Canada as the Target of GDR Espionage

German Democratic Republic (GDR) diplomatic missions included a legal residentur: an intelligence service base whose presence was more or less openly acknowledged. This was staffed by the Hauptverwaltung A (HVA - Main Directorate Foreign Intelligence), one of the principal divisions within the Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security). The HVA’s main task was espionage. While most of the HVA files have been destroyed, the HVA had created a special database which holds all of the information it produced between 1969 and 1989. This database allows us to identify which source delivered what information and when, who received the information, and what value each piece of information had. The GDR’s Canadian embassy did not open until 1987, and due to the short term of its existence the HVA residentur in Canada could hardly have played a significant intelligence role. And we can almost be certain that it did not build up and manage an unofficial spy network from Canada. In fact, the HVA appears to have acquired its knowledge about Canada primarily from other sources, mainly agents within the West German foreign ministry and from other partner intelligence agencies. The GDR had undoubtedly deep insights into the domestic and foreign affairs of Canada. They were well informed about the role Canada played within NATO and within the Helsinki Accord. Within Canada, regulations governing everyday life were of primary concern, indicating that the country was being used as an operational spearhead. Knowledge about the Canadian intelligence services was fragmentary and selective, but also very accurate. Although there has been no evidence concerning East German spies in Canada, we cannot definitely conclude that there were none. Only the Canadian Security Intelligence Service can shed light on that

How Successful was the Stasi in the West after all?

The author has attempted to assess the effectiveness of activity of Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HV A), i.e the intelligence unit of the GDR Ministry for State Security (MfS/ Stasi). The circumstances of the unification of Germany and the liquidation of the GDR would indicate that the primary task of HV A, that is defence of state interests, was not accomplished. Detailed analysis presented by the author shows that the final assessment of the effectiveness of HV A is more complicated. The author suggested an evaluation model which in his opinion is useful to review the work of intelligence services, assuming that the degree of accomplishment of the intelligence objectives was the main indicator of the effectiveness and success of the HV A activities. Effectiveness of work of the intelligence should also have translated into long-term existence and activity of the service. The third indicator was defined by the author as the customer and employee satisfaction. In this case, it concerned, among other things, the loyalty and sense of identification of the HV A employees and agents. The author’s conclusions also concern the possibility of comparing the activity of HV A against the work of other intelligence services

Short Takes: Intelligence-Service Psychology: A German Perspective

To date, four German volumes in the series Intelligence-Service Psychology (Nachrichtendienstpsychologie) have been published. These volumes generated interest in both the German and non-German speaking communities. It was therefore decided to translate some of the basic articles of the series into English (Litzcke, Müller-Enbergs & Ungerer, 2008), making them accessible to a wider range of readers. This article contains abbreviated versions of the articles in the book