TENANCY RENT CONTROL AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT IN MAINTENANCE

Under tenancy rent control, rents are regulated within a tenancy but not between tenancies. This paper investigates the effects of tenancy rent control on housing quality and maintenance. Since the discounted revenue received over a fixed-duration tenancy depends only on the starting rent, intuitively the landlord has an incentive to spruce up the unit between tenancies in order to “show†it well, but little incentive to maintain the unit well during the tenancy. The paper formalizes this intuition, and presents numerical examples illustrating the efficiency loss from this effect.tenancy rent control, rent control, maintenance, housing quality, credible commitment

Two Essays in Economics

Thesis advisor: Arthur LewbelThe thesis includes two essays. The first essay, Inequality Moments in Estimation of Discrete Games with Incomplete Information and Multiple Equilibria, develops a method for estimation of static discrete games with incomplete information, which delivers consistent estimates of parameters even when games have multiple equilibria. Every Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a discrete game of incomplete information is associated with a set of choice probabilities. I use maximum and minimum equilibrium choice probabilities as upper and lower bounds on empirical choice probabilities to construct moment inequalities. In general, estimation with moment inequalities results in partial identification. I show that point identification is achievable if the payoffs are functions of a sufficient number of explanatory variables with a real line domain and outcome-specific coefficients associated with them. The second essay, Tenancy Rent Control and Credible Commitment in Maintenance, co-authored with Richard Arnott, investigates the effect of tenancy rent control on maintenance and welfare. Under tenancy rent control, rents are regulated within a tenancy but not between tenancies. The essay analyzes the effects of tenancy rent control on housing quality, maintenance, and rehabilitation. Since the discounted revenue received over a fixed-duration tenancy depends only on the starting rent, intuitively the landlord has an incentive to spruce up the unit between tenancies in order to show it well, but little incentive to maintain the unit well during the tenancy. The essay formalizes this intuition, and presents numerical examples illustrating the efficiency loss from this effect.Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009.Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.Discipline: Economics

Regional Reallocation of Russian Industry in Transition

In this paper we suggest to use a 'new economic geography' paradigm for explanation of regional reallocation of industrial employment in Russia in 1985-1999. We construct a new economic geography" type model adjusted to specific features of Russian economy. This model gives a counterfactual distribution of industry across regions and allows us to construct a theoretical factor NEGF which is supposed to predict real changes in allocation of industrial employment. Our analysis of empirical data shows that NEGF indeed has a predictive power and this result is valid for a sufficiently wide range of model specifications.Russia, new economic geography, industry allocation

TENANCY RENT CONTROL AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT IN MAINTENANCE

Under tenancy rent control, rents are regulated within a tenancy but not between tenancies. This paper investigates the e¤ects of tenancy rent control on housing quality, maintenance, and rehabilitation. Since the discounted revenue received over a …xed-duration tenancy depends only on the starting rent, intuitively the landlord has an incentive to spruce up the unit between tenancies in order to “show ” it well, but little incentive to maintain the unit well during the tenancy. The paper formalizes this intuition, and presents numerical examples illustrating the e ¢ ciency loss from this e¤ect

Railroad Restructuring in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe: One Solution for All Problems?

Railways restructuring takes place under very different circumstances and with very different goals in Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and Russia. There are some improvements in productivity associated with the reforms in the European Union (among others access to infrastructure and vertical separation). But they are not certain to be replicated following similar restructuring in transition economies, especially if one takes account of the much higher shadow price on government subsidies in the latter. The current and proposed reforms in the railways of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia are described in detail; the likely outcomes of reforms in the special economic, regulatory and legal environments of these countries are analysed; and an alternative proposal for restructuring in Russia is presented