Third time’s the charm? Bulgaria’s November elections and the elusive quest for a parliamentary majority

Bulgaria has held three parliamentary elections in 2021, with the latest vote taking place on 14 November alongside the first round of the country’s presidential election. In the second round of the presidential vote, held on 21 November, incumbent President Rumen Radev was re-elected for another five-year term. Kjell Engelbrekt and Petia Kostadinova write that amid widespread frustration with the country’s political leaders, there is now a mandate for a new government to implement real change

Kärnvapen i en alltmer multipolär värld : forskningsöversikt och jämförande analys av amerikansk, brittisk, fransk och rysk doktrin

The first part of this report provides an overview of the history of nuclear weapons doctrine, as it evolved in parallel to the practice of warfare and war planning in the mid-1940s and subsequently as an integral element of the cold war. A distinction is made between the early development of nuclear weapons doctrine, when United States held a dominant position in the field, and the near-parity situation that ensued in the late 1960s and onwards. The second part of the report consists of an analysis of American, British, French and Russian nuclear weapons doctrine between 1991 and 2018, illustrating how a period of low tension was gradually replaced with a reinvigoration of mutual suspicion after the year 2000. A third part briefly examines recent contributions to the American scholarly debate about the utility of nuclear weapons for strategic thought in a world moving toward polycentrism, as it revisits earlier theoretical insights and challenges conventional wisdoms. The fourth and final part elicits lessons for Sweden in particular. Overall, the report demonstrates that nuclear weapons consistently have represented an integral element of managing security risks in the Western hemisphere but that domestic political and defense industry considerations play in as well. It also suggests that doctrinal adjustments mirror the major concerns of policymakers in this regard and that nuclear powers are well aware of special obligations and privileges ascribed to them by countries that lack this category of weapons. A world in which the United States wields the greatest share of this power (unipolarity) will nonetheless be quite different from one in which two countries possess roughly the same capacity (bipolarity), and yet fundamentally different from one in which three or more countries compete to gain, or sustain, an edge toward others (multipolarity). To the extent that the world is moving toward greater security competition including the dimension of nuclear power, it will inevitably be more difficult for individual states to remain on the sidelines, unless they are ready to compromise their political autonomy. In terms of options for aligning Sweden with a broader security arrangement in the near future, there are only three feasible alternatives that may offset the risk of nuclear coercion: responding within the framework of the EU, forge closer ties to NATO, or build a bilateral relationship to the United States. Each such option comes with its own set of assets and liabilities, as does remaining a passive bystander.Transaltantisk och europeisk säkerhet , FORB

Beyond Burdensharing and European Strategic Autonomy : Rebuilding Transatlantic Security After the Ukraine War

The war in Ukraine unleashed in early 2022 may temporarily obscure the long-term trend that the United States is shrinking its military footprint in and around Europe, as the defence posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Central Europe suddenly was bolstered by tens ofthousands of additional US troops. For as long as the war drags on, certainly, these reinforcements will stay in place. But if, and when, the war ends or shifts to attrition warfare stretching out for years, aswas the case after the 2014 annexation of the Crimea, one can easily envisage changes in how European governments manage security and defence issues among themselves and in relation to their North American counterparts. While the debate on transatlantic security so far has played out in two distinct modes, either focusing on the economic side of burdensharing or projecting a vision of European strategic autonomy, there is a need for a more sober understanding of the future division of labour, one that would be grounded in the right blend of economics and deterrence. The main suggestion of this article is that stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ‘split the difference’ and strike a new grand bargain on the basis of their respective strengths. Once key issues of financial equity and militarydeterrence have been adequately addressed, European governments will still have their work cut out forthemselves. They must elaborate solutions to specific challenges at the sub-strategic theatre level and atthe same time navigate the complexities of optimizing defence reforms, aligning regional force designs and rendering foreign policy compatible with the strategic priorities of the European Union (EU) and Europe at large

What Carl Schmitt Picked Up in Weber’s Seminar : A Historical Controversy Revisited

The intellectual relationship between Carl Schmitt and Max Weber has been a point of controversy for at least half a century. At the 1964 convention of the German Sociological Association, in honor of Weber's centenary, Schmitt was famously referred to as Weber's “legitimate student.” This article uses the chapter Schmitt specifically wrote for an edited volume in Weber's memory, published in 1923, as the starting point for juxtaposing the two scholars, and then expands the analysis to encompass a range of sources and commentaries. The comparison focuses on the approach of each of the two scholars to methodology and didactics, theory and conceptual use, as well as to the society/social science nexus. The article concludes by arguing that Schmitt performed a double rhetorical move: while styling himself as Weber's student, he then drew on that authority to assault Weber's liberalism and concept of scientific integrity

Mission Creep? The Nontraditional Security Agenda of the G7/8 and the Nascent Role of the G20

In 2008–2011, the Group of 20 swiftly eclipsed the Group of 7, created in themid-1970s as an informal mechanism for stabilizing markets and facilitating transnational currency exchange and investment. Several observers have expressed the view that the former, broader group is also destined to appropriate the role of the Group of 8, the G7’s pioneering successor in the realm of nontraditional security. This article examines the G7/8 legacy of forgingquasi-permanent institutional arrangements and frameworks in this policy area and goes on to gauge nontraditional security initiatives subsequently launched by the G-20. Having juxtaposed the past record of these bodies and analyzed the interests and power dynamics that influence member stateaction in the short and long term, the article outlines three basic options for how the relationship between the G-20 and the G7/8 may evolve

Mission Creep? The Nontraditional Security Agenda of the G7/8 and the Nascent Role of the G20

In 2008–2011, the Group of 20 swiftly eclipsed the Group of 7, created in themid-1970s as an informal mechanism for stabilizing markets and facilitating transnational currency exchange and investment. Several observers have expressed the view that the former, broader group is also destined to appropriate the role of the Group of 8, the G7’s pioneering successor in the realm of nontraditional security. This article examines the G7/8 legacy of forgingquasi-permanent institutional arrangements and frameworks in this policy area and goes on to gauge nontraditional security initiatives subsequently launched by the G-20. Having juxtaposed the past record of these bodies and analyzed the interests and power dynamics that influence member stateaction in the short and long term, the article outlines three basic options for how the relationship between the G-20 and the G7/8 may evolve

The Missing Link in the EU's Nascent Strategic Approach toward Asia : Military Diplomacy

The Lisbon Treaty enacted in 2009 allows the European Union (EU) to adopt a foreign, security, and defense policy with a higher profile. In particular, the High Representative and the European External Action Service are now in a position to conduct a continuous conversation with China, India, Japan, and ASEAN beyond trade-oriented dialogues. But a genuine strategic approach toward Asia requires military expertise so as to adequately assess how to best contribute to stability in this part of the world. Military diplomacy involving individual member states already takes place, yet virtually no information is shared at the EU level. The adoption of a full-fledged strategic approach toward Asia would not only be politically astute and make excellent economic sense; it can also consolidate EU institutions in the realm of foreign, security and defense policy

Responsibility Shirking at the United Nations Security Council : Constraints, Frustrations, Remedies

The United Nations Security Council is the primary international body in charge of upholding international peace andsecurity. Permanent and nonpermanent member states share in the responsibility to avert great power conflicts andthwart asymmetric disputes, regional instability and civil war, but the former task has priority and the prerogatives andtherefore the obligations of the five permanent member states widely exceed those of countries that hold two-yearelected seats. The bifurcation of roles nevertheless produces ‘responsibility shirking’, which weakens Council perfor-mance on the latter type of tasks. This article suggests that responsibility shirking is underreported in the literatureeven though it is well known to diplomatic practitioners. It considers three types of remedies to the situation, arguingthat amendments to the UN Charter or the Provisional Rules of Procedure are unlikely, but that piecemeal and prag-matic reform could precipitate a change of mindset. In particular, allowing nonpermanent member states to co-chairthe drafting of resolutions is likely to engage all member states in the core business of the Council