Perceptions of the Social Role of the State in Egypt

The fourth of four volumes, this volume covers contemporary political and social issues in Egypt. The contributors include: Mona Abaza, Nadje Sadeg al-Ali, Iman Hamdy, Noha el-Mikawy, Reem Saad.https://fount.aucegypt.edu/faculty_book_chapters/2001/thumbnail.jp

Bullets over ballots: Islamist groups, the state and electoral violence in Egypt and Morocco

This article is concerned with state-sponsored electoral violence in liberalized autocracies. The first section of the paper identifies a number of variables that can help explain the decision calculus of authoritarian incumbents to deploy force against strong electoral challengers. The second section then examines these propositions with reference to Egypt and Morocco. Drawing on recent parliamentary elections in both countries the article questions why, despite facing the challenge of political Islam, the two regimes differed so markedly in their willingness to manipulate the polls by recourse to violence. Whilst the Egyptian authorities decided to abrogate all pretence of peaceful elections in favour of violent repression against the Muslim Brotherhood candidates and sympathizers, no such tactics were deployed by the ruling elite in Morocco. We suggest that three principal factors influenced the regimes' response to this electoral challenge: (1) the centrality of the elected institution to authoritarian survival; (2) the availability of alternative electioneering tools; and (3) the anticipated response of the international community. The article concludes by suggesting that in order to understand better when and how states deploy violence in elections, we need to focus on a more complex set of factors rather than simply on the electoral potency of key opposition challengers or the authoritarian nature of the state

Institutional Reform of Economic Legislation in Egypt

The relationship between institutional and economic reform has dominated the field of development research since the 1990s. However, there is unclarity on the significance of reform of institutions of legislation and representation (whether in the form of interest groups or other civil society organizations). Similarly, there is unclarity regarding the sequence of reform of such institutions. There are, for example, four unresolved contentions about institutional reform. (1) If economic reform partly means economic legislation, is it necessary to reform parliament even when economic legislation is mainly done by the executive? (2) If economic reform requires efficient allocation of resources, is it necessary to strengthen special interest groups and increase societal representation/participation, running the risk of increasing clientelistic lobbying? (3) If one is to answer both questions positively, how should the reformation of the institution of parliament and that of interest representation happen and (4) in which sequence? This study focuses on the institutional environment of economic law-making in Egypt in a decade of intensive economic reform. It highlights the phases that characterized the relationship between economic reform and economic legislation, uncovers the macro-political factors that influence the institution of legislation, and unravels the institutional weakness embedded in the informational base of legislation. The argument is that economic legislation involves an intricate process of judgement. This process of judgement may require redundant channels of information processing and opinion-making that go beyond a linear and simple expert-executive relationship. Hence, the institutional reform of parliament and of interest representation become necessary even in politico-economic systems where the executive is dominant. This study relies on analyses of parliamentary discussions of nine major economic laws between 1989 & 1997 as well as on opinion surveys and extensive interviews with parliamentarians and interest group representatives

Institutional reform of economic legislation in Egypt

'The relationship between institutional and economic reform has dominated the field of development research since the 1990s. However, there is unclarity an the significance of reform of institutions of legislation and representation (whether in the form of interest groups or other civil society organizations). Similarly, there is unclarity regarding the sequence of reform of such institutions. There are, for example, four unresolved contentions about institutional reform. 1. If economic reform partly means economic legislation, is it necessary to reform parliament even when economic legislation is mainly done by the executive? 2. If economic reform requires efficient allocation of resources, is it necessary to strengthen special interest groups and increase societal representation/ participation, running the risk of increasing clientelistic lobbying? 3. If one is to answer both questions positively, how should the reformation of the institution of parliament and that of interest representation happen and 4. in which sequence? This study focuses on the institutional environment of economic law-making in Egypt in a decade of intensive economic reform. It highlights the phases that characterized the relationship between economic reform and economic legislation, uncovers the macro-political factors that influence the institution of legislation, and unravels the institutional weakness embedded in the informational base of legislation. The argument is that economic legislation involves an intricate process of judgement. This process of judgement may require redundant channels of information processing and opinion-making that go beyond a linear and. simple expert-executive relationship. Hence, the institutional reform of parliament and of interest representation become necessary even in politico-economic systems where the executive is dominant. This study relies an analyses of parliamentary discussions of nine major economic laws between 1989 and 1997 as well as on opinion surveys and extensive interviews with parliamentarians and interest group representatives.' (author's abstract)'Seit den 90er Jahren ist das Verhaeltnis von institutionellen zu oekonomischen Reformen zentraler Untersuchungsgegenstand der Entwicklungsforschung. Doch noch immer ist die Bedeutung von institutionellen Reformen der Legislative und nicht-staatlichen Vertretungseinrichtungen - sei es in der Form von Interessensgruppen oder anderen Organisationen der Zivilgesellschaft - nicht eindeutig geklaert. Zugleich besteht Unklarheit hinsichtlich der zeitlichen Abfolge solcher institutionellen Reformen. Es existieren zum Beispiel vier Themen zur Debatte bezueglich der Reform von Institutionen. 1. Wenn oekonomische Reformen zumindest teilweise auch oekonomische Gesetzgebung bedeuten, ist es dann notwendig, das Parlament zu reformieren, selbst wenn die Gesetzgebung vornehmlich durch die Exekutive erfolgt? 2. Wenn oekonomische Reformen die effiziente Verteilung von Ressourcen erforderlich macht, ist es dann notwendig, bestimmte Interessensgruppen zu staerken und die gesellschaftliche Vertretung/ Beteiligung zu foerdern, auch wenn die Gefahr bestuende, dass wir dadurch klientelistische Lobbyisten foerdern? 3. Wenn beide Fragen bejaht werden, wie sollte die Reform der Institution des Parlaments und die der Interessensvertretung geschehen und 4. in welcher Reihenfolge? Diese Studie konzentriert sich auf die institutionellen Bedingungen der Wirtschaftsgesetzgebung in Aegypten in einem Jahrzehnt intensiver Wirtschaftsreform. Sie beleuchtet Phasen, die durch das Verhaeltnis zwischen wirtschaftlicher Reform und oekonomischer Gesetzgebung charakterisiert sind, erkundet die makro-politischen Faktoren, die die Institutionen der Legislativen beeinflussen und entlarvt die institutionelle Schwaeche, die der Informationsbasis der Gesetzgebung zu Eigen ist. Es wird argumentiert, dass die oekonomische Gesetzgebung einem komplizierten Urteilsprozess einhergeht. Dieser Urteilsprozess kann redundante Kanaele der Informationsverarbeitung und Meinungsfuehrung erfordern, was ueber ein lineares und einfaches Experten-Exekutive-Verhaeltnis hinaus geht. Damit wird die institutionelle Reform des Parlaments und der Interessensvertretung sogar in polit-oekonomischen Systemen notwendig, in denen die Exekutive dominiert. Diese Studie basiert auf Analysen der parlamentarischen Diskussionen ueber neun grundlegende Wirtschaftsgesetze zwischen 1989 und 1997, sowie auf Meinungsumfragen und umfangreichen Interviews mit Parlamentariern und Vertretern von Interessensgruppen.' (Textauszug)German title: Institutionelle Reform des aegyptischen WirtschaftsrechtsSIGLEAvailable from http://www.zef.de/zef englisch/f publ.html / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman