Supertypes of voters in a model of general elections

The paper examines a model of general elections with electorate composed of infinitely many voters classified into a finite number of types. We focus on the problem of aggregation of different types of voters into supertypes for two cases of voting: with and without the possibility of abstention

Wybory uogólnione modelowane z użyciem nieskończenie wielu wyborców

The paper examines a model of general elections with electorate composed of infinitely many voters classified into a finite number of types. We focus on the case of elections among two candidates, we give a full characterisation of equilibria in such models and we classify equilibria with respect to their stability.W artykule rozważa się ogólny model wyborów z elektoratem złożonym z nieskończenie wielu wyborców poklasyfikowanych w skończonej liczbie typów. Skupiono się na przypadku wyborów między dwoma kandydatami, podając pełną charakterystykę rozwiązań takich modeli i klasyfikację tych rozwiązań w odniesieniu do ich stabilności

Comparing two ways of measuring the power of party members in simple majority voting games

We examine two approaches to the problem of measuring the voting power of individuals in a voting body with an a priori coalition structure by means of the Shapley-Shubik index. In order to analyze this question we apply games with a priori unions and composite games. We compare these two approaches basing on voting games with 100 voters and different coalition structures and present our conclusions