2,776 research outputs found
Developing Online Learning Materials for Higher Education: An Overview of Current Issues
The changing roles and challenges for higher education and the increased productivity required of faculty are driving forces for the development of more diverse and efficient teaching methods. Educational trends are toward more learner-centered materials. In response to these trends, colleges and universities are now offering courses at a distance and in forms other than traditional delivery.
Online courseware materials may be a viable means of fulfilling these numerous requirements but are very resource-intensive to develop. Multiple approaches to developing online learning have been tried, with limited success. The primary approach has been for faculty to enter their own course materials into the computer.
To maximize university resources, the most effective approach for developing online learning materials must be determined and institutionalized. While faculty are the most logical persons to provide course content and design, faculty should not be expected to complete the technical tasks associated with developing online learning materials
Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense
On occasion, criminal defendants hope to convince a jury that the state has not met its burden of proving them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by offering evidence that someone else (a third party) committed the crime. Currently, state and federal courts assess the admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt using a variety of standards. In general, however, there are two basic approaches. Many state courts require a defendant to proffer evidence of some sort of direct link or connection between a specific third-party and the crime. A second group of state courts, as well as federal courts, admit evidence of third-party guilt if it is relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, or its state equivalent, and not excluded by other rules of evidence, such as 403. While some scholars have lauded the 401/403 approach as the better test, in practice the two tests operate in much the same way and the evidentiary bottom line is that the defendant\u27s evidence is frequently deemed inadmissible. Courts have offered two justifications for the strict restrictions on third-party guilt evidence: (1) to prevent juror confusion; and, (2) to guard against fabricated statements by third parties. We explain why these fears are unfounded, and then turn to the focus of this article: the importance of narrative relevance. Existing evidentiary restrictions fail to consider the role third party guilt evidence plays in shaping the narrative, or story, that the defendant will present to the jury in his defense. Empirical studies have shown that - more than legal standards, definitions or instructions - narrative plays a key role in the juror decision-making process. Without a thorough understanding and consideration of the narrative relevance of third party guilt evidence, restrictions on its use cannot be and are not being appropriately applied because they fail to account for the way in which jurors actually think and process information at trial. After discussing the importance of narrative relevance, we propose a new test which is more consistent with a defendant\u27s constitutional rights to a fair trial and to present a complete defense. First, the threshold test for admissibility should be probable cause. If the evidence proffered by the defendant would permit the state to proceed with a criminal prosecution against the third party, then the defendant must be permitted to tell the story of third party guilt. A story for the goose is a story for the gander. Once, the threshold test is satisfied, we propose that, with one significant exception, a defendant should be permitted to admit third-party guilt evidence if that same evidence would be admissible against the third party were he the defendant. The exception is propensity evidence. There is no need to balance the probative value of the third-party guilt evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice because the third-party suffers no prejudice by the admission of the evidence at a trial in which he is not the accused. Thus, admission of propensity (or other character) evidence concerning a third party should not be precluded
Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense
On occasion, criminal defendants hope to convince a jury that the state has not met its burden of proving them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by offering evidence that someone else (a third party) committed the crime. Currently, state and federal courts assess the admissibility of evidence of third-party guilt using a variety of standards. In general, however, there are two basic approaches. Many state courts require a defendant to proffer evidence of some sort of direct link or connection between a specific third-party and the crime. A second group of state courts, as well as federal courts, admit evidence of third-party guilt if it is relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, or its state equivalent, and not excluded by other rules of evidence, such as 403. While some scholars have lauded the 401/403 approach as the better test, in practice the two tests operate in much the same way and the evidentiary bottom line is that the defendant\u27s evidence is frequently deemed inadmissible. Courts have offered two justifications for the strict restrictions on third-party guilt evidence: (1) to prevent juror confusion; and, (2) to guard against fabricated statements by third parties. We explain why these fears are unfounded, and then turn to the focus of this article: the importance of narrative relevance. Existing evidentiary restrictions fail to consider the role third party guilt evidence plays in shaping the narrative, or story, that the defendant will present to the jury in his defense. Empirical studies have shown that - more than legal standards, definitions or instructions - narrative plays a key role in the juror decision-making process. Without a thorough understanding and consideration of the narrative relevance of third party guilt evidence, restrictions on its use cannot be and are not being appropriately applied because they fail to account for the way in which jurors actually think and process information at trial. After discussing the importance of narrative relevance, we propose a new test which is more consistent with a defendant\u27s constitutional rights to a fair trial and to present a complete defense. First, the threshold test for admissibility should be probable cause. If the evidence proffered by the defendant would permit the state to proceed with a criminal prosecution against the third party, then the defendant must be permitted to tell the story of third party guilt. A story for the goose is a story for the gander. Once, the threshold test is satisfied, we propose that, with one significant exception, a defendant should be permitted to admit third-party guilt evidence if that same evidence would be admissible against the third party were he the defendant. The exception is propensity evidence. There is no need to balance the probative value of the third-party guilt evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice because the third-party suffers no prejudice by the admission of the evidence at a trial in which he is not the accused. Thus, admission of propensity (or other character) evidence concerning a third party should not be precluded
Responsive neurostimulation for people with drug-resistant epilepsy and autism spectrum disorder
PURPOSE: Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have comorbid epilepsy at much higher rates than the general population, and about 30% will be refractory to medication. Patients with drug-resistant epilepsy (DRE) should be referred for surgical evaluation, yet many with ASD and DRE are not resective surgical candidates. The aim of this study was to examine the response of this population to the responsive neurostimulator (RNS) System.
METHODS: This multicenter study evaluated patients with ASD and DRE who underwent RNS System placement. Patients were included if they had the RNS System placed for 1 year or more. Seizure reduction and behavioral outcomes were reported. Descriptive statistics were used for analysis.
RESULTS: Nineteen patients with ASD and DRE had the RNS System placed at 5 centers. Patients were between the ages of 11 and 29 (median 20) years. Fourteen patients were male, whereas five were female. The device was implanted from 1 to 5 years. Sixty-three percent of all patients experienced a \u3e50% seizure reduction, with 21% of those patients being classified as super responders (seizure reduction \u3e90%). For the super responders, two of the four patients had the device implanted for \u3e2 years. The response rate was 70% for those in whom the device was implanted for \u3e2 years. Improvements in behaviors as measured by the Clinical Global Impression Scale-Improvement scale were noted in 79%. No complications from the surgery were reported.
CONCLUSIONS: Based on the authors\u27 experience in this small cohort of patients, the RNS System seems to be a promising surgical option in people with ASD-DRE
When Lightning Strikes Back: South Carolina\u27s Return to the Unconstitutional Standardless Capital Sentencing Regime of the Pre-Furman Era
A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual Disability and Capital Punishment Twelve Years after The Supreme Court\u27s Creation of a Categorical Bar
This article examines empirically the capital cases decided by the lower courts since the United States Supreme Court created the categorical ban against the execution of persons with intellectual disability twelve years ago in the Atkins decision
When Lightning Strikes Back: South Carolina\u27s Return to the Unconstitutional Standardless Capital Sentencing Regime of the Pre-Furman Era
A Tale of Two (and Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual Disability and Capital Punishment Twelve Years after The Supreme Court\u27s Creation of a Categorical Bar
This article examines empirically the capital cases decided by the lower courts since the United States Supreme Court created the categorical ban against the execution of persons with intellectual disability twelve years ago in the Atkins decision
Diverging volumetric trajectories following pediatric traumatic brain injury.
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is a significant public health concern, and can be especially disruptive in children, derailing on-going neuronal maturation in periods critical for cognitive development. There is considerable heterogeneity in post-injury outcomes, only partially explained by injury severity. Understanding the time course of recovery, and what factors may delay or promote recovery, will aid clinicians in decision-making and provide avenues for future mechanism-based therapeutics. We examined regional changes in brain volume in a pediatric/adolescent moderate-severe TBI (msTBI) cohort, assessed at two time points. Children were first assessed 2-5 months post-injury, and again 12 months later. We used tensor-based morphometry (TBM) to localize longitudinal volume expansion and reduction. We studied 21 msTBI patients (5 F, 8-18 years old) and 26 well-matched healthy control children, also assessed twice over the same interval. In a prior paper, we identified a subgroup of msTBI patients, based on interhemispheric transfer time (IHTT), with significant structural disruption of the white matter (WM) at 2-5 months post injury. We investigated how this subgroup (TBI-slow, N = 11) differed in longitudinal regional volume changes from msTBI patients (TBI-normal, N = 10) with normal WM structure and function. The TBI-slow group had longitudinal decreases in brain volume in several WM clusters, including the corpus callosum and hypothalamus, while the TBI-normal group showed increased volume in WM areas. Our results show prolonged atrophy of the WM over the first 18 months post-injury in the TBI-slow group. The TBI-normal group shows a different pattern that could indicate a return to a healthy trajectory
Empirical constraints on the nucleosynthesis of nitrogen
We derive empirical constraints on the nucleosynthetic yields of nitrogen by incorporating N enrichment into our previously developed and empirically tuned multizone galactic chemical evolution model. We adopt a metallicity-independent (‘primary’) N yield from massive stars and a metallicity-dependent (‘secondary’) N yield from AGB stars. In our model, galactic radial zones do not evolve along the observed [N/O]–[O/H] relation, but first increase in [O/H] at roughly constant [N/O], then move upward in [N/O] via secondary N production. By t ≈ 5 Gyr, the model approaches an equilibrium [N/O]–[O/H] relation, which traces the radial oxygen gradient. Reproducing the [N/O]–[O/H] trend observed in extragalactic systems constrains the ratio of IMF-averaged N yields to the IMF-averaged O yield of core-collapse supernovae. We find good agreement if we adopt || and ||. For the theoretical AGB yields we consider, simple stellar populations release half their N after only ∼250 Myr. Our model reproduces the [N/O]–[O/H] relation found for Milky Way stars in the APOGEE survey, and it reproduces (though imperfectly) the trends of stellar [N/O] with age and [O/Fe]. The metallicity-dependent yield plays the dominant role in shaping the gas-phase [N/O]–[O/H] relation, but the AGB time-delay is required to match the stellar age and [O/Fe] trends. If we add ∼40 per cent oscillations to the star formation rate, the model reproduces the scatter in the gas phase [N/O]–[O/H] relation observed in external galaxies by MaNGA. We discuss implications of our results for theoretical models of N production by massive stars and AGB stars
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