The Economics of Life ++ - Reflections on the Term of Copyright

Copyright, and indeed all intellectual property, reflects a compromise between the need for reward on creations we see – by reserving them to the creator – and the need to let information freely flow so as to permit further creations to emerge with as few encumbrances as possible. Over the past quarter century or so, all parameters of copyright have been moved towards more protection, disturbing the underlying compromise. The term of protection extends well beyond what is practically useful for the vast majority of creators, much as it may serve the needs of a small number of large players who hold important older copyrights still producing revenue. This paradoxical situation results from a few founding principles considered untouchable in the countries members of the Berne Convention: it is automatically obtained, without formality and for a uniform and rather lengthy term. If we want to redress the balance underlying copyright, we may have to call these principles into question and lead creators individually to reveal the value they attach to their right by renewing it, allowing it to lapse into the public domain when they no longer value it. Whilst this would reintroduce formalities into the structure of copyright, technological advances may make these less of a burden than they were at the time of their abolition. Alternatively, one might consider an interpretation of equitable exceptions to copyright (such as fair use and fair dealing) so as to expand them gradually as the copyright in question ages. Such approaches would have the fortunate effect of avoiding that lobbying by the happy few needlessly locks up culture for most of us. Le droit d'auteur, et à vrai dire tous les droits intellectuels, reflète un compromis entre la nécessité de faire miroiter au créateur une rémunération pour les créations que l'on voit, et la nécessité de laisser l'information circuler librement de manière à permettre à de nouvelles créations d'émerger avec aussi peu d'obstacles que possible. Au cours du dernier quart de siècle ou à peu près, tous les paramètres du droit d'auteur ont été déplacés vers plus de protection, perturbant l'équilibre sous-jacent. La durée de protection s'étend bien au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire en pratique pour la très vaste majorité des créateurs, même si elle sert bien les besoins d'une infime minorité de grands joueurs détenant des droits d'auteur qui ont un certain âge mais continuent à produire des revenus. Cette situation résulte des principes tenus pour immuables dans les pays membres de l'Union de Berne : le droit est obtenu automatiquement, sans formalité et pour une période uniforme et de longue durée. Pour redresser l'équilibre sous-jacent au droit d'auteur, il faudra remettre en question ces principes et amener les créateurs individuellement à révéler la valeur qu'ils attachent à leur droit en le renouvelant, permettant que le droit glisse dans le domaine public s'ils n'y attachent plus de valeur suffisante. S'il est vrai qu'une telle approche réintroduirait des formalités dans le droit d'auteur, les avances techniques intervenues depuis leur abolition rendent l'accomplissement de ces formalités moins onéreux que dans le temps. Alternativement, on pourrait envisager une interprétation des exceptions équitables au droit d'auteur, comme le fair use ou l'utilisation équitable, de manière à les étendre à mesure que le droit d'auteur en question prend de l'âge. De telles approches auraient l'heureux effet d'éviter que le lobbying par les happy few entrainerait le verrouillage inutile de beaucoup de culture pour le commun des mortels.Intellectual property, copyright, term, fair dealing, Propriété intellectuelle, droit d'auteur, durée, utilisation équitable.

La traduction du nouveau Code civil néerlandais en anglais et en français

[À l'origine dans / Was originally part of : CRDP - Droit et nouveaux rapports sociaux]La traduction du nouveau Code civil néerlandais en anglais et en français représentait un grand défi en raison du caractère systématique et fondateur d’un code, du recours à une terminologie et à une organisation nouvelles et de la longueur des articles. Dans un premier temps, le Code a été traduit selon une terminologie juridique anglaise strictement civiliste, tant en anglais qu’en français, et a été publié sous un format trilingue. Toutefois, sous la pression des praticiens, lesquels recherchaient une traduction correspondant mieux aux attentes de lecteurs anglophones habitués à la terminologie de la common law, une formule a été élaborée pour produire une version anglaise compréhensible pour les deux familles juridiques, au besoin hors de tout contexte et sans recourir à des notes. Une telle formule mérite considération lorsqu’il s’agira de produire d’autres traductions de textes civilistes en anglais

On cultural property and its protection: a law-and-economics comment

[À l'origine dans / Was originally part of : CRDP - Droit, biotechnologie et rapport au milieu]Version originale de l'auteur / Author's OriginalThe term cultural property seems to have come into vogue after the Second World War as part of efforts to prevent the recurrence of the massive war-time destruction of objects of cultural significance to various groups and, in some cases, to all of humanity. The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict symbolises those efforts. Destruction is not the only doomsday scenario for cultural property. Removal of objects from their owners or region of origin is another concern. This, too, had occurred during the Second World War with the nazis’ looting treasures of all kinds from occupied territories, not to mention the massive confiscation of the property of their Jewish victims everywhere. But the concern was older, as Merryman for one shows in the story of the Elgin marbles, brought from Greece to England during the 19th century. This concern has found expression in a 1970 UNESCO treaty and in a 1995 Unidroit Convention seeking to halt international traffic in cultural property

Allocution faite à l'occasion de la remise du prix Vogel 2013 en droit économique

[À l'origine dans / Was originally part of : Fac. Droit - Coll. facultaire - Généralités]Le texte rappelle les valeurs profondes qui ont toujours caractérisé la culture française : raffinement, élégance, originalité et innovation, ouverture et liberté. Ces valeurs sont aussi celles du Québec et du Canada. On les retrouve dans les critères pour l'attribution du Prix Vogel en droit économique 2013. Ces valeurs méritent d'être rappelées et poursuivies au XXIe siècle.Cabinet Vogel & Vogel, Pari

The Economics Of Civil Law Contract And Of Good Faith

Version originale de l'auteur / Author's Original[À l'origine dans / Was originally part of : Fac. Droit - Coll. facultaire - Théories du droit]In his 1993 book on the Limits of Freedom of Contract, Michael Trebilcock acknowledged the difficulties of trying to set criteria for correcting informational asymmetries. Informational asymmetries are one opening for opportunism and it has been generally acknowledged that one of the fundamental objectives of legal systems is to curtail opportunism. A civil-code based legal system has the ambition of being closed, i.e. covering all difficulties in private relationships within its purview. To accomplish this, it has to rely on open-ended concepts that can be used in unforeseen circumstances; yet legal certainty requires that such concepts be used sparingly and that recurrent circumstances calling for their application be particularised into more specific concepts having their own more detailed legal regime. The paper seeks to make the case that good faith in civil law systems is the exact opposite of opportunism; that it is one of the residual open-ended concepts 'closing' the system; and that it is particularised in a number of civil code concepts. These developments allow us to illustrate the difficulties Michael foretold in his book.Summary.................................... 1 Introduction............................... 2 Preliminary thoughts: On civil law systems. 3 I. The general function of contract law . 4 II. Opportunism and good faith............ 10 A. Opportunism......................... 10 B. Good faith.......................... 13 Conclusion................................. 15 Bibliography............................... 1

What’s so Special About Cyberspace ? Reflections on Elkin-Koren And Salzberger

Un résumé en français est également disponible.[À l'origine dans / Was originally part of : CRDP - Droit et technologies d'information et de communication]In this article, author Ejan Mackaay presents the defining characteristics of Cyberspace and offers a legal and economic analysis of the relationships between the different actors of the Internet market, in margin of Nina Elkin-Koren and Eli Salzberger works. On the one hand, it is specified that the virtual market of cyberspace is challenging the traditional analysis of economic actors. He presents a new analytical framework that better explain the complex relationships between economic actors in the virtual market. This new approach, called neo-institutional analysis, is based on the notion that economic actors use the scarce resources to be integrated within the institutions that serve them best. On the other hand, it is specified that cyberspace shares a lot of significant characteristics of an economic market. However, being a virtual market, cyberspace does not offer the same limitations as a physical market. Certain limitations imposed by the nature of the physical market helped create certain norms that were generally taken for granted. The absence of such limits and their associated norms thus present a challenge to law and policy makers to better regulate the virtual market. To illustrate the significant divergences between the physical and virtual market, the author analyses the later in the light of the four different market failures defined by the neo-classical economic theory, namely monopolies, the availability of public goods, imperfect in formations and negatives externalities. A monopoly is a market failure that has the effect of greatly reducing competition can be amplified by the bandwagon effect and, if left unchecked, leads to lock-ins or to exclusion. The second market failure analyzed in the article is the availability of public goods. In the context of cyberspace, information can be regarded as the main public good. Yet, certain copyright and intellectual property rules can greatly limit access to this public good. Information deficiencies are another market failure, but cyberspace offers tools for users to gather the appropriate knowledge before engaging in a transaction. Finally, negative externalities, which can be seen as side effects of commercial interactions, are generally lower in cyberspace because of greater exit options. The author concludes by stating that electronic commerce and cyberspace are challenging the traditional economic and political theories. Furthermore, cyberspace offers a new perspective on the phenomenon of the formation of norms

The Civil Law Of Contract

Version originale de l'auteur / Author's Original[À l'origine dans / Was originally part of : Fac. Droit - Coll. facultaire - Droit des affaires, Droit bancaire et Droit fiscal

L’efficacité du contrat: une perspective d’analyse économique du droit

[À l'origine dans / Was originally part of : CRDP - Droit, biotechnologie et rapport au milieu]Version originale de l'auteur / Author's OriginalQue faut-il entendre par l’Efficacité du contrat ? Chez les économistes et dans les écrits de l’analyse économique du droit, le terme efficacité est souvent employé comme traduction de efficiency. Dans le discours économique, ce terme a un sens technique et s’entend, pour faire court, d’un état de l’économie où aucun réarrangement des ressources ne permettrait d’améliorer le bien-être collectif, tous les gains possibles d’échange ayant été réalisés. En français, on voit employés, pour désigner cette idée, les termes d’efficience et d’efficacité, l’un et l’autre souvent qualifiés par l’adjectif économique, pour bien les distinguer du sens ordinaire des termes

Brexit - populist reaction to the 2008 speculative bubble bursting?

As evidence accumulates about the harmful effects Brexit is likely to cause to the British economy, one may wonder what made a majority of Brits vote to leave the EU. Rather than treat it as a fit of ill temper or an unfortunate accident, this paper explores the idea that it should be seen as a populist reaction triggered by the burst of the speculative bubble in 2008-2009 and the subsequent economic mayhem. To make the case, the paper looks at (1) what populism is, (2) how it can arise as part of long-term economic waves and (3) what precisely happened in Britain before and after 2009

Sui Generis Rights on Folklore Viewed From a Property Rights Perspective

This paper looks at sui generis rights claimed for the protection of folklore. Since rights should not be created in any which way if one is to avoid privileges and rent-seeking, it is important to be clear about design constraints stemming from such rights being species of property rights, adapted to deal with the particular content of information structures that need special encouragement or protection. Examination of the logic of property rights in general and of intellectual property rights in particular reveals that intellectual property rights are sought because of their decentralised incentive and information effects, but that they need to be circumscribed because of the monopolistic effects they entail. The trouble with monopoly is that whilst it is in place, one does not realise the creativity that is prevented from emerging. All intellectual property rights reflect compromises of these contradictory tendencies and as a result, more and stronger intellectual property rights are not necessarily better from a general welfare point of view. The forms of sui generis rights proposed for folklore appear modelled on copyright, but with the removal of several key features that define the equilibrium inherent in copyright: no originality requirement; no known creation date or creators; indefinite duration. Folklore kept secret is altogether taken out of commerce. As a result, these rights strike a balance very much more to the monopoly side of the spectrum than do existing intellectual property rights and hence risk severely constraining creativity. This may seem like an acceptable constraint given the objective of preservation, but one must realise that it will affect the future carriers of the protected information. Faced with severe restrictions on ways they can improve their lives within the protected setting, they may well opt for the exit option and head for greener pastures. This would severely strain efforts to preserve whatever the sui generis rights aim to protect. Information lock-up may not be the most promising formula for preservationProperty rights, intellectual property, copyright, sui generis rights, folklore.,