Biosecurity of select agents and toxins

CHDS State/LocalThe concept of biosecurity as it pertains to Biological Select Agents and Toxins in American biomedical research institutions is explored in some depth. Posing the research question "How can specific public biomedical research universities securely use and store biological select agents?" the thesis outlines the dynamics of the select agent and toxin list, the relevant history of the control of biological agents both in the international and domestic settings, including federal regulations pertaining to biosecurity (42CFR73). Two specific case studies are presented in the thesis. The biosecurity strategies and tactics at these two distinct biomedical research are compared. An answer to the research question is proposed and additional areas for research are outlined.http://archive.org/details/biosecurityofsel109452290Captain, the University of Texas at Houston Police DepartmentApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Performance Standards of University Police Departments

Evaluates performance standards and performance measure criteria

Converging and emerging threats to health security

Advances in biological sciences have outpaced regulatory and legal frameworks for biosecurity. Simultaneously, there has been a convergence of scientific disciplines such as synthetic biology, data science, advanced computing and many other technologies, which all have applications in health. For example, advances in cybercrime methods have created ransomware attacks on hospitals, which can cripple health systems and threaten human life. New kinds of biological weapons which fall outside of traditional Cold War era thinking can be created synthetically using genetic code. These convergent trajectories are dramatically expanding the repertoire of methods which can be used for benefit or harm. We describe a new risk landscape for which there are few precedents, and where regulation and mitigation are a challenge. Rapidly evolving patterns of technology convergence and proliferation of dual-use risks expose inadequate societal preparedness. We outline examples in the areas of biological weapons, antimicrobial resistance, laboratory security and cybersecurity in health care. New challenges in health security such as precision harm in medicine can no longer be addressed within the isolated vertical silo of health, but require cross-disciplinary solutions from other fields. Nor can they cannot be managed effectively by individual countries. We outline the case for new cross-disciplinary approaches in risk analysis to an altered risk landscape