Book review: A Europe made of money: the emergence of theEuropean monetary system

The current crisis in the eurozone has roots going back four decades to the negotiations that eventually led to the introduction of the Euro. In A Europe Made of Money, Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol examines those negotiations and the politics and motivations of those that participated. Aidan Regan finds that the book illustrates the important role played by political elites and EU institutions in shaping Europe’s economic and monetary union, and is a crucial read for those wanting to understand the eurozone’s current problems

The Euro crisis: a historical perspective

In this research report IDEAS explores the current euro crisis by looking at the debates preceding the conception of the euro. How can the early days of EU monetary cooperation help us understand today's predicament? And what lessons can we draw from them for the euro? Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol is Pinto Fellow at LSE IDEAS. Today's debates about the viability of the eurozone bear a striking resemblance with those about the creation of a European single currency in the late twentieth century. The early steps of European monetary cooperation, the negotiations over the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS), those over the creation of the euro, as well as the other plans suggested which eventually failed (the proposal for a European parallel currency for instance), help us better understand the challenges that the euro faces today. Many of the issues at stake then are indeed still central to debates now. The question of the transfer of resources from richer to poorer member states, the adoption of a German-inspired interpretation of monetary policy, to take but two examples, are issues that anyone reading today's newspapers will be familiar with. This paper argues that looking at these past debates do not just provide an insight into the past – but also helps us better understand our current predicament

Don't blame the Euro: historical reflections on the roots of the Eurozone crisis

The article argues that many of the issues that are causing trouble in the eurozone today had long been debated, but not solved, prior to the beginning of the so-called euro crisis. Three thematic examples are used to show this: the decade-long discussion surrounding economic convergence and the question of a transfer union; the dispute over the alleged use of financial mechanisms as a substitute for addressing structural economic weaknesses; and the development of European banking regulation and supervision before the creation of the single currency. Finally, the article argues that even though some of the features of today’s crises – in particular the debt and deficit issues – were outlined at the time of the euro’s introduction, some important recent developments such as the various new operations undertaken by the European Central Bank were not. This should command modesty and cautiousness in the analysis of the evolution of the euro crisis

Laurent Warlouzet, Governing Europe in a Globalizing World : Neoliberalism and its Alternatives following the 1973 Oil Crisis

Laurent Warlouzet, Governing Europe in a Globalizing World : Neoliberalism and its Alternatives following the 1973 Oil Crisis, Abingdon, Routledge, 2018; 288 pp.; £105.00 hbk; ISBN 9781138729421

Rethinking Franco-German relations: a historical perspective. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n˚29 | November 2017

Franco-German relations as the ‘engine’ of European integration are widely perceived to have stalled in recent years. This policy contribution assesses what the Franco-German relationship can achieve, what its shortcomings are, and what it means for the wider governance of the euro area and the European Union

La cenerentola d'Europa? L'Italia e l'integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi by Antonio Varsori

No abstract available

Le développement des centres financiers internationaux depuis la fin du système Bretton Woods: le cas de Bahreïn, 1966-1986 = The rise of international financial centres after the breakdown of Bretton Woods: The case of Bahrain, 1966-1986

Cet article analyse le développement de Bahreïn en tant que centre financier international dans les années 1970 et 1980. L’article analyse d’abord les raisons qui permettent d’expliquer le développement soudain et spectaculaire de Bahreïn en tant que centre financier international. Ensuite il étudie jusqu’à quel point Bahreïn est un centre de dimension réellement internationale, en particulier comparé à Beyrouth et Singapour. Finalement, l’article analyse les raisons qui peuvent expliquer pourquoi aucune crise bancaire ne s’est développée sur l’île, malgré un développement financier rapide qui aurait pu laisser penser à la formation de bulles spéculatives. <br/> <br/> This article focuses on the development of Bahrain as an international financial centre in 1970s and 1980s. The article first analyses the reasons that contribute to explain the sudden and spectacular rise of Bahrain as an international financial centre. Then it moves to scrutinise the extent to which Bahrain’s rise was truly international in scope especially compared to Beirut and Singapore. Finally, the article reflects on the reasons why no banking crisis occurred on the island, in spite of a rapid financial development which could have signalled the growth of a banking bubble

The role of a creditor in the making of a debt crisis: the French government's financial support for Poland, between cold war interests and economic constraints, 1958-1981

In spite of considerable attention granted to sovereign debt failures, we still have limited knowledge of the incentives which induced creditors to lend at unsustainable levels. This article looks at the French government’s policy towards Poland from 1958, when economic cooperation between the two countries started, until Poland's announcement in 1981 that it could not service its debt. Export credit guarantees supported France's financial involvement, and this implied the government's strong influence on the decision to lend. This article brings out the tension between economic and political priorities in French policymaking during the cold war. Archival evidence reveals that as early as 1975 the French finance ministry warned that French risks were excessive; that Poland’s growing economic difficulties would render the country unable to repay its debts; and recommended limiting France's financial commitments. The French government, however, decided not only to carry on but also to increase lending, in order to support its political objective of using economic and financial means to relax East–West tensions. This article illustrates how creditors play a part in sovereign debt crises by voluntarily turning a blind eye to a country’s growing inability to repay its debts, and thus reinforce a vicious circle of indebtedness

The UK's EU Vote: The 1975 Precedent and Today's Negotiations. Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2015/08, June 2015

Highlights • The United Kingdom's European Union Referendum Bill, introduced in the House of Commons on 28 May 2015, legislates for the holding of a referendum before 31 December 2017 on the UK’s continued EU membership. UK prime minister David Cameron is opening negotiations with other EU member states to try to obtain an EU reform deal that better suits UK interests. Both the negotiations and the outcome of the referendum pose major challenges for the UK and the EU. • It will not be the first time that a UK government has staged a referendum following a renegotiation of its terms of EU membership. The first such referendum took place on 5 June 1975 after nearly a year of renegotiations, and the ‘yes’ won with 67.2 percent of the vote. Notwithstanding obvious differences, the conduct of today’s renegotiations should bear in mind this precedent, and in particular consider (a) how much the UK government can get out of the negotiations, in particular with respect to potential Treaty changes; (b) why political marketing is central to the referendum’s outcome; (c) how the UK administration’s internal divisions risk derailing the negotiations; and (d) why the negotiations risk antagonising even the UK’s best allies

Adjusting an institutional framework to a globalising world: the creation of new institutions in the EEC, 1957-1992

This article explores the development of all new EEC institutions between 1957 and 1992 within policy areas relevant to the possible development of a European single currency. It argues that if most institutions created pre-1992 were not crisis management institutions as would be the case post-2008, some important institutions were created in response to the perception of a structural international banking/political/economic crisis, particularly in the 1970s. This comparison in time underlines the continuity of reflections about the missing elements of a functioning single currency area, the obstacles to reform, and sheds light on the radical institutional changes that occurred post-2008