Testing convergence of European regions: A semiparametric approach

We provide a reappraisal of income convergence across european regions over the last two decades by using a semiparametric partially linear model to approximate the relationship between the average growth rate of gdp per capita and the initial gdp per capita. Estimation results point out both country heterogeneity and non-linearity in the convergence process. The findings suggest that low income regions, in particular those from new adhesion countries, diverge while medium income regions converge and that there is no evidence of convergence for high income regions

Should a Retailer Support a Quality Improvements Strategy?

In a one-manufacturer-one-retailer supply chain, players establish both operations and marketing strategies and coordinate the chain through the implementation of a support program. A retailer, who sets both the pricing and the advertising strategies, acts as chain leader and decides whether to support a manufacturer’s operational strategy, such as quality improvements. The players share the overall chain revenues based on an exogenous, fixed sharing agreement. We compared coordinated and non-coordinated solutions in which coordination is carried out via a support program for quality improvements. While according to the literature a retailer–leader always has an economic preference for operation-based coordination, our findings reveal that: (a) low operational efficiency and effectiveness discourage the retailer’s interest in coordination and (b) good sharing parameter values overcome concerns regarding operational inefficiency but not those of operational ineffectiveness

Should a retailer support a quality improvements strategy?

In a one-manufacturer-one-retailer supply chain, players establish both operations and marketing strategies and coordinate the chain through the implementation of a support program. A retailer, who sets both the pricing and the advertising strategies, acts as chain leader and decides whether to support a manufacturer’s operational strategy, such as quality improvements. The players share the overall chain revenues based on an exogenous, fixed sharing agreement. We compared coordinated and non-coordinated solutions in which coordination is carried out via a support program for quality improvements. While according to the literature a retailer–leader always has an economic preference for operation-based coordination, our findings reveal that: (a) low operational efficiency and effectiveness discourage the retailer’s interest in coordination and (b) good sharing parameter values overcome concerns regarding operational inefficiency but not those of operational ineffectiveness

Overcoming the drawbacks of a Revenue Sharing Contract in a marketing channel through a coop program

In a marketing channel governed by goodwill dynamics, players adjust their pricing and advertising strategies when shifting from a wholesale price contract (WPC) to a revenue sharing contract (RSC). We demonstrate that this shift is not payoff-Pareto-improving when the retailer, who is the player transferring the share of revenues, is myopic. Further, we identify the conditions under which the negative effects an RSC creates may be alleviated when the manufacturer offers a support program. Finally, contrarily to operational coordination instruments such as an RSC, a support program always leads to a payoff-Pareto-improving situation and thus should be preferred by firms to reach coordination. © 2012 The Author(s)