A Political Economy of the Immigrant Assimilation: Internal Dynamics

Within immigrant society different groups wish to help the migrants in different ways – immigrant societies are multi-layered and multi-dimensional. We examine the situation where there exists a foundation that has resources and that wishes to help the migrants. To do so they need migrant groups to invest effort in helping their country-folk. Migrant groups compete against one another by helping their country-folk and to win grants from the foundation. We develop a model that considers how such a competition affects the resources invested by the groups’ supporters and how beneficial it is to immigrants. We consider two alternative rewards systems for supporters – absolute and relative ranking – in achieving their goals.

Migration and Culture

Culture is not new to the study of migration. It has lurked beneath the surface for some time, occasionally protruding openly into the discussion, usually under some pseudonym. The authors bring culture into the open. They are concerned with how culture manifests itself in the migration process for three groups of actors: the migrants, those remaining in the sending areas, and people already living in the recipient locations. The topics vary widely. What unites the authors is an understanding that though actors behave differently, within a group there are economically important shared beliefs (customs, values, attitudes, etc.), which we commonly refer to as culture. Culture and identify play a central role in our understanding of migration as an economic phenomenon; but what about them matters? Properly, we should be looking at the determinants of identity and the determinants of culture (prices and incomes, broadly defined). But this is not what is done. Usually identity and culture appear in economics articles as a black box. Here we try to begin to break open the black box.migration, culture

Migration and Culture

Culture is not new to the study of migration. It has lurked beneath the surface for some time, occasionally protruding openly into the discussion, usually under some pseudonym. The authors bring culture into the open. They are concerned with how culture manifests itself in the migration process for three groups of actors: the migrants, those remaining in the sending areas, and people already living in the recipient locations. The topics vary widely. What unites the authors is an understanding that though actors behave differently, within a group there are economically important shared beliefs (customs, values, attitudes, etc.), which we commonly refer to as culture. Culture and identify play a central role in our understanding of migration as an economic phenomenon; but what about them matters? Properly, we should be looking at the determinants of identity and the determinants of culture (prices and incomes, broadly defined). But this is not what is done. Usually identity and culture appear in economics articles as a black box. Here we try to begin to break open the black box.

Why Pay Taxes When No One Else Does?

In this paper we try to understand the phenomena whereby a large proportion of the population evades tax payments. We present a model which incorporates elements from the theory of information cascades with the standard model of tax evasion and analyze the connection between the decision of a potential tax evader, the number of tax evaders and the number caught in previous periods. General conditions exist under which any expected utility maximizing tax evaders will decide to emulate other tax evaders.uncertainty, information cascades, tax evasion

A Political Economy of the Immigrant Assimilation: Internal Dynamics

Within immigrant society different groups wish to help the migrants in different ways – immigrant societies are multi-layered and multi-dimensional. We examine the situation where there exists a foundation that has resources and that wishes to help the migrants. To do so they need migrant groups to invest effort in helping their country-folk. Migrant groups compete against one another by helping their country-folk and to win grants from the foundation. We develop a model that considers how such a competition affects the resources invested by the groups’ supporters and how beneficial it is to immigrants. We consider two alternative rewards systems for supporters – absolute and relative ranking – in achieving their goals.migration, assimilation, political economy

Good Governance and Good Aid Allocation

We model the aid allocation decision where the donor government has announced that good governance is the criterion for receiving aid. Potential recipients must compete for the aid funds. The structure of the competition is important to the donor in terms of achieving good governance, and to the recipients in terms of what they receive. The leaders of potential recipient countries look at aid availability through this contest as part of the competing objectives they face – some good, some not good. The donor country prefers a contest under which the aid will only go to one country while the leaders of the receiving countries prefer that each country obtains the proportion of aid relative to its governance quality. If poverty reduction is an independent goal as well, a poverty trap may be created. With good governance as a criterion, donors may work through both bilateral and multilateral agencies.foreign aid, governance, decentralization, rent seeking

Ethnicity, Assimilation and Harassment in the Labor Market

We often observe minority ethnic groups at a disadvantage relative to the majority. Why is this and what can be done about it? Efforts made to assimilate, and time, are two elements working to bring the minority into line with the majority. A third element, the degree to which the majority welcomes the minority, also plays a role. We develop a simple theoretical model useful for examining the consequences for assimilation and harassment of growth in the minority population, time, and the role of political institutions. Over time, conflicts develop within the minority group as members exhibit different interests in assimilating and in maintaining their cultural identity. We discuss how this affects the minority’s position over time and the influence of public policy.networks, harassment, contracts, assimilation, ethnicity, market structure

A Political Economy of the Immigrant Assimilation: Internal Dynamics

Within immigrant society different groups wish to help the migrants in different ways – immigrant societies are multi-layered and multi-dimensional. We examine the situation where there exists a foundation that has resources and that wishes to help the migrants. To do so they need migrant groups to invest effort in helping their country-folk. Migrant groups compete against one another by helping their country-folk and to win grants from the foundation. We develop a model that considers how such a competition affects the resources in-vested by the groups’ supporters and how beneficial it is to immigrants. We consider two alternative rewards systems for supporters – absolute and relative ranking – in achieving their goals.

Poverty and Governance: The Contest for Aid

Countries compete with one another for funds distributed by nongovernment organizations (NGOs). We examine the competition over poverty and governance conducted by a NGO in the allocation of its funds among potential recipient countries. The NGO in its decisionmaking process also takes into account the initial conditions of each potential recipient, including the current quality of governance and wealth (poverty). For example, all else equal, the poorer country will have a higher probability of obtaining funds; or, the better the applicant?s governance, the greater are its gains. Moreover, the maximum aid a country can obtain depends on its wealth. Investment in good governance, the wealth/poverty status of the applicant, and its current quality of governance will in conjunction determine the funds potential recipients can expect to obtain. We also consider recent changes in the levels of these factors in our attempt to understand the roles these factors play in the competition for aid, and the outcome for the quality of governance.nongovernment organizations, NGOs, aid, competition

Prospective Evaluation of Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Performed in Dogs and Cats According to the RECOVER Guidelines. Part 1: Prognostic Factors According to Utstein-Style Reporting.

Factors associated with positive cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) outcomes defined according to the veterinary Utstein-style CPR reporting guidelines have not been described since implementation of the Reassessment Campaign on Veterinary Resuscitation (RECOVER) CPR clinical guidelines in 2012. The aims of this study were to assess factors associated with positive CPR outcomes at a U.S. veterinary teaching hospital, to re-evaluate these factors since implementation of the RECOVER guidelines compared to reported factors prior to their publication, and to identify potential additional factors since guideline publication. One-hundred and seventy-two dogs and 47 cats that experienced cardiopulmonary arrest (CPA) and had CPR performed were prospectively included in this observational study. Supervising clinicians were asked to complete a data form on CPR events immediately following completion of CPR efforts. Multivariable logistic regression was used to evaluate the effect of twenty hospital, animal, and arrest variables on the three patient outcomes "any return of spontaneous circulation (ROSC)," "sustained ROSC," and survival to hospital discharge. Cats had significantly higher odds to achieve any ROSC [OR (95%CI) 2.72 (1.12-6.61), p = 0.028] and survive to hospital discharge than dogs [OR (95%CI) 4.87 (1.52-15.58), p = 0.008]. Patients had significantly lower odds of achieving any ROSC if CPA occurred during nighttime hours [OR (95%CI) nighttime = 0.52 (0.27-0.98), p = 0.043], and higher odds if CPA was witnessed [OR (95%CI) 3.45 (1.57-7.55), p = 0.002], if less people were involved in CPR efforts [OR (95%CI) 0.8 (0.66-0.96), p = 0.016], if pulses were palpable during CPR [OR (95%CI) 9.27 (4.16-20.63), p < 0.0005], and if an IV catheter was already in place at the time of CPA [OR (95%CI) 5.07 (2.12-12.07), p = 0.0003]. Odds for survival to hospital discharge were significantly higher if less people were involved in CPR efforts [OR (95%CI) 0.65 (0.46-0.91), p = 0.013] and for patients of the anesthesia service [OR (95%CI) 14.82 (3.91-56.17), p = 0.00007]. Overall, factors associated with improved CPR outcomes have remained similar since incorporation of RECOVER guidelines into daily practice. Witnessed CPA events and high-quality CPR interventions were associated with positive patient outcomes, emphasizing the importance of timely recognition and initiation of CPR efforts. An optimal CPR team size has yet to be determined