On evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics in asymmetric two-population games

We analyze the main dynamical properties of the evolutionarily stable strategy ESS for asymmetric two-population games of finite size in its corresponding replicator dynamics. We introduce a defnition of ESS for two-population asymmetric games and a method of symmetrizing such an asymmetric game. Then, we show that every strategy profile of the asymmetric game corresponds to a strategy in the symmetric game, and that every Nash equilibrium (NE) of the asymmetric game corresponds to a (symmetric) NE of the symmetric version game. So, we study (standard) replicator dynamics for the asymmetric game and define corresponding (non-standard) dynamics of the symmetric game.Asymmetric game; Evolutionary games; ESS; Replicator dynamics.

The Evolutionary Processes for the Populations of Firms and Workers

This paper analyzes the cultural evolution of firms and workers. Following an imitation rule, each firm and worker decides whether to be innovative (or not) and skilled (or unskilled). We apply evolutionary game theory to find the system of replicator dynamics, and characterize the low-level and high-level equilibria as Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) “against the field.” Hence, we study how a persistent state of underdevelopment can arise in strategic environments in which players are imitative rather than rational maximizers. We show that when the current state of the economy is in the basin of attraction of the poverty trap, players should play against the field if they want to change their status quo. The threshold level to overcome the poverty trap can be lowered if there is an appropriate policy using income taxes, education costs and skill premia. Hence, we study the replicator dynamics with a subsidy and payoff taxation to overcome the poverty trap.Imitative behavior, conformism, poverty traps, skill premium, strategic complementarities

Corruption driven by imitative behavior

One can restructure institutions, but if individual-level motivations for corrupt behavior are not understood, these restructuring may not be effective. We introduce an evolutionary-game modeling to deal with the problem of corruption driven by imitative behavior. Highlights ► We develop an evolutionary dynamics to study corrupt behavior. ► There exists a threshold from which agents prefer to follow a non-corrupt behavior. ► A key variable is the reviewing rate of imitation for the choices of behavior

Análisis de cointegración y valores umbrales entre la inflación y el crecimiento económico en México: 1970-2007

The aim of this paper is to estimate long run relationships and threshold effects between inflation and economic growth in Mexico. We show the existence of such relationship in a cointegrated vector on Economic Growth (log of real GDP) and Inflation rate finding a corresponding elasticity significantly negative. Moreover, the causal relationship between these two series is studied using a more robust Granger causality test, without finding any directional causality between them. The estimated threshold model suggests 9 percent as the threshold level (i.e., structural break point) of inflation above which inflation significantly slows the Mexican economic growth.cointegration, economic growth, inflation, structural break

On Modelling Migrant Behavior Driven by Imitation

This paper studies the evolutionary dynamics of migration. We argue that, under bounded rationality, the strategic foundations of the migrant behavior are based in the imitation of peers. We show that any migratory flow can be modeled from a dynamical system, whose parameters reflect the social and economic policies implemented by the decision maker and the rules of the imitative process followed by the population. Education or technological innovation subsidies can lead to an increasing flow of skilled workers to the country in which this policy is more intensively developed. Impact of such subsidies on migration processes can be easily analyzed based on our model. We show that an economy may avoid skilled workers losses as a result of migration flows, only if the number of local firms investing in research and development exceeds a certain threshold value. Moreover, if this value is exceeded, such an economy is attending a positive process of imitation of skilled workers

Demanda por servicios turísticos: análisis de su evolución en un modelo autoorganizado

The dynamics of tourists and guests can be modeled in a varied of ways and, in most of this models tourist destinations behave as dynamic evolving complex systems. In this paper we represent an economic problem in which the affluence of tourists to a specific place depends on the "state" of the place (infrastructure, maintenance, ambiance’s conditions, etc) that in turn depends on the individuals decisions on these parameters, that are influenced by the behaviour of the other agents. We introduce a model of the interactions between natural resources, residents, tourists and authorities in the self-organized kind of evolution of a tourist destination. The model, starting up from simple components can produce very complex behaviours. Because of the complexity of the model a computational analysis is required. We show that the model can reproduce several meaningful situations. Depending on the levels of the system parameters we can detect the possibility of mass tourism (and a negative crowding effect on environment) or sustainable management of the destination. We show that when preferences of tourists and/or residents induce the depredation of the natural resources and disdain for the environmental quality of the region, the authorities cannot reverse the negative behaviour of the agents by investing on preservation; they have to punish non cooperative agents. The model also shows that, when all the participants are cooperative, the environmental quality improves and tourism demand increases, inducing, in turn an increase in welfare.La dinámica de turistas y residentes se puede modelar en diversas maneras y, en la mayoría de tales modelaciones los destinos turísticos se comportan como sistemas complejos de desarrollo dinámico. En este trabajo representamos un modelo donde la afluencia de turistas a un lugar especifico depende del "estado" del lugar (infraestructura, mantenimiento, condiciones ambientales etc.) que a su vez depende de las decisiones conductuales individuales, influenciados por al conducta de los demás agentes. Introducimos un modelo autoorganizado para representar la interacción entre recursos naturales, residentes, turistas y autoridades locales para analizar la evolución de un destino turístico. Debido a la complejidad del modelo utilizamos análisis computacional. Dependiendo de los niveles de los parámetros del sistema podemos detectar la posibilidad de un turismo de masas (y de un efecto de congestión que es negativo hacia el medioambiente) o la sustentabilidad de la destinación. Mostramos que cuando las preferencias de los turistas y/o de residentes inducen la depredación de los recursos naturales, las autoridades locales no pueden revertir el daño causado invirtiendo en preservación; por lo que se deben intentar cambiar el tipo depredador de los agentes. El modelo también muestra que, cuando todos los participantes son cooperativos o pro-ambientalistas la calidad ambiental mejora y la demanda turística aumenta en forma sostenible, induciendo, alternadamente un aumento en el bienestar social de la región

EVOLUTION OF THE PLACE ATTACHMENT: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH

Despite relatively cheap mobility and intensive globalization processes, the place attachment remains an important part the human existence (Lewicka, 2010:226, ). Our aim is to understand the evolution of the place attachment. For this purpose we apply evolutionary game theory with the replicator dynamics and we follow the literature on the identity economics. A novelty which Akerlof i Kranton (2000) introduce is that an individual may choose an activity opposite to her identity in order to maximize her own utility. In other words, the choice of identity and activities is separated. Pavlinović (2012) develops a basic evolutionary game-theory model of spatial identity where agents can only act in line with their own identity. On the contrary, Akerlof i Kranton (2000) introduce the assumption that an individual may choose an activity opposite to her. Thus, we modify the model in Pavlinović (2012) and consider the choice of identity and action separately. We explore if this modification significantly affects the results

Imitative Behavior and Evolutionary Dynamics for the Comparative Advantage of International Trade Theory

We claim that economic agents driven by imitative behavior may impact the industrial specialization of national economies. We use a simple two-country model, where workers and firms decide to be skilled (or unskilled) and innovative (or non-innovative). We show that comparative advantages and international trade, under the assumption of a rational strategic behavior of the economic agents, can lead countries towards either an equilibrium with high-social performance or a poverty trap

Imitative Behavior and Evolutionary Dynamics for the Comparative Advantage of International Trade Theory

We claim that economic agents driven by imitative behavior may impact the industrial specialization of national economies. We use a simple two-country model, where workers and firms decide to be skilled (or unskilled) and innovative (or non-innovative). We show that comparative advantages and international trade, under the assumption of a rational strategic behavior of the economic agents, can lead countries towards either an equilibrium with high-social performance or a poverty trap

The Evolutionary Processes for the Populations of Firms and Workers

This paper analyzes the cultural evolution of firms and workers. Following an imitation rule, each firm and worker decides whether to be innovative (or not) and skilled (or unskilled). We apply evolutionary game theory to find the system of replicator dynamics, and characterize the low-level and highlevel equilibria as Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) “against the field.” Hence, we study how a persistent state of underdevelopment can arise in strategic environments in which players are imitative rather than rational maximizers. We show that when the current state of the economy is in the basin of attraction of the poverty trap, players should play against the field if they want to change their status quo. The threshold level to overcome the poverty trap can be lowered if there is an appropriate policy using income taxes, education costs and skill premia. Hence, we study the replicator dynamics with a subsidy and payoff taxation to overcome the poverty trap. JEL Classification: C72, C79, D83, O12