The effects on developing countries of the Kyoto Protocol and carbon dioxide emissions trading

The trading of rights to emit carbon dioxide has not officially been sanctioned by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but it is of interest to investigate the consequences, both for industrial (Annex B) and developing countries, of allowing such trades. The authors examine the trading of caps assigned to Annex B countries under the Kyoto Protocol and compare the outcome with a world in which Annex B countries meet with their Kyoto targets without trading. Under the trading scenario the former Soviet Union is the main seller of carbon dioxide permits and Japan, the European Union, and the United States are the main buyers. Permit trading is estimated to reduce the aggregate cost of meeting the Kyoto targets by about 50 percent, compared with no trading. Developing countries, though they do not trade, are nonetheless affected by trading. For example, the price of oil and the demand for other developing country exports are higher with trading than without. The authors also consider what might happen if developing countries were to voluntarily accept caps equal to Business as Usual Emissions and were allowed to sell emission reductions below these caps to Annex B countries. The gains from emissions trading could be big enough to give buyers and sellers incentive to support the system. Indeed, a global market for rights to emit carbon dioxide could reduce the cost of meeting the Kyoto targets by almost 90 percent, if the market were to operate competitively. The division of trading gains, however, may make a competitive outcome unlikely: Under perfect competition, the vast majority of trading gains go to buyers of permits rather than to sellers. Even markets in which the supply of permits is restricted can, however, substantially reduce the cost to Annex B countries of meeting their Kyoto targets, while yielding profits to developing countries that elect to sell permits.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Markets and Market Access,Montreal Protocol,Climate Change,Environmental Economics&Policies,Carbon Policy and Trading,Energy and Environment,Economic Theory&Research,Montreal Protocol

Short-term CO₂ abatement in the European power sector

This paper focuses on the possibilities for short term abatement in response to a CO2 price through fuel switching in the European power sector. The model E-Simulate is used to simulate the electricity generation in Europe as a means of both gaining insight into the process of fuel switching and estimating the abatement in the power sector during the first trading period of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Abatement is shown to depend not only on the price of allowances, but also and more importantly on the load level of the system and the ratio between natural gas and coal prices. Estimates of the amount of abatement through fuel switching are provided with a lower limit of 35 million metric tons in 2005 and 19 Mtons in 2006

Bringing Transportation into a Cap-and-Trade Regime

Abstract in HTML and technical report in PDF available on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change website (http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/).The U.S. may at some point adopt a national cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases, and if and when that happens the system of CAFE regulation of vehicle design very likely could still be in place. Imposed independently these two systems can lead to economic waste. One way to avoid the inefficiency is to integrate the two systems by allowing emissions trading between them. Two possible approaches to potential linkage are explored here, along with a discussion of ways to guard against violation under such a trading regime of vehicle standards that may be justified by non-climate objectives. At a minimum, implementation of a U.S. cap-and-trade system is several years in the future, so we also suggest intermediate measures that would gain some of the advantages of an integrated system and smooth the way to ultimate interconnection.This study received funding from the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, which is supported by a consortium of government, industry and foundation sponsors

Climate Change Taxes and Energy Efficiency in Japan

Abstract in HTML and technical report in PDF available on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change website (http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/).In 2003 Japan proposed a Climate Change Tax to reduce its CO2 emissions to the level required by the Kyoto Protocol. If implemented, the tax would be levied on fossil fuel use and the revenue distributed to several sectors of the economy to encourage the purchase of energy efficient equipment. Analysis using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model shows that this policy is unlikely to bring Japan into compliance with its Kyoto target unless the subsidy encourages improvement in energy intensity well beyond Japan’s recent historical experience. Similar demand-management programs in the U.S., where there has been extensive experience, have not been nearly as effective as they would need to be to achieve energy efficiency goals of the proposal. The Climate Change Tax proposal also calls for restricting Japan’s participation in the international emission trading. We consider the economic implications of limits on emissions trading and find that they are substantial. Full utilization of international emission trading by Japan reduces the carbon price, welfare loss, and impact on its energy-intensive exports substantially. The welfare loss with full emissions trading is one-sixth that when Japan meets its target though domestic actions only, but Japan can achieve substantial savings even under cases where, for example, the full amount of the Russian allowance is not available in international markets

Emissions trading to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the United States : the McCain-Lieberman Proposal

Abstract in HTML and technical report in PDF available on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change website (http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/).The Climate Stewardship Act of 2003 (S. 139) is the most detailed effort to date to design an economy-wide cap-and-trade system for US greenhouse gas emissions reductions. The Act caps sectors at their 2000 emissions in Phase I of the program, running from 2010 to 2015, and then to their 1990 emissions in Phase II starting 2016. There is a strong incentive for banking of allowances, raising the costs in Phase I to achieve savings in Phase II. Use of credits from outside the capped sectors could significantly reduce the cost of the program, even though limited to 15% and 10% of Phase I and II allowances respectively. These credits may come from CO2 sequestration in soils and forests, reductions in emissions from uncapped sectors, allowances acquired from foreign emissions trading systems, and from a special incentive program for automobile manufacturers. The 15% and 10% limits increase the incentive for banking and could prevent full use of cost-effective reductions from the uncapped sectors. Moreover, some of the potential credits might contribute little or no real climate benefit, particularly if care is not taken in defining those from forest and soil CO2 sequestration. Analysis using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis model shows that costs over the two Phases of the program could vary substantially, depending on normal uncertainty in economic and emissions growth, and the details of credit system implementation

Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game

This paper analyzes polluters\u27 incentives to move from a traditional command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental economics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual regulatory implementation in CAC regimes, and therefore fail to compare TPP regimes with any CAC regime that is actually observed. This paper models CAC environmental regulation as a bargaining game over pollution entitlements. Using a reduced form model of the regulatory contest, it shows that CAC regulatory bargaining likely generates a regulatory status quo under which firms with the highest compliance costs bargain for the smallest pollution reductions, or even no reduction at all. As for a tradable permits regime, it is shown that all firms are better off under such a regime than they would be under an idealized CAC regime that set and enforced a uniform pollution standard, but permit sellers (low compliance cost firms) may actually be better off under a TPP regime with relaxed aggregate pollution levels. Most importantly, because high cost firms (or facilities) are the most weakly regulated in the equilibrium under negotiated or bargained CAC regimes, they may be net losers in a proposed move to a TPP regime. When equilibrium costs under a TPP regime are compared with equilibrium costs under a status quo CAC regime, several otherwise paradoxical aspects of firm attitudes toward TPP type reforms can be explained. In particular, the otherwise paradoxical pattern of allowances awarded under Phase II of the 1990 Clean Air Act\u27s acid rain program, a pattern tending to favor (in Phase II) cleaner, newer generating units, is explained by the fact that under the status quo regime, a kind of bargained CAC, it was the newer cleaner units that were regulated, and which therefore had higher marginal control costs than did the largely unregulated older, plants. As a normative matter, the analysis here implies that the proper baseline for evaluating TPP regimes such as those contained in the Bush Administration\u27s recent Clear Skies initiative is not idealized, but nonexistent CAC regulatory outcomes, but rather the outcomes that have resulted from the bargaining game set up by CAC laws and regulations

Arnold and Tilla English Opera Troupe Playbill

Seeking to cultivate popular support for opera in the Victorian Era, American-style opera evolved with traveling troupes performing in English, particularly during the post-Civil War period. This playbill, ca. 1860s, is for the performance of the Arnold and Tilla\u27s English Opera Troupe at Norumbega Hall in Bangor. The company was formed by the principle artists of the Kellogg Opera Company and the Richings Opera Company for a three-week tour of Maine. They performed the Daniel Auber opera, Fra Diavolo and Michael William Balfe\u27s Bohemian Girl on two different nights. Fra Diavolo was one of the Kellogg Company\u27s standard operas while Bohemian Girl was performed regularly by the Richings Company. Performers of note included Blanche Ellerman, a London-born Prima Donna who obtained a contract with the Caroline Riching Opera Company and American-born James Albert Arnold who joined the Riching Company around 1866. The pair would marry in 1869. Clara Fisher was born in London and was considered a prodigy of the stage. At the age of 16 she emigrated to the United States, debuting to rave reviews. She became so financially successful, she was able to retire from the stage in 1844. Poor investments forced her to resume performing in 1850. At the time of her appearance in Bangor, Fisher would have been in her mid-50s.https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mainebicentennial/1105/thumbnail.jp