Imperfect Justice: Looted Assets, Slave Labor, and the Unfinished Business of World War II

I want to tell you an improbable story about how fifty years after the end of World War II, long-forgotten victims of not only the greatest genocide in history, but of what we learned was also the greatest theft in history, finally achieved some belated, as I call it, imperfect justice. This includes: those who placed their most precious assets in the safest banking system in Europe--in Switzerland-to keep them out of Hitler\u27s clutches (for fifty years after the war, they were unable to recover them); those who were forced into brutal slavery and forced labor at the hands of German and Austrian employers and were never compensated (most of these, by the way, were non-Jews in Eastern Europe); those whose hard work, businesses, and apartments were confiscated and never restituted after the war; those whose insurance policies were never paid; and more broadly, those whose entire culture was stolen from them. It is a story of how some of the world\u27s most powerful corporations were finally held accountable five decades after the end of World War II. It is a story of political intrigue, of diplomacy at the highest levels, involving our president and the heads of government of a number of European countries. It is a story of threats of sanctions by state and local authorities, and a story that involves a colorful cast of characters reminiscent of a Shakespearean play

Economists and White House Decisions

While I served in the White House, [as Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy and Executive Director of the White House Domestic Policy Staff from 1977-81], Ph.D. economists occupied the positions of Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Treasury, Director of the Council on Wage and Price Stability, the President's anti-inflation adviser, Chairman and Council Members of the Council of Economic Advisers, and many other senior positions throughout the government. Yet we presided over an economy with double-digit inflation and interest rates and a recession. Presidents of the United States and their White House Staff members expect economists to be omniscient prophets of the future course of the economy, unerring economic policy advisers, and teachers of the mysterious science of economics to often distracted pupils. They expect their economists to provide an economic blueprint for high growth, low inflation, and a guaranteed re-election—but without offending any important constituencies. What is the appropriate role for economists in the White House? What can they realistically be expected to do?

Reindustrialization through Coordination or Chaos?

Jose Ortega y Gasset once said that to define is to exclude and deny. The authors of the preceding article (hereinafter referred to collectively as Miller) attempt to discredit American-style industrial policy by mischaracterizing it. Miller does this through a series of historical and contemporary examples which in reality are easily criticized attempts at centralized planning and which bear little relation to the industrial policy strategies proposed for the 1980\u27s. These inapt examples lead Miller to dismiss industrial policy on the ground that it would lead to politicized, collectivist action against the public good. They also compel him to favor reliance on the market, which Miller asserts is the best coordinator of business, labor, and consumer decisions-especially in a complex industrial economy. Perhaps the most serious defect in Miller\u27s discussion, however, is its failure to address three important realities that must be considered when evaluating the desirability of implementing an industrial policy: (1) government\u27s inevitable involvement in microeconomic policy-making, (2) the nature of international economic competition, and (3) the difficulties that attend the present transition of the American economy from a manufacturing to a service and information economy