Finance and hunger : empirical evidence of the agricultural productivity channel

Using cross-country and panel regressions, the authors show that financial sector development significantly reduces undernourishment (hunger), largely through gaining farmers and others access to productivity-enhancing equipment, translating into beneficial income and general effects. They show specifically that a deeper financial sector leads to higher agricultural productivity, including higher cereal yields, through increased fertilizer and tractor use. Higher productivity in turn leads to lower undernourishment. The results are robust to various specifications and econometric tests and imply that a 1 percentage point increase in private credit to GDP reduces undernourishment by 0.22-2.45 percentage points, or about one-quarter the impact of GDP per capita.Economic Theory&Research,Rural Poverty Reduction,Achieving Shared Growth,Inequality

The Political Economy of Financial Fragility

While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on enforcement of investor protection, which may be structured so as to block funding for new entrants, or limit their access to refinance after a shock. This forces inefficient default and exit by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen financial fragility. After large external shocks, borrowers from the political elite in very corrupt countries may successfully lobby for weak enforcement, and retain control of collateral. We provide evidence that industry exit rates and profit margins after banking crises are higher in the most corrupt countries.

Do incumbents manipulate access to finance during banking crises?

The author tests the hypothesis that during systemic banking crises, access to finance is opportunistically tightened by incumbents to eliminate or weaken competition from mainly young firms. He finds this to be especially true in more corrupt countries. To do so, he uses a methodology similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998) on three-digit manufacturing industry-level data provided by the United Nations Statistics Division for about 15 industrial and developing countries in over 20 industries on average. The author shows that price-cost margins in externally more financially dependent industries are higher during crisis than in externally less dependent industries in countries with higher levels of corruption. He finds the opposite relationship for the change in the industry-level number of establishments during a crisis. The results withstand an array of robustness checks, including using different indices of corruption, different controls, and robust estimation techniques.

Does Campaign Finance imply Political Favors?

This paper provides empirical evidence that campaign contributions arestrongly associated with market expectations of future firm-specific political favors,including preferential access to external financing. Using a novel dataset, we find thatfirms in Brazil providing contributions in the 1998 campaign to (elected) federal deputiesexperienced higher stock returns following the election, even after controlling forindustry-specific effects and firm-specific controls. This suggests that federal deputieswere expected to shape policy to benefit these firms in particular. Consistent with suchpolitical favors, we find that these firms relative to a control group substantially increasedtheir financial leverage in the four years following election, suggesting that contributionsgained firms preferential access to finance

Treatment-related mortality in children with cancer:Prevalence and risk factors

Aim: Intensive treatment regimens have contributed to a marked increase in childhood cancer survival rates. Death due to treatment-related adverse effects becomes an increasingly important area to further improve overall survival. In this study, we examined 5-year survival in children with cancer to identify risk factors for treatment-related mortality (TRM). Methods: All children (aged <18 years at diagnosis) diagnosed with cancer in 2 Dutch university hospitals between 2003 and 2013 were included, survival status was determined and causes of death were analysed. Various demographic and treatment factors were evaluated, for which a multivariable competing risks analysis was performed. Results: A total of 1764 patients were included; overall 5-year survival was 78.6%. Of all 378 deaths, 81 (21.4%) were treatment-related, with infection being responsible for more than half of these deaths. Forty percent of TRM occurred in the first three months after initial diagnosis. Factors associated with TRM in the multivariable competing risks analysis were diagnosis of a haematological malignancy, age at diagnosis <1 year and receipt of allogeneic haematopoietic stem cell transplantation. In children suffering from haematological malignancies, TRM accounted for 56.3% of 103 deaths. Conclusion: Over one in five deaths in children with cancer death was related to treatment, mostly due to infection. In children suffering from a haematological malignancy, more children died due to their treatment than due to progression of their disease. To further increase overall survival, clinical and research focus should be placed on lowering TRM rates without compromising anti-tumour efficacy. The findings presented in this study might help identifying areas for improvement

The impact of a cancer Survivorship Care Plan on gynecological cancer patient and health care provider reported outcomes (ROGY Care): study protocol for a pragmatic cluster randomized controlled trial

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>There is a need for improvement of information provision and post-treatment care for cancer survivors. A Survivorship Care Plan (SCP) is recommended by the American Institute of Medicine and the Dutch Health Council, which is a summary of patients' course of treatment as a formal document, and includes recommendations for subsequent cancer surveillance, management of late effects, and strategies for health promotion. Until now, evidence on the effects of implementing the SCP in clinical practice is lacking. The rationale and study design of a pragmatic cluster randomized trial, aiming to assess the impact of SCP care in routine clinical practice, is presented.</p> <p>Methods/Design</p> <p>A web-based patient registration system 'Registrationsystem Oncological GYnecology' (ROGY) is used by gynecologists in the South of the Netherlands since 2006. A personalized SCP can automatically be generated out of ROGY. In this pragmatic cluster randomized controlled trial, 12 hospitals are randomized to either 'usual care' or 'SCP care'. In patients with 'usual care', the gynecologist provides care as usual. In patients with 'SCP care', information about the tumor stage and treatment is personally discussed with the patient and a document is handed to the patient. Prospectively, all patients diagnosed with endometrial or ovarian cancer in the participating hospitals will be approached for study participation. Patients will complete questionnaires after surgery, and before additional treatment, and after 6, 12, 18 and 24 months. In addition, health care providers will be asked their opinion about implementation of SCP care. Primary outcome is defined as patient satisfaction with information provision and care. Secondary outcomes are illness perception, health-related quality of life, health care use, prevalence, course and referral rate of survivors with psychosocial distress, and health care providers' evaluation of SCP care.</p> <p>Discussion</p> <p>The ROGY Care trial will help to gain insight into the impact of SCP care on patient reported outcomes, and on the evaluation of cancer survivors and health care providers of the different elements of the SCP. Therefore, results will contribute to efforts to improve quality of care for cancer survivors.</p> <p>Trial registration</p> <p>Trial Registration: <url>http://www.ClinicalTrials.gov</url>. Identifier: <a href="http://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01185626">NCT01185626</a></p> <p>Medical Research Ethics Committee Reference Number: NL33429.008.10 Grant Reference Number: UVT2010-4743</p

The Political Economy of Financial Fragility

October 2005While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on enforcement of investor protection, which may be structured so as to block funding for new entrants, or limit their access to refinance after a shock. This forces inefficient default and exit by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen financial fragility. After large external shocks, borrowers from the political elite in very corrupt countries may successfully lobby for weak enforcement, and retain control of collateral. We provide evidence that industry exit rates and profit margins after banking crises are higher in the most corrupt countries.21世紀COEプログラム = 21st-Century COE Progra

The Political Economy of Financial Fragility

While financial liberalization has in general favorable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on enforcement of investor protection, which may be structured so as to block funding for new entrants, or limit their access to refinance after a shock. This forces inefficient default and exit by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen financial fragility. After large external shocks, borrowers from the political elite in very corrupt countries may successfully lobby for weak enforcement, and retain control of collateral. We provide evidence that industry exit rates and profit margins after banking crises are higher in the most corrupt countries.Politics; Lobbying; Financial Development; Investor protection

The Political Economy of Financial Fragility

While financial liberalization has in general favourable effects, reforms in countries with poor regulation is often followed by financial crises. We explain this variation as the outcome of lobbying interests capturing the reform process. Even after liberalization, market investors must rely on enforcement of investor protection, which may be structured so as to block funding for new entrants, or limit their access to refinance after a shock. This forces inefficient default and exit by more leveraged entrepreneurs, protecting more established producers. As a result, lobbying may deliberately worsen financial fragility. After large external shocks, borrowers from the political elite in very corrupt countries may successfully lobby for weak enforcement, and retain control of collateral. We provide evidence that industry exit rates and profit margins after banking crises are higher in the most corrupt countries.entry; exit; financial crises; inequality; political economy; refinancing; strategic default