Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations

This Article argues that the distinction between donors and customers is critical, and that the contract failure model is therefore seriously flawed. It distinguishes two types of nonprofit corporations - those structured to satisfy donors\u27 needs ( donative nonprofits ) and those structured to satisfy customers\u27 needs ( mutual benefit nonprofits ). This dichotomy suggests a very different nonprofit corporation law than the one urged by Hansmann. Once the concept of contract failure is limited to donors, it can be refined to serve as part of the rationale for donative nonprofits. Refining the concept of contract failure reveals, however, that it confuses the analysis of mutual benefit nonprofits, which actually solve a different problem for customers and thus require a different corporate structure. The first Part of this Article places the discussion in context by outlining the purposes of a nonprofit corporation law. The second Part summarizes the Hansmann, or contract failure, theory. The third Part develops an alternative theory and contrasts it with the Hansmann thesis, considering first the donative nonprofits and then the mutual benefit nonprofits

The Pitfalls of Empirical Research: Studying Faculty Publication Studies

This article critiques empirical studies by attorneys in the hopes that they will be held to the minimal standards of research competence that are to be found in other academic fields which rely on empirical studies. Because law-trained scholars are notoriously weak at empirical research, this article identifies some of the methodological considerations that should inform empirical research. These fall into four broad categories: (1) problems of conceptualization, (2) problems of measurement, (3) problems of data presentation and analysis, and (4) problems of inference. This article examines all of these considerations in the context of an empirical survey done by Professors Swygert and Gozansky investigating the relationship between law faculty research and tenure

Probabilities and Proof: Can HLA and Blood Group Testing Prove Paternity?

Advancing medical technology has produced tests which offer the opportunity to resolve paternity disputes with more accuracy than unaided traditional evidentiary techniques are likely to obtain. Because the biology underlying the statistical evidence in paternity cases offers a wealth of previously unavailable information which is certain to revolutionize the adjudication of paternity suits, but it is important that the courts not become so mesmerized by these new sources of evidence that they neglect to subject them to traditional principles of evidence applicable to all testimony. Additionally, for some time scholars have disagreed on the proper application of a probability formula called Bayes\u27 Theorem to questions of proof. Because the evidence yielded by modern serologic tests is inherently quantitative and probabilistic, questions concerning the use of Bayesian calculations in the trial setting will thus have to be decided in these paternity disputes. This article undertakes a critical analysis of the use of probability calculations in paternity cases and of the broader issues implicit in this growing practice. Although the statistical information derived from Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) testing should be admissible in paternity cases, the article concludes that no expert, no matter what skill level, can correctly testify to any quantified probability that the defendant in a given case is in fact the father. It reviews the difficulties associated with traditional evidentiary techniques in paternity cases, the nature and appeal of HLA and other modern serologic techniques, and the statistical reasoning which necessarily underlies expert testimony. After reviewing the problems associated with statistical identification evidence, the article concludes by endorsing more suitable alternatives to the methodology currently used in paternity litigation