main conclusions are that “the polluter pays” rule cannot be justified in principle and that bargaining may result in inefficiency. We demonstrate with an example from Israel that essentially conforms to the theoretical structure. Copyright 2001, Oxford University Press.

Optimal Allocation of Tradable Pollution Rights and Market Structures

Tradable environmental rights are increasingly pursed as a regulatory instrument, to control for environmental quality. However, in the presence of market power, regulation through an allocation of tradable rights generally yield inefficient outcomes. This article analyzes the effect of the initial distribution of tradable rights on the firms’ strategies and performance in abatement and production, and proposes an efficient criterion for the allocation of tradable rights among firms with market power and competitive fringe firms. The suggested criterion maximizes efficiency of the market based regulation. A simple numerical example illustrates the theoretical discussion. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005Tradable pollution rights, allocation efficiency, environmental policy, L130, Q580, Q520,