Engines of Growth: Domestic and Foreign Sources of Innovation

We examine productivity growth since World War II in the five leading research economies: West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States. Available data on the capital-output ratio suggest that these countries grew as they did because of their ability to adopt more productive technologies, not because of capital deepening per se. We present a multicountry model of technological innovation and diffusion which has the implication that, for a wide range of parameter values, countries converge to a common growth rate, with relative productivities depending on the speed with which countries adopt technologies developed at home and abroad. Using parameter values that fit a cross section of data on productivity, research, and patenting, we simulate the growth of the five countries, given initial productivity levels in 1950 and research efforts in the subsequent four decades. Based on plausible assumptions about 'technology gaps' that existed among these countries in 1950 we can explain their growth experiences quite successfully. Specifically, the simulations capture the magnitude of the slowdown in German, French, and Japanese productivity growth and the relative constancy of U.K. and U.S. growth.

Innovation, Diffusion, and Trade

We explore the determinants of research specialization across countries and its consequences for relative wages. Using a dynamic Ricardian model we examine the effects of faster international technology diffusion and lower trade barriers on the incentive to innovate. In the absence of any diffusion at all, countries devote the same share of resources toward research regardless of trade barriers or research productivity. As long as trade barriers are not too high, faster diffusion shifts research activity toward the country that does it better. This shift in research activity raises the relative wage there. It can even mean that, with more diffusion, the country better at research ends up with a larger share of technologies in its exclusive domain.

Trade in Ideas: Patenting and Productivity in the OECD

We develop and estimate a model of technological innovation and its contribution to growth at home and abroad. International patents indicate where innovations come from and where they are used. Countries grow at a common steady-state rate. A country's relative productivity depends upon its capacity to absorb technology. We estimate that, except for the United States, OECD countries derive almost all of their productivity growth from abroad.

International Patenting and Technology Diffusion

We model the invention of new technologies and their diffusion across countries. Our model predicts that, eventually, all countries will grow at the same rate, with each country's productivity ranking determined by how rapidly it adopts inventions. The common growth rate depends on research efforts in all countries, while research effort is determined by how much inventions earn at home and abroad. Patents affect the return to invention. We relate the decision to patent an invention internationally to the cost of patenting in a country and to the expected value of patent protection in that country. We can thus infer the direction and magnitude of the international diffusion of technology from data on international patenting, productivity, and research. We fit the model to data from the five leading research economies. The parameters indicate how much technology flows between these countries and how much each country earns from its inventions domestically and elsewhere. Our results imply that foreign countries are important sources of technology even though countries earn most of their return to innovation at home. For example, about half of U.S. productivity growth derives from foreign technology yet U.S. investors earn 98 per cent of the revenue from their inventions domestically.

Trade in Capital Goods

Innovative activity is highly concentrated in a handful of advanced countries. These same countries are also the major exporters of capital goods to the rest of the world. We develop a model of trade in capital goods to assess its role spreading the benefits of technological advances. Applying the model to data on production and bilateral trade in capital equipment, we estimate the barriers to trade in equipment. These estimates imply substantial differences in equipment prices across countries. We attribute about 25 percent of cross-country productivity differences to variation in the relative price of equipment, about half of which we ascribe to barriers to trade in equipment.

Innovation, Trade, and Growth

We consider the interaction of trade and technology diffusion in a two-region model of innovation and imitation. We find that globalization, either in the form of lower trade barriers or in faster diffusion of technology between innovator and imitator spurs innovation, benefiting both regions.

Dissecting trade: firms, industries, and export destinations

We examine entry across 113 national markets in 16 different industries using a comprehensive data set of French manufacturing firms. The data are unique in indicating how much each firm exports to each destination. Looking across all manufacturers: (1) Firms differ substantially in export participation, with most selling only at home; (2) The number of firms selling to multiple markets falls off with the number of destinations with an elasticity of ?2.5; (3) Decomposing French exports to each destination into the size of the market and French share, variation in market share translates nearly completely into firm entry while about 60 percent of the variation in market size is reflected in firm entry. Looking within each of 16 industries we find little variation in these patterns. We propose that any successful model of trade and market structure must confront these facts.Exports ; International trade

Unbalanced Trade

We incorporate trade imbalances into a quantitative model of bilateral trade in manufactures, dividing the world into forty countries. Fitting the model to 2004 data on GDP and bilateral trade we calculate how relative wages, real wages, and welfare would differ in a counterfactual world with all current accounts balancing. Our results indicate that closing the current accounts requires modest changes in relative wages. The country with the largest deficit (the United States) needs its wage to fall by around 10 percent relative to the country with the largest surplus (Japan). But the prevalence of nontraded goods means that the real wage in Japan barely rises while the U.S. real wage falls by less than 1 percent. The geographic barriers implied by the current pattern of trade are sufficiently asymmetric that large bilateral deficits remain even after current accounts balance. The U.S. manufacturing trade deficit with China falls to $65 billion from its 2004 level of$167 billion.

Dissecting Trade: Firms, Industries, and Export Destinations

We examine entry across 113 national markets in 16 different industries using a comprehensive data set of French manufacturing firms. The data are unique in indicating how much each firm exports to each destination. Looking across all manufacturers: (1) Firms differ substantially in export participation, with most selling only at home; (2) The number of firms selling to multiple markets falls off with the number of destinations with an elasticity of -2.5; (3) Decomposing French exports to each destination into the size of the market and French share, variation in market share translates nearly completely into firm entry while about 60 percent of the variation in market size is reflected in firm entry. Looking within each of 16 industries we find little variation in these patterns. We propose that any successful model of trade and market structure must confront these facts.