9 research outputs found
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Friends with Benefits? Power and Influence in Proxy Warfare
This dissertation analyzes patterns of power and influence in the context of proxy alliances between states and armed, non-state groups. In particular, I explore the following questions: Why do some states have leverage over their non-state proxies, while others find themselves at the behest of their far weaker allies? Put differently, why doesn't a state's enormous material advantage systematically translate into an ability to influence the behavior of proxy groups? Governments often find themselves stymied by belligerent proxies and drawn into unwanted conflict escalation with adversaries--precisely what states sought to avoid by relying on covert, indirect alliances in the first place. I argue that the very factors that make proxy warfare appealing to states--its clandestine, informal nature--threaten to undermine governments' abilities to exert leverage over their proxies.
Governments seek out proxy alliances when the material or political costs of directly confronting an adversary are unappealingly high, driven by the logic that proxy groups can help states achieve their foreign policy objectives "on the cheap" and in a way that allows states to plausibly deny involvement in a conflict. However, the actions states must take to ensure plausible deniability, specifically the decisions political leaders make about how they will manage and oversee a proxy ally, can undermine their leverage. The decisions political leaders make about alliance design and management, which have negative effects on their bargaining power, are fundamentally driven by two related logics: the requirements of plausible deniability, and attempts to navigate the preferences of domestic political veto players and bureaucracies.
Plausible deniability requires establishing as much distance as possible between a decision maker and a proxy and/or operating with a minimal footprint on the ground. To do so, political leaders often delegate authority for managing tasks pertaining to the proxy alliance to covert organizations with the security sector (e.g., intelligence organizations). However, this clandestine and informal delegation is problematic in two respects. First, the bureaucratic actor to whom the political leader delegates authority for carrying out tasks pertaining to the proxy alliance has a general incentive to ensure its organization is abundantly resourced. Therefore, it has a vested interest in the perpetuation of the proxy alliance. Second, bureaucratic leaders (as well as all of the other individuals to whom authority is delegated) may have personal, political, or ideological preferences that differ substantially from those of the political leadership.
If the effects of delegating authority in this way are so perverse, why do leaders do it? And why don't they reign in wayward bureaucrats? At the most basic level, leaders have a high valuation for plausible deniability for international or domestic political reasons (to avoid retaliation from an adversary or keep things secret from domestic political actors), and powerful, entrenched bureaucracies are difficult to control. Digging deeper, however, there is a compelling domestic political story that existing accounts of proxy alliances have neglected to tell. Political leaders often abdicate authority to other bureaucratic actors or individuals--even when they may foresee the issues identified above--as a strategy for protecting themselves from domestic political veto players with strong policy preferences that diverge substantially from their own.
To evaluate the explanatory scope of the theory, I explore patterns of influence in proxy alliance in a series of comparative case studies, in which I use process tracing and structured, focused comparison to assess whether and to what extent decisions about alliance management affect a state's leverage over its non-state proxy. Specifically, I analyze bargaining power in six different proxy alliances: the Syria-Fatah alliance in the 1960s-70s; the alliance between the FNLA and UNITA in Angola and the United States from 1975-76; the India-Mukti Bahini alliance in East Pakistan in 1971; the United States-UNITA alliance in Angola in the 1980s; the alliance between the United States, Iran, and Israel, and the KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1970s; and the alliance between India and Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. I compare the explanatory scope of my theory to the interstate alliance politics literature, and find that my theory not only accounts for the unexplained variation in the universe of cases, but also offers a more complete understanding of the dynamics of state-proxy relationships
Ten Years In: Implementing Strategic Approaches to Cyberspace
This book represents a look beyond theories and analogies to examine the challenges of strategy implementation. In the essays that follow, practitioners who are building cyberspace forces at-scale join scholars who study power and force in this new domain to collectively offer a unique perspective on the evolution and future of cyber strategy and operations.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1044/thumbnail.jp
Cyber Command Needs New Acquisition Authorities
The Department of Defense acquisitions process drives how the military builds and equips its fighting forces to achieve strategic priorities set by national leadership, and it is a central element of how the military determines planning, budgeting and procurement. The overall projected budget planning process, called the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), takes place in five-year intervals and is organized into 12 different MFP categories, each of which represents a combination of the personnel, forces and appropriated funding that together constitute a Defense Department program to achieve certain objectives. How the MFP categories are defined and organized, and which elements within the Pentagon manage the acquisition authorities associated with each MFP category, is important: These issues shape what kinds of capabilities the department can acquire for different missions and purposes
Allies and Airpower in Libya
[...]time provided breathing room for the fledging opposition force to become more skilled. [...]there is little available evidence regarding Syrian rebels' skill level
What do the Trump Administration\u27s Changes to PPD-20 Mean for Offensive Cyber Operations?
The Wall Street Journal recently reported that the Donald J. Trump administration removed some of the restrictions governing the approval process for offensive cyberattacks conducted against U.S. adversaries under Presidential Policy Directive 20 (PPD-20). With the elevation of U.S. Cyber Command to a unified combatant command in May 2018—on par with the Pentagon’s other combatant commands—the logic behind the reported revisions was that the commander of Cyber Command should have authority to take action comparable to that of other combatant command commanders
Confidence Building Meaures for the Cyber Domain
There is a growing debate among scholars and practitioners in the cyber conflict field regarding the extent to which the cyber domain is likely to be characterized by inadvertent escalatory spirals and arms races between increasingly cyber-capable states. Historically, technological innovation or geopolitical dynamics have propelled states to form confidence building measures (CBM) or create arms control regimes to institutionalize constraints on offensive military technology and guard against inadvertent conflict and escalation. We argue that cyber CBMs could blunt some of the factors that contribute to crises and escalation. Given the absence of arms control regimes for the cyber domain, cyber CBMs could be used to mitigate the risks to stability between states and possibly change the incentives that could lead to crises. In assessing current cyber confidence building initiatives, this article creates a novel framework to better understand these efforts. It also identifies limits of cyber CBMs and provides prescriptions for new steps in cyber CBMs to enhance mutual security and guard against inadvertent conflict stemming from cyber operations