The effects of inflation on growth and fluctuations in dynamic macroeconomic models

Economic Growth;Macroeconomic Models;Inflation;Monetary Models

The Nonlinear Phillips Curve and Inflation Forecast Targeting - Symmetric Versus Asymmetric Monetary Policy Rules

We extend the Svensson (1997a) inflation forecast targeting framework with a convex Phillips curve. We derive an asymmetric target rule, that implies a higher level of nominal interest rates than the Svensson (1997a) forward looking version of the reaction function popularised by Taylor (1993). Extending the analysis with uncertainty about the output gap, we find that uncertainty induces a further upward bias in nominal interest rates. Thus, the implications of uncertainty for optimal policy are the opposite of standard multiplier uncertainty analysis.inflation targets;nonlinearities;asymmetries;stochastic control

A note on "macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated game"

Game Theory;Elections;Econometrics

Credibility and Transparency of Central Banks: New Results Based on Ifo’s World Economicy Survey

This paper reports the results of a survey among private sector economists about credibility and transparency of central banks. In line with the survey of Alan Blinder among central bankers, we asked participants in Ifo’s World Economic Survey to answer questions on the importance and determinants of credibility. The results of both surveys are very comparable. Credibility is considered to be important to attain price stability at low cost, while the best ways to earn credibility are a history of honesty and a high level of central bank independence. According to our respondents, the Federal Reserve is the most credible, transparent and independent central bank out of seven large central banks. The ECB is not perceived as highly credible or tranparent, even though our respondents consider it to be very independent.transparency, credibility, independence, monetary policy, ECB

Fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity: Stackelberg versus Nash equilibrium.

Several recent studies have shown that, when fiscal and monetary authorities play a Stackelberg game, central bank opacity has a fiscal disciplining effect in the sense that it induces the government to reduce taxes and public expenditures, leading hence to lower inflation and output distortions, and lower macroeconomic variability. We show in this paper that, in a Nash equilibrium, the government is still disciplined by central bank opacity. However, the disciplining effect on the level and variability of inflation and the output gap is dominated by the direct effect of opacity.Distortionary taxes, output distortions, central bank transparency (opacity), fiscal disciplining effect.

Time preference and international tax competition

Taxation;Capital Movements;Preferences;Models

Evolutionary game theory

Game Theory

Phonebanking

Banking;Market Structure;Game Theory