Flute Studio Recital I

Flute Studio Recital I Tuesday, February 25, 2020 at 12noon Recital Hall James W. Black Music Center 1015 Grove Avenue Richmond, Va

Formaldehyde monitor for automobile exhausts

Device makes use of microwave spectral absorption in low-Q resonant Stark cell, and indications are that ultimate sensitivity of instrument is within 100 parts per billion of formaldehyde. Microwave source is very small and requires only six-volt dc bias for operation. Coarse tuning is accomplished mechanically and fine tuning by adjusting dc-bias voltage

Flute Studio Recital I

Flute Studio Recital IDaniel Stipe, pianoTuesday, October 1, 2019 at noonRecital HallJames W. Black Music Center 1015 Grove AvenueRichmond, Va

Bidding Strategies in Internet Yankee Auctions: Theory and Evidence

In the past few years, we have witnessed a tremendous proliferation of transactions using the Internet as a virtual marketplace. U.S. News and World Report estimates the value of electronic commerce around $13 billion in 1998. In addition to transactions where prices are posted, sellers also use Internet auctions to sell goods such as clothing, collectibles, computers, and electronics. Current estimates place the value of auction transactions in the Internet at$30 million per week. A popular format for Internet auctions is the Yankee format. Here, a seller offers k identical units for sale, and bidders specify how many units they want and the per-unit price they want to pay. Bidding takes place progressively over a predetermined time period and the k highest bids at closing win the units at their specified prices. Ties are broken on the basis of quantities first and time of bidding second. Two features make these auctions different from standard auctions. First, unlike "live" auctions with fixed participation costs, entering each bid may be costly in a Yankee auction since bidding takes place over several hours (or days) and, in addition to connectivity cost, several minutes time must spend several registering the new price. Second, each time the bidder visits the auction site, she is uncertain about the competition since it is possible for more bidders to decide to enter before the closing. Here, we derive and characterize equilibrium strategies in simple Yankee auctions with stochastic demand. We show that costly bidding may induce bidders to bid high or jump bid in earlier rounds. These jump bids play a signaling role; they attempt to discourage later bidders from competing with established bidders. This way, under some conditions, both sender and receiver of the signal may be better off in equilibrium. The sender because deterring competition saves her the costs of additional bids, and the receiver because she avoids the costs of fruitless early competition. Here, we derive conditions on bidding costs and bidder types that result in a signaling equilibrium of this nature. We show that the characteristics of the equilibrium are closely related to the structure of demand uncertainty faced by the bidders since signal bidding has more strategic value when bidders anticipate further competition later in the auction. We use data from hundreds of Yankee Auctions to test some predictions of the jump-bidding model. In confirmation, we find (a) over 40% of the bidders in our sample enter jump bids, (b) any individual bidder is more likely to enter a jump bid as his first bid, (c) earlier bidders are more likely to enter jump bids than later bidders, (d) the relative size of a jump bid is increasing in the number of bidders relative to units being sold, and (e) the relative size of a jump bid is decreasing in the object's average value. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of costly bidding and jump-bidding strategies on Internet auction design.

Bidding Strategies in Internet Yankee Auctions

A bidding strategy commonly observed in Internet auctions, though not frequently in live auctions, is that of "jump-bidding," or entering a bid larger than necessary to be a current high bidder. In this paper, we argue that the cost associated with entering on-line bids and the uncertainty concerning bidding competition -- both of which distinguish Internet from live auctions -- can explain this phenomenon. We present a simple theoretical model that accounts for the preceding characteristics, and derive the conditions under which jump-bidding constitutes an equilibrium strategy in a format commonly used for on- line trading, the Yankee Auctionâ. We then present evidence recorded from hundreds of Internet auctions that is consistent with the basic predictions from our model. We find that jump-bidding is more likely earlier in an Internet auction, when jumping has a larger strategic value, and that the incentives to jump bid increase as bidder competition becomes stronger. Several of our results have implications for starting bid and minimum bid increment rules set by Internet auction houses. We also discuss possible means of reducing bidding costs, and evidence that Internet auctioneers are pursuing this goal.internet auctions, bidding costs, jump bidding

A PC-based bus monitor program for use with the transport systems research vehicle RS-232 communication interfaces

Experiment critical use of RS-232 data busses in the Transport Systems Research Vehicle (TSRV) operated by the Advanced Transport Operating Systems Program Office at the NASA Langley Research Center has recently increased. Each application utilizes a number of nonidentical computer and peripheral configurations and requires task specific software development. To aid these development tasks, an IBM PC-based RS-232 bus monitoring system was produced. It can simultaneously monitor two communication ports of a PC or clone, including the nonstandard bus expansion of the TSRV Grid laptop computers. Display occurs in a separate window for each port's input with binary display being selectable. A number of other features including binary log files, screen capture to files, and a full range of communication parameters are provided

Report and Recommendations on Two Chilean Labor Force Surveys

For many years, Chile has benefited from two surveys of labor force developments for the “Greater Santiago Area.” One of these surveys dates back to the 1950s and is conducted by the University of Chile. The other is a national survey, conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (NIS), from which data are also available for the Santiago Metropolitan Area. Results, especially the rate of unemployment, do not always coincide, and this has been particularly the case for all years since 1998. This report studies this problem of non concurrence, identifies a number of areas for possible explanation, and makes recommendations for improvement of survey operations. Both surveys were found to follow quite well recommendations of the International Labor Organization regarding the measurement of employment and unemployment. Two significant areas in the report concern the questionnaires used for the surveys and data estimation techniques. Fourteen recommendations for improvements in the surveys are offered, with major attention focused on plans by the NIS to introduce an entirely new questionnaire in the near future. With respect to the University’s survey, the authors recommend changes in the basic questionnaire and survey weighting procedures. They also recommend improving data analysis (NIS), maintaining error profiles for data collection (both surveys), and using seasonal adjustment for statistical analysis (both).

If You're So Smart, Why Aren't You Rich? Belief Selection in Complete and Incomplete Markets

This paper provides an analysis of the asymptotic properties of consumption allocations in a stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous consumers. In particular we investigate the market selection hypothesis, that markets favor traders with more accurate beliefs. We show that in any Pareto optimal allocation whether each consumer vanishes or survives is determined entirely by discount factors and beliefs. Since equilibrium allocations in economies with complete markets are Pareto optimal, our results characterize the limit behavior of these economies. We show that, all else equal, the market selects for consumers who use Bayesian learning with the truth in the support of their prior and selects among Bayesians according to the size of the their parameter space. Finally, we show that in economies with incomplete markets these conclusions may not hold. Payoff functions can matter for long run survival, and the market selection hypothesis fails.Market selection hypothesis, subjective beliefs, general equilibrium, incomplete markets, complete markets

Performance and operational economics estimates for a coal gasification combined-cycle cogeneration powerplant

A performance and operational economics analysis is presented for an integrated-gasifier, combined-cycle (IGCC) system to meet the steam and baseload electrical requirements. The effect of time variations in steam and electrial requirements is included. The amount and timing of electricity purchases from sales to the electric utility are determined. The resulting expenses for purchased electricity and revenues from electricity sales are estimated by using an assumed utility rate structure model. Cogeneration results for a range of potential IGCC cogeneration system sizes are compared with the fuel consumption and costs of natural gas and electricity to meet requirements without cogeneration. The results indicate that an IGCC cogeneration system could save about 10 percent of the total fuel energy presently required to supply steam and electrical requirements without cogeneration. Also for the assumed future fuel and electricity prices, an annual operating cost savings of 21 percent to 26 percent could be achieved with such a cogeneration system. An analysis of the effects of electricity price, fuel price, and system availability indicates that the IGCC cogeneration system has a good potential for economical operation over a wide range in these assumptions